煤电企业供应链合作冲突规制模型

中国管理科学 ›› 2008, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (4): 96-103.

煤电企业供应链合作冲突规制模型

赵晓丽, 乞建勋

华北电力大学工商管理学院北京 102206

收稿日期:2007-11-07 修回日期:2008-07-24 出版日期:2008-08-31 发布日期:2008-08-31
作者简介:赵晓丽(1970- ),女(汉族),黑龙江双城人,华北电力大学工商管理学院金融与国际贸易系主任,副教授,博士,研究方向:贸易经济与产业发展、能源经济.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70773040)

Regulation Model of Supply Chain Cooperative Conflict—The Case of Coal and Eletric Power Enterprises

ZHAO Xiao-li, QI Jian-xun

School of Management, North-China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China

Received:2007-11-07 Revised:2008-07-24 Online:2008-08-31 Published:2008-08-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 供应链合作中由于企业目标的不完全一致性,合作企业间利益分配的激励性缺失,以及环境的不确定性等问题,会产生合作冲突。这一问题若不能得到有效解决,会影响到企业合作关系的稳定。本文在分析供应链合作冲突的表现及根源的基础上,重点研究了如何通过自我实施规制和政府规制解决合作冲突问题。认为自我实施规制应该通过可自执行协议模型和借鉴"关系性租金最大化"的思想建立的规制模型完成;而政府规制应重点从实现激励相容为目标的利益分配规制模型入手,实现从合作利益分配中的"囚徒困境"博弈向"猎鹿博弈"的转化。

关键词: 供应链合作, 合作冲突, 自我实施规制, 政府规制

Abstract: Cooperative conflict will take place during the process of supply chain cooperation due to the different aim between cooperation enterprises,less inspiration of profit distribution,and the environmental uncertainty.It would affect the stability of cooperation relationship,if the problem of cooperative conflict can't be resolved effectively.The performances and reasons of cooperative conflict of supply chain are analyzed at first,then we pay more attention to studying how to resolve the cooperative conflict by self-regulation and government regulation.It is considered that the self-regulation should be finished by self-enforcing agreements and the model of maximization of relationship rent.While the government regulation should be finished by establishing proper benefit distribution proportion in order to turn prisoner's game to deerstalking game to realize benefit consistent inspiring.

Key words: supply chain cooperation, cooperative conflict, self-regulation model, government regulation model

中图分类号:

C934
F270

赵晓丽, 乞建勋. 煤电企业供应链合作冲突规制模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2008, 16(4): 96-103.

ZHAO Xiao-li, QI Jian-xun. Regulation Model of Supply Chain Cooperative Conflict—The Case of Coal and Eletric Power Enterprises[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2008, 16(4): 96-103.

[1]	陈中洁, 于辉. 需求扰动下供应链反向保理的鲁棒决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(7): 89-101.
[2]	李芳, 马鑫, 洪佳, 叶春明. 政府规制下非对称信息对闭环供应链差别定价的影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(7): 116-126.
[3]	陈中洁, 于辉. 资金约束背景下反向保理的供应链合作[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(12): 113-123.
[4]	王宇, 于辉. 供应链合作下零售商股权融资策略的模型分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(6): 101-110.
[5]	孙彩虹, 田真真, 于辉. 零售商退出风险的供应链冲击与协调契约分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(6): 38-45.
[6]	马祖军, 胡书, 代颖. 政府规制下混合渠道销售/回收的电器电子产品闭环供应链决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(1): 82-90.
[7]	赵晓丽, 乞建勋. 供应链不同合作模式下合作利益分配机制研究——以煤电企业供应链为例[J]. 中国管理科学, 2007, 15(4): 70-76.