双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (2): 101-111.

双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

黄守军¹, 任玉珑^1,2, 孙睿^1,2, 俞集辉³

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
2. 重庆大学能源技术经济研究院, 重庆 400044;
3. 重庆大学输配电装备及系统安全与新技术国家重点实验室, 重庆 400044

收稿日期:2011-11-08 修回日期:2012-10-28 出版日期:2014-02-20 发布日期:2014-02-18
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金资助项目（70903080）；国家电网公司管理咨询项目（SGTGBRKT[2011]001）；中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目（CDJXS12020002）

Stochastic Differential Game Models of Vertical Cooperative Mitigation in Duopoly Electricity Market

HUANG Shou-jun¹, REN Yu-long^1,2, SUN Rui^1,2, YU Ji-hui³

1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
2. Academy of Energy Technologic Economics, Chongqing University, Humanities and Science Research Base of Ministry of Education, Chongqing 400044, China;
3. State Key Laboratory of Power Transmission Equipment & System Security and New Technology, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China

Received:2011-11-08 Revised:2012-10-28 Online:2014-02-20 Published:2014-02-18

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑单电网公司与双发电商所组成的渠道结构，构建了发电商投资减排、电网公司投资消纳的优势互补的异质型垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型，先后考察并比较了分散决策和集成决策下的反馈均衡结果。在此基础上，讨论了利润共享契约下系统增量利润的分配问题。研究表明：对于分散决策，电网公司选择性承担发电商的减排费用；两种决策下的发电商减排和电网公司购电价格以及分散决策下的减排补贴与发电商之间的减排竞争强度相关；在一定条件和范围内，合作博弈有利于提高电网公司购电电价，同时为此所带来的风险增大。

关键词: 电力市场, 低碳能源消纳机制, 合作减排, 减排竞争, 随机微分对策, 反馈均衡

Abstract: Considering the channel structure of a grid corporation and two power suppliers,stochastic differential game models of vertical cooperative mitigation are developed.The cooperation is heterogeneous and advantage-advantage,in which the power suppliers invest mitigation and the grid corporation invests utilization,and the feedback equilibria in the decentralized and integrated decision are investigated successively.Based on the comparison between the Stackelberg game and cooperative game,the share of the system's incremental profit under a profit-sharing contract is discussed.The results indicate that the grid corporation would selectively undertake a potion of power suppliers' mitigation expenses in decentralized decision.The equilibrium mitigation of power suppliers,purchase price and mitigation allowance of grid corporation are correlated to the mitigation competition coefficient.The cooperative game helps to raise purchase price in a certain condition and range,and brings about greater risk for the attempt.

Key words: electricity market, low-carbon energy utilization mechanism, cooperative mitigation, mitigation competition, stochastic differential game, feedback equilibrium

中图分类号:

TM73
F123.9

黄守军, 任玉珑, 孙睿, 俞集辉. 双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(2): 101-111.

HUANG Shou-jun, REN Yu-long, SUN Rui, YU Ji-hui. Stochastic Differential Game Models of Vertical Cooperative Mitigation in Duopoly Electricity Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(2): 101-111.

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