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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 28-32.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

上游企业R&D投资策略的博弈分析

田盈1,2, 蒲勇健1   

  1. 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆, 400044;
    2. 重庆师范大学数学与计算机学院, 重庆, 400047
  • 收稿日期:2003-05-27 修回日期:2004-06-07 出版日期:2004-08-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    教育部高校博士点专项基金(20020611009)

Game Analyseis on R&D Policy of Upstream Firm

TIAN Ying1,2, PU Yong-jian1   

  1. 1. College of Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
    2. Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 400047, China
  • Received:2003-05-27 Revised:2004-06-07 Online:2004-08-28 Published:2012-03-07

PDF (PC)

1800

被引次数

75

摘要： 市场上存在一个上游和一个下游企业时,纵向一体化能使上游企业的R&D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润均增加。本文研究了在不进行纵向一体化的情况下,上下游企业之间是否能够通过谈判,达成契约,从而使上游企业的R&D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润都达到纵向一体化时水平的问题。研究表明:如果上、下游企业进行两阶段动态博弈,该契约不会是一个子博弈精炼纳什均衡。只有上、下游企业进行无限次重复博弈,双方才有可能达成契约,并且双方都会遵守该契约。

关键词: R&D, 纵向一体化, 契约, 博弈

Abstract: When an upstream and a downstream firm exist in the market,vertical integration can increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit.This paper studies the problem whether the upstream and downstream firms can sign a contract to increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit to the level after the vertical integration.It is shown that,if the upstream and downstream firms play two-stage dynamic game,the contract is not a perfect Nash equilibrium.If the upstream and downstream firms play infinitely repeated game,the contract can be signed and abided.

Key words: R&D, vertical integration, contract, game

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