考虑社会效率下军民两用国防专利转让动态许可定价策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2366

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

两用国防专利转民用所提高的社会效率水平是研究我国国防专利转移许可的重要因素。考虑到消费者感知到的社会效率改善是一个动态过程，本文研究由一个军工企业将一项两用国防专利转让给一个民用制造商的动态许可定价策略，分别构建了军工企业无许可、固定费用许可和提成许可三种动态博弈模型，得出每一种模型下的均衡解、稳态解和最优决策解，并分析了贴现率和军民品牌差异等对许可双方决策以及最优许可定价策略的影响。根据仿真结果可知：从短期看，军工企业在无许可模式下的利润更高；然而，从长期看，军工企业在许可模式下可以获得更高的利润。相对于无许可和固定费用许可，提成许可推动军工企业提高社会效率的作用更明显，进而扩大市场需求量。稳态决策下，当贴现率较小时，无许可模式更有益于军工企业；当贴现率高于一定阈值时，许可模式下军工企业利润更高。军民双方对许可模式的选择受军、民产品品牌力差异的影响较为明显，对于军工企业来讲，当民用制造商品牌力较小时，提成许可模式最优；当民用制造商品牌力接近军工企业时，市场竞争较为激烈，固定费用许可模式最优。

关键词: 社会效率, 两用国防专利, 许可定价策略, 价格竞争, 动态博弈

Abstract:

Considering the impact of the improvement of the social efficiency brought by transferring the dual-use defense patents to the civilian market， the dynamic licensing pricing strategy of the dual-use defense patent is studied. The dynamic no licensing model， dynamic fixed-fees licensing model and dynamic royalty licensing model considering the social efficiency are constructed. Based on this， the optimal dual-use defense patent licensing strategy of military manufacturer is studied， and the impact of discount rate and military and civilian product brand difference is analyzed. The results show that： 1） For the military manufacturer， in the short term， it is easier to obtain higher profits without licensing， but in the long run， the choice of the licensing strategy is more beneficial to the military manufacturer； 2） Compared with the dynamic fixed fee licensing model， the dynamic royalty licensing can encourage the military manufacturer to improve the social efficiency， moreover， the improved social efficiency under the dynamic royalty licensing improves the consumer utility and helps to expand the market sales， which helps the military manufacturer to get more licensing revenue and sales revenue. 3） Under the steady-state equilibrium， the no licensing strategy is more beneficial to the military manufacturer when the discount rate is lower， however， the licensing strategy will be more beneficial to the military manufacturer when the discount rate is higher. 4） When the brand power of the civilian manufacturer is weak， the royalty licensing model is optimal； others， the fixed fee licensing model is optimal.

Key words: social efficiency, dual-use defense technology, licensing pricing strategy, price competition, dynamic games

中图分类号:

F273.1

闫飞, 陈洪转. 考虑社会效率下军民两用国防专利转让动态许可定价策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(9): 148-160.

Fei Yan, Hongzhuan Chen. Research on Dynamic Licensing Pricing Strategy of Dual-use Defense Patent Considering the Social Efficiency[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(9): 148-160.

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