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中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (12): 53-67.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0098

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府补贴能激励企业创新吗?——基于演化博弈的新创与在位企业创新行为分析

朱金生, 朱华   

  1. 武汉理工大学经济学院,湖北 武汉430070
  • 收稿日期:2019-01-17 修回日期:2020-12-29 出版日期:2021-12-20 发布日期:2021-12-28
  • 通讯作者: 朱华(1987-),女(汉族),湖北潜江人,武汉理工大学经济学院,博士研究生,研究方向:技术经济,Email:zhuh@whut.edu.cn. E-mail:zhuh@whut.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BJY057);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72004173)

Can Government Subsidies Spur Enterprise Innovation?——Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Innovation Behavior of New and Incumbent Firms

ZHU Jin-sheng, ZHU Hua   

  1. School of Economics, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
  • Received:2019-01-17 Revised:2020-12-29 Online:2021-12-20 Published:2021-12-28
  • Contact: 朱华 E-mail:zhuh@whut.edu.cn

摘要: 为考察政府补贴激励企业创新的有效性,文章将补贴对象、补贴强度和补贴环境纳入同一框架,分析补贴效果与企业属性、补贴强度和竞争程度的关系。首先以企业创新偏好的异质性为前提构建政府补贴下新创企业与在位企业的演化博弈模型,分析产品市场竞争和补贴强度的变化影响企业创新行为选择的机理;然后利用门槛模型和我国143家上市企业数据,实证检验补贴强度和产品市场竞争对不同企业创新选择行为的作用。研究结果表明:政府补贴更易对新创企业产生激励作用;只有在补贴强度超过阈值的情况下,政府补贴才能促使不同企业均选择创新;产品市场竞争弱化了政府补贴对企业创新的促进作用。因此,政府除继续加大对企业创新支持力度以外,还应对不同企业实施差异化补贴政策,并针对不同的市场竞争环境制定合理的补贴资源分配战略。

关键词: 政府补贴;企业创新;演化博弈;Hotelling模型

Abstract: In order to investigate the effectiveness of motivation from government subsidies to enterprise innovation, subsidy objects, subsidy intensity and subsidy environment are innovatively integrated into the same analytical framework, and the effect of the government's enterprise innovation subsidies on start-ups and incumbents are be compared. Firstly, on the premise of heterogeneity of innovation preference of enterprises, the evolutionary game model between newly-established firms and incumbent firms under government subsidy is constructed. Then, the threshold model and data of 143 listed enterprises in China are employed to empirically test the influence of subsidy intensity and competition on innovation choice behaviors of different firms. The results show that new enterprises are more accessible to be stimulated by innovation subsidy. Only when the subsidy intensity exceeds the threshold, government subsidy can encourage both types of enterprises to innovate. Fierce competition in product homogeneity weakens the promotion effect of government subsidies on enterprise innovation. Therefore, government should not only continue to increase the support for enterprise innovation, but also implement differentiated subsidy policies for different enterprises, and make reasonable allocation strategy of subsidy resources according to different market competition environment.

Key words: government subsidy; enterprise innovation; evolution game; hotelling model

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