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中国管理科学 ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 46-50.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

非对称信息下业务外包中的质量评价决策

张翠华, 黄小原   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳, 110004
  • 收稿日期:2002-10-08 出版日期:2004-02-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
  • 基金资助:
    辽宁省自然科学基金项目(9910200208)

ZHANG Cui-hua, HUANG Xiao-yuan   

  1. School of Business and Management, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2002-10-08 Online:2004-02-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要: 研究了不同信息下供应链业务外包的产品质量评价决策问题,考虑购买商作为委托人和供应商作为代理人分别建立了他们的质量决策模型,重点研究了非对称信息下的决策问题已经变成最优控制问题,运用极大值原理推导了供应商质量预防信息隐匿情况下购买商的质量评价的最优解,并进行了仿真计算和分析,对比了不同信息环境下的决策结果。

关键词: 非对称信息, 供应链, 委托代理, 极大值原理, 质量预防, 质量评价

Abstract: Quality evaluation decision problem in outsourcing is studied under different information backgrounds.Quality profit models are set up with regards to buyer as principal and supplier as agent.Focus is on the study of decision problem turned into optimal control problem under asymmetric information.Maximum principle is used to get the solution to quality evaluation when supplier prevention information is hidden and simulation calculation is done.Simulation results under different information backgrounds are analyzed and compared.

Key words: asymmetric information, supply chain, principal agent, maximum principle, quality prevention, quality evaluation

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