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中国管理科学 ›› 2002, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 38-42.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

供应链中基于Stackelberg博弈的EOQ模型

张钦1,2, 达庆利1, 沈厚才3   

  1. 1. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏, 南京, 210096;淮阴工学院计算机工程系, 江苏, 淮安, 223001;
    2. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏, 南京, 210096;
    3. 南京大学管理科学与工程研究院, 江苏, 南京, 210093
  • 收稿日期:2001-07-03 修回日期:2001-12-17 出版日期:2002-06-28 发布日期:2012-03-06
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(79800015)

EOQ Models Based on Stackelberg Game in Supply Chain

ZHANG Qin1,2, DA Qing-li1, SHEN Hou-cai3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China;
    2. Department of Computer Engineering, Huaiyin Institute of Technology, Huai’an 223001, China;
    3. Graduate School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2001-07-03 Revised:2001-12-17 Online:2002-06-28 Published:2012-03-06

摘要: 本文考虑一个含有一个供应商和一个零售商的整个供应链中,供应商在链中占据垄断地位,他不仅拥有零售商相关的成本信息,还有交货时间的决策权。在这种条件下,本文研究零售商和供应商的最优交货时间和最优订货周期问题,给出了近似的最优解,并用数值方法分析了对交货时间的控制给供应商和给零售商带来的和益处和损失。

关键词: 供应链, 交货时间, Stackelberg博弈, EOQ

Abstract: This paper disdlsses a Distribution Channel system that it contains one supplier and a single retailer.The supplier in the channel holds monopolistic status,in which he not only has relative cost information about the retailer,but also the decision-making right of the lead-time.In this case,the paper investigates the optimal lead-time and order cycle time,meanwhile analysis that the lead-time is likely to bring the supplier and the retailer profits and losses by numerical data.

Key words: supply chain, lead-time, Stackelberg game, EOQ

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