利益冲突下的证券分析师跟进行为研究——基于面板数据的实证研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (6): 43-49.

利益冲突下的证券分析师跟进行为研究——基于面板数据的实证研究

姚禄仕, 何方, 王丽娜, 雷晓洁

合肥工业大学管理学院, 安徽合肥 230009

收稿日期:2012-10-22 修回日期:2012-12-17 出版日期:2014-06-20 发布日期:2014-06-26
作者简介:姚禄仕（1962- ），男（汉族），安徽桐城人，合肥工业大学管理学院教授，博士，研究方向：资本市场、公司治理、会计学.
基金资助:
上海证券交易所联合研究计划项目（2011QTXM0978）；中国证券业协会重点科研项目（2010-0645）

Research on Security Analyst Follow-up Behavior under the Conflicts of Interest——An Exemplified Study Based on Panel Data

YAO Lu-shi, HE Fang, WANG Li-na, LEI Xiao-jie

School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Anhui 230009, China

Received:2012-10-22 Revised:2012-12-17 Online:2014-06-20 Published:2014-06-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 现实中的证券分析师无时无刻不处于证券市场的利益链条之上，这使得其研究的独立性与客观性会受到利益冲突行为的影响。文章在对利益冲突与分析师跟进行为之间关系进行理论分析的基础上，以2008年1月到2010年12月共12个季度的A股市场1171家上市公司的8432个跟进数据为样本，通过构建面板数据的固定效应变截矩模型，进行实证检验。结果表明：机构投资者持股比例越高，即来自内部的利益冲突压力越大，分析师跟进人数越多；而高管持股变动对分析师跟进行为的影响效果不显著。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关分析师跟进的理论研究，而且也为监管部门出台相关政策规范分析师行业的发展提供了新的决策参考。

关键词: 利益冲突, 分析师跟进行为, 机构持股比例, 高管持股变动

Abstract: The securities analyst are in the interests chain of the securities market all the time, which makes the independence and objectivity of the research influenced by the behavior of conflict of interest. A total of 12 quarters of 8432 groups which come from the 1171 listed companies in the A-share market from January 1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2010 are chosed as the research sample based on the theoretical analysis of the relationship between conflicts of interest and analysts' follow-up behavior. By building the fixed-effect intercept model of panel data, the empirical study shows that: the higher the proportion of institutional investors holding, that is, the greater the pressure from the internal conflict of interest, the more the number of analysts' follow-up. What's more, the effect of executive ownership changes on analysts' follow-up behavior is not significant. This study not only enriches the theoretical research of the analysts' follow-up behavior, but also provides a new decision-making reference for the introduction of the related policies by regulatory authorities in order to promote the development of the analyst industry.

Key words: conflicts of interest, follow-up behavior of analysts, institutional ownership, the changes of executive ownership

中图分类号:

F830.91

姚禄仕, 何方, 王丽娜, 雷晓洁. 利益冲突下的证券分析师跟进行为研究——基于面板数据的实证研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(6): 43-49.

YAO Lu-shi, HE Fang, WANG Li-na, LEI Xiao-jie. Research on Security Analyst Follow-up Behavior under the Conflicts of Interest——An Exemplified Study Based on Panel Data[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(6): 43-49.

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