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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (10): 177-186.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0978

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于现金闭环供应链中重复调运问题的协调机制研究

邱虹1, 朱南2, 张霆3   

  1. 1.西华大学管理学院,四川 成都610039;2.西南财经大学西部商业学院,四川 成都610000; 3.戴顿大学商学院,美国 戴顿45469
  • 收稿日期:2020-05-26 修回日期:2020-07-19 出版日期:2022-10-20 发布日期:2022-10-12
  • 通讯作者: 邱虹(1977-),女(汉族),四川成都人,西华大学管理学院/国际经济与管理研究院,教授,博士,研究方向:系统工程与决策科学,Email:qh1365@163.com E-mail:qh1365@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BGL011);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872192);广东省自然科学基金面上项目(2022A1515011799)

Modeling the Coordination Mechanisms of Cross-shipping Based on Cash Closed-loop Supply Chain

QIU Hong1, ZHU Nan2, ZHANG Ting3   

  1. 1. School of Management, Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, China;2. Western Business School, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu610074, China;3. School of Business Administration,University of Dayton, Dayton45469, US
  • Received:2020-05-26 Revised:2020-07-19 Online:2022-10-20 Published:2022-10-12
  • Contact: 邱虹 E-mail:qh1365@163.com

摘要: 本文针对当前中国银行业现金物流管理中存在的高成本、低效率的重复调运问题,研究具有线性与非线性特征的两类罚款协调机制对商业银行现金清分策略的影响。为了衡量和比较协调机制的影响效果,分别构建了中国人民银行(中央银行)和商业银行总成本最优的联合决策模型以及商业银行成本最优的分散决策模型,分析了两类协调机制对商业银行清分决策的影响。研究结果表明:线性罚款机制不能激励商业银行选择联合决策下的最优清分率,无法实现降低现金闭环供应链总成本的协调目标;非线性罚款机制能够激励商业银行选择联合决策下的最优清分率,并在减少重复调运方面兼具约束与激励双重协调效果。

关键词: 现金闭环供应链;重复调运;协调机制

Abstract: To encourage commercial banks behavioral changes that help lower the overall societal costs of cash processing and distribution by curtailing overuse of a free governmental service, the coordination mechanism of recirculation fee is proposed to motivate commercial banks (CBs) to reduce the cross-shipping and fulfill their fit-sorting obligations in a socially optimal manner. The influence of two types coordination mechanisms on the cross-shipping is studied. A nonlinear coordination mechanism is first proposed (NLRF) based on the recirculation fee with the linear characteristic (LRF) which is the current practice of foreign central bank, and the differences between them are analyzed in three aspects: the measurement standard, minimum quota and calculation method. To examine the efficacy of two mechanisms, the social optimum is then characterized using the Cash Closed-Loop Supply Chain (C-CLSP) framework, and the responses of commercial banks under LRF, NLRF and without mechanism are analyzed respectively by three decentralized optimization models of commercial banks. Numerical examples demonstrate that the CBs’ complex decision-making behaviors face the coordination mechanisms from various different aspects and the influence of different circulation parameters on the coordination effect. The results show that the LRF mechanism cannot guarantee a socially optimal response from CBs. NLRF mechanism, as a fundamentally different mechanism characterized non-linear, helps induce CBs to self-select the social optimum. Our mechanism incorporates a fairness adjustment that avoids penalizing CBs that recirculate their fair share of cash and rewards CBs that recirculate more than this amount.

Key words: cash closed-loop supply chain; cross-shipping; coordination mechanism

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