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中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 131-137.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

需求均匀分布条件下的供应链渠道协调——基于奖励与惩罚的双重契约

李凯1, 张迎冬2, 严建援3   

  1. 1. 南开大学工业工程系, 天津 300071;
    2. 天津大学管理学院, 天津 300072;
    3. 南开大学商学院, 天津 300071
  • 收稿日期:2010-07-17 修回日期:2012-03-15 出版日期:2012-06-29 发布日期:2012-07-05
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(11YJC630099);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70471040)

Supply Chain Coordination under Uniformly Distributed Market Demand ——A Dual Contract based on Both Bonus and Penalty

LI Kai1, ZHANG Ying-dong2, YNA Jian-yuan3   

  1. 1. Department of Industrial Engineering, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;
    2. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;
    3. Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
  • Received:2010-07-17 Revised:2012-03-15 Online:2012-06-29 Published:2012-07-05

摘要: 本文研究了由生产商和分销商构成的供应链在需求均匀分布市场条件下的渠道协调机制。设计了一个惩罚和奖励相结合的契约模型,将奖惩额度和比例作为协调因子,提出了惩罚和奖励相结合的渠道协调机制。通过算例验证和分析了四个协调因子在渠道协调中的作用机制,并得出了相关分析结论。

关键词: 渠道协调, 惩罚契约, 奖励契约, 协调机制

Abstract: The channel coordination mechanism of the supply chain composed of producers and distributors under uniformly distributed market demand is studied in this paper. A bonus-penalty mixed contract model is designed with the coordinating factor: bonus, penalty, bonus ratio and penalty ratio. The mixed channel coordination mechanism is also discussed. An example verifies the coordination of four factors in channel coordination. Also some findings are proposed based on the result of the example.

Key words: channel coordination, penalty contract, bonus contract, coordination mechanism

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