不平衡的渠道权力结构下强制性权力的使用：Z模型的检验

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1331

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 132-140.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1331

• 论文 • 上一篇

不平衡的渠道权力结构下强制性权力的使用：Z模型的检验

魏瑞锋¹, ², 庄贵军¹, 庞芳兰³

1.西安交通大学管理学院，陕西西安710049； 2.浙江工业职业技术学院商贸学院，浙江绍兴312000；3.兰州理工大学经济管理学院，甘肃兰州730050

收稿日期:2020-07-14 修回日期:2021-02-22 发布日期:2023-05-23
通讯作者: 庄贵军(1960-)，男(汉族)，山东胶南人，西安交通大学管理学院，教授，博士生导师，研究方向：网络环境下的营销渠道管理，Email: zhgj@mail.xjtu.edu.cn. E-mail:zhgj@mail.xjtu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71132005)；国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072141)

Exercises of Coercive Power under Imbalanced Power Structure in Marketing Channels: Testing Z Model

WEI Rui-feng¹, ², ZHUANG Gui-jun¹, PANG Fang-lan³

1. School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China;2. School of Business, Zhejiang industry polytechnic college, Shaoxing 312000, China;3. School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou 730050, China

Received:2020-07-14 Revised:2021-02-22 Published:2023-05-23
Contact: 庄贵军 E-mail:zhgj@mail.xjtu.edu.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 企业间权力及其使用是渠道管理的一个重要工具，受到研究者的高度关注。双边阻吓理论和冲突盘旋理论则是用来解释二者关系的两种主要理论。本文以Z模型为理论基础，通过问卷调查从制造商一方收集数据，检验了两个认知变量“报复惧怕”和“攻击预期”的中介作用。检验结果支持Z模型及其逻辑：在制造商和分销商的合作关系中，在权力不平衡的情况下，当制造商的权力小于分销商的权力时，制造商的权力使用决定于分销商的权力且与它自己的权力关系不显著，制造商的报复惧怕在其中起中介作用；当制造商的权力大于分销商的权力时，制造商的权力使用决定于其自身的权力且与分销商的权力关系不显著，制造商的攻击预期在其中起中介作用。

关键词: Z模型；双边阻吓模型；报复惧怕；攻击预期；渠道权力；权力使用

Abstract: Interfirm power and its exercises have been considered as one of important tools for marketing channel management and intensively studied by researchers. Bilateral deterrence theory and conflict spiral theory are the two theories frequently applied for explaining the relationship between Interfirm power and its exercises. Nevertheless, different cognitive variables playing a mediating role in the two theories will lead to different and even contradictory predictions. In 2014, Zhuang et al. discussed the appropriateness of the two theories in the study of channel power and concluded that bilateral deterrence theory was more appropriate and proposed a revised model of Lawler’s bilateral deterrence model, namely Z model. Since the two mediators of cognitive variables in Z model, namely “fear of retaliation” and “expectation of attack”, have not been empirically tested, the appropriateness of Z model could not be truly confirmed. To fill this gap, this paper tests the mediating role of the two cognitive variables between channel power and its use.

Key words: Z model; bilateral deterrence model; fear of retaliation; expectation of attack; channel power; exercises of power

中图分类号:

F713.5

魏瑞锋, 庄贵军, 庞芳兰. 不平衡的渠道权力结构下强制性权力的使用：Z模型的检验[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(5): 132-140.

WEI Rui-feng, ZHUANG Gui-jun, PANG Fang-lan. Exercises of Coercive Power under Imbalanced Power Structure in Marketing Channels: Testing Z Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(5): 132-140.

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不平衡的渠道权力结构下强制性权力的使用：Z模型的检验

Exercises of Coercive Power under Imbalanced Power Structure in Marketing Channels: Testing Z Model

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