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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2002, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 20-23.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

双边激励与风险企业的股权结构配置

陈永庆, 王浣尘   

  1. 上海交通大学管理学院 上海 200030
  • 收稿日期:2001-03-09 修回日期:2001-10-12 出版日期:2002-04-28 发布日期:2012-03-06

Double-side Incentive Problem and the Equity Structure of Venture Firm

CHEN Yong-qing, WANG Huan-chen   

  1. Management School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China
  • Received:2001-03-09 Revised:2001-10-12 Online:2002-04-28 Published:2012-03-06

PDF (PC)

1916

被引次数

157

摘要： 风险投资家为风险企业提供金融资本的同时,也为其提供了增殖服务,获得风险资本的风险企业的发展是一个风险企业家和风险投资家共同倾注努力的结果。然而,由于风险企业特殊的信息结构特征,导致风险企业家和风险投资家之间存在严重的委托—代理问题,双边激励是其中的一个主要的道德风险问题,而股权结构的安排有助于激励两者为风险企业倾注努力。本文将建立风险企业股权结构与双边激励问题的关系模型,从解决激励风险企业家、风险投资家为风险企业作出努力的双边激励问题出发,确定最优的风险企业股权结构。

关键词: 风险企业, 风险企业家, 风险投资家, 双边激励, 股权结构

Abstract: Venture Capital not only invests the financial capital in Venture Firm,but also supplies the value-added services to develop the Venture Firm.Therefore,it could be said that the development of the Venture Firm is the result of Venture Capitalist and Entrepreneur’s effort.However,there are serious Principle-agency Problem in the development of Venture Firm due to the particular information structure.Double-side Problem is the main moral problem.The equity structure is a way to deal with this problem.This article structures a model between the equity structure and the Double-side Problem in order to design optimal equity structure on the basis of equilibrium between the effort’s benefit and the cost.

Key words: venture firm, entrepreneur, venture capitalist, double-side incentive, equity structure

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