考虑需求扰动及零售商公平关切行为的服务供应链决策

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2132

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

需求扰动会打破服务供应链原有的均衡状态并影响供应链收益分配公平。基于此，本文构建由提供增值服务的制造商和公平关切零售商组成的服务供应链模型，探讨了增值服务与零售商公平关切行为对供应链决策的影响，并分析了零售商存在不同类型时制造商的最优运营策略。研究结果表明：（1）制造商提供增值服务总是有助于供应链成员应对需求扰动，提高供应链绩效水平；（2）零售商的类型及其公平关切行为不仅影响供应链成员的决策结果的鲁棒区间，还会威胁供应链的稳定；（3）当偏离成本满足一定条件时，制造商有望通过选择不同类型的零售商来提高自身及供应链的期望利润；（4）零售商的非短视行为会加剧需求扰动对供应链的影响，且可能会损害制造商及供应链利润，并降低服务水平。

关键词: 供应链管理, 需求扰动, 增值服务, 公平关切

Abstract:

Demand disruption inevitably breaks the equilibrium of the service supply chain and affect the fairness of revenue distribution in the supply chain. In the volatile market climate， the fairness of revenue distribution and original value-added services strategy should be concerned to alleviate the negative impact of demand disruption. Therefore， a service supply chain model is constructed， which consists of a manufacturer， who provide value-added services， and a fairness-concerned retailer. Then， the effects of value-added services and retailer's fairness-concerned behavior in supply chain are discussed based on game theory. And in the expansion section， the optimal strategy of the manufacturer is analyzed when the retailer has different characteristics. The results show that：（1） Value-added services provided by manufacturer help supply chain members cope with demand disruption and improve the revenue of the supply chain. （2） The retailer’s characteristics and fairness-concerned behavior impact the interval of robustness of supply chain members' decision-making. （3） When the deviation cost satisfied certain conditions， the manufacturer can improve expected revenue of supply chain by cooperating with retailers of certain characteristics. （4） The retailer's foresight behavior will aggravate the impact of demand disruption on the supply chain and may reduce the revenue of supply chain and the service capacity.

Key words: supply chain management, demand disruption, value-added services, fairness concerns

中图分类号:

F272

林志炳, 郭耿, 陈蕾雯. 考虑需求扰动及零售商公平关切行为的服务供应链决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(7): 316-323.

Zhibing Lin, Geng Guo, Leiwen Chen. Service Supply Chain Decisions with Consideration of Demand Disruption and Retailer’s Fairness Concerns[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(7): 316-323.

图/表 8

表1

需求扰动下未提供增值服务的制造商与S型零售商的决策结果"

参数	$Δ a < - 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 2$	$- 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 2 < Δ a < 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 1$	$Δ a > 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 1$
$π ˜ m d n$	$18 ((a + Δ a) 2 (1 + μ) 1 + 2 μ + 2 Δ a u 2 + (1 + 2) u 22 1 + μ)$	$a (a + 2 Δ a) (1 + μ) 8 + 16 μ$	$18 ((a + Δ a) 2 (1 + μ) 1 + 2 μ - 2 Δ a u 1 + (1 + 2) u 12 1 + μ)$
$π ˜ r d n$	$A 2 + (1 + 2 μ) 2 u 2 (2 (a + Δ a) (1 + μ) + u 2) 16 (1 + 2 μ) (1 + μ) 2$	$a (a + 4 (a + Δ a) μ) 16 + 32 μ$	$A 2 + (1 + 2 μ) 2 u 1 (- 2 (a + Δ a) (1 + μ) + u 1) 16 (1 + 2 μ) (1 + μ) 2$
$w ˜ d n$	$12 ((a + Δ a) (1 + μ) 1 + 2 μ - u 2)$	$(a + 2 Δ a) (1 + μ) 2 + 4 μ$	$12 ((a + Δ a) (1 + μ) 1 + 2 μ + u 1)$
$p ˜ d n$	$3 (a + Δ a) 4 - (1 + 2 μ) u 2 4 + 4 μ$	$3 a 4 + Δ a$	$3 (a + Δ a) 4 + (1 + 2 μ) u 1 4 + 4 μ$

表1

表2

需求扰动下提供增值服务的制造商与S型零售商的决策结果"

参数	$Δ a < - 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 2$	$- 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 2 < Δ a < 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 1$	$Δ a > 1 + 2 μ 1 + μ u 1$
$π ˜ m d s$	$π m d s + A 3 + A 4 u 2 (2 Δ a (1 + μ) + (1 + 2 μ) u 2) 2 (1 + μ) A 1$	$π m d s + a Δ a (2 - θ 2) (1 + μ) A 1$	$π m d s + A 3 + A 4 u 1 (- 2 Δ a (1 + μ) + (1 + 2 μ) u 1) 2 (1 + μ) A 1$
$π ˜ r d s$	$π r d s + (- 2 + θ 2) (1 + 2 μ) (A 5 - A 6 u 2 + A 7 u 22) (1 + μ) 2 A 12$	$π r d s + a Δ a (2 - θ 2) μ A 1$	$π r d s + (- 2 + θ 2) (1 + 2 μ) (A 5 + A 6 u 1 + A 7 u 12) (1 + μ) 2 A 12$
$w ˜ d s$	$w d s + A 8 - (4 + 9 μ - θ 2 (2 + 4 μ)) u 2 A 1$	$w d s + Δ a (1 + μ) 1 + 2 μ$	$w d s + A 8 + (4 + 9 μ - θ 2 (2 + 4 μ)) u 1 A 1$
$p ˜ 0 d s$	$p 0 d s + Δ a (1 + μ) + (1 + 2 μ) u 2 A 1$	$p 0 d s$	$p 0 d s + Δ a (1 + μ) - (1 + 2 μ) u 1 A 1$
$p ˜ d s$	$p d s + A 9 - (2 - θ 2) (1 + 2 μ) 2 u 2 (1 + μ) A 1$	$p d s + Δ a$	$p d s + A 9 + (2 - θ 2) (1 + 2 μ) 2 u 1 (1 + μ) A 1$
$s ˜ d s$	$s d s + θ (Δ a (1 + μ) + (1 + 2 μ) u 2) A 1$	$s d s$	$s d s + θ (Δ a (1 + μ) - (1 + 2 μ) u 1) A 1$

表2

表3

需求扰动下未提供增值服务的制造商与F型零售商的决策结果"

	$Δ a < - u 2$	$- u 2 < Δ a < u 1$	$Δ a > u 1$
$π ˜ m d n ∪$	$A 10 + 2 (Δ a - a μ + Δ a μ) u 2 + (1 + μ) u 22 8 + 16 μ$	$Δ a > 0 a ((a + 2 Δ a) (1 + μ) + 2 μ u 1) 8 + 16 μ$	$A 10 - 2 (Δ a - a μ + Δ a μ) u 1 + (1 + μ) u 12 8 + 16 μ$
$π ˜ m d n ∪$	$A 10 + 2 (Δ a - a μ + Δ a μ) u 2 + (1 + μ) u 22 8 + 16 μ$	$Δ a < 0 a ((a + 2 Δ a) (1 + μ) - 2 μ u 2) 8 + 16 μ$	$A 10 - 2 (Δ a - a μ + Δ a μ) u 1 + (1 + μ) u 12 8 + 16 μ$
$π ˜ r d n ∪$	$(1 + 4 μ) (a + Δ a + u 2) 2 16 + 32 μ$	$Δ a > 0 a (a + 4 (a + Δ a) μ - 4 μ u 1) 16 + 32 μ$	$(1 + 4 μ) (a + Δ a - u 1) 2 16 + 32 μ$
$π ˜ r d n ∪$	$(1 + 4 μ) (a + Δ a + u 2) 2 16 + 32 μ$	$Δ a < 0 a (a + 4 (a + Δ a) μ + 4 μ u 2) 16 + 32 μ$	$(1 + 4 μ) (a + Δ a - u 1) 2 16 + 32 μ$
$w ˜ d n ∪$	$(a + Δ a) (1 + μ) - (1 + 3 μ) u 2 2 + 4 μ$	$Δ a > 0 (a + 2 Δ a) (1 + μ) + 2 μ u 1 2 + 4 μ$	$(a + Δ a) (1 + μ) + (1 + 3 μ) u 1 2 + 4 μ$
$w ˜ d n ∪$	$(a + Δ a) (1 + μ) - (1 + 3 μ) u 2 2 + 4 μ$	$Δ a < 0 (a + 2 Δ a) (1 + μ) - 2 μ u 2 2 + 4 μ$	$(a + Δ a) (1 + μ) + (1 + 3 μ) u 1 2 + 4 μ$
$p ˜ d n ∪$	$3 (a + Δ a) - u 2 4$	$34 a + Δ a$	$3 (a + Δ a) + u 1 4$

表3

表4

需求扰动下提供增值服务的制造商与F型零售商的决策结果"

参数	$Δ a < - u 2$	$- u 2 < Δ a < u 1$	$Δ a > u 1$
$π ˜ m d s ∪$	$π m d s ∪ - A 13 + (2 - θ 2) (1 + μ) (u 2 + Δ a) 2 2 A 1$	$Δ a > 0 π m d s ∪ + A 12 (Δ a + Δ a μ + μ u 1) A 1$	$π m d s ∪ + A 13 + (2 - θ 2) (1 + μ) (u 1 - Δ a) 2 2 A 1$
$π ˜ m d s ∪$	$π m d s ∪ - A 13 + (2 - θ 2) (1 + μ) (u 2 + Δ a) 2 2 A 1$	$Δ a < 0 π m d s ∪ + A 12 (Δ a + Δ a μ - μ u 2) A 1$	$π m d s ∪ + A 13 + (2 - θ 2) (1 + μ) (u 1 - Δ a) 2 2 A 1$
$π ˜ r d s ∪$	$π r d s ∪ + A 14 (Δ a + u 2) (2 a + Δ a + u 2) A 12$	$Δ a > 0 π r d s ∪ + A 12 μ (Δ a - u 1) A 1$	$π r d s ∪ + A 14 (Δ a - u 1) (2 a + Δ a - u 1) A 12$
$π ˜ r d s ∪$	$π r d s ∪ + A 14 (Δ a + u 2) (2 a + Δ a + u 2) A 12$	$Δ a < 0 π r d s ∪ + A 12 μ (Δ a + u 2) A 1$	$π r d s ∪ + A 14 (Δ a - u 1) (2 a + Δ a - u 1) A 12$
$w ˜ d s ∪$	$w d s ∪ + A 8 - 2 (2 - θ 2) (1 + 3 μ) u 2 A 1$	$Δ a > 0 w d s ∪ + Δ a + Δ a μ + μ u 1 1 + 2 μ$	$w d s ∪ + A 8 + 2 (2 - θ 2) (1 + 3 μ) u 1 A 1$
$w ˜ d s ∪$	$w d s ∪ + A 8 - 2 (2 - θ 2) (1 + 3 μ) u 2 A 1$	$Δ a < 0 w d s ∪ + Δ a + Δ a μ - μ u 2 1 + 2 μ$	$w d s ∪ + A 8 + 2 (2 - θ 2) (1 + 3 μ) u 1 A 1$
$p ˜ 0 d s ∪$	$p 0 d s ∪ + (1 + μ) Δ a + u 2 A 1$	$p 0 d s ∪$	$p 0 d s ∪ + (1 + μ) Δ a - u 1 A 1$
$p ˜ d s ∪$	$p d s ∪ + A 11 - (2 - θ 2) (1 + 2 μ) u 2 A 1$	$p d s ∪ + Δ a$	$p d s ∪ + A 11 + (2 - θ 2) (1 + 2 μ) u 1 A 1$
$s ˜ d s ∪$	$s d s ∪ + θ (1 + μ) (Δ a + u 2) A 1$	$s d s ∪$	$s d s ∪ + θ (1 + μ) (Δ a - u 1) A 1$

表4

图1

图2

表5

偏离成本大小对利润的影响"

$(u 1, u 2)$	$Δ a$	$d s ∪$					$d s$
$(u 1, u 2)$	$Δ a$	$π ˜ s d s ∪$	$s ˜ d s ∪$	$π ˜ m d s ∪$	$π ˜ s c d s ∪$	$π ˜ r d s ∪$	$π ˜ s d s$	$s ˜ d s$	$π ˜ m d s$	$π ˜ s c d s$	$π ˜ r d s$
(0.5,0.5)	2	2.45	0.56	12.72	30.16	17.44	2.32	0.55	12.13	29.60	17.46
	0.2	1.85	0.49	9.44	22.32	12.88	1.85	0.49	9.44	23.14	13.70
	-0.2	1.85	0.49	7.72	21.22	13.50	1.85	0.49	7.72	20.39	12.67
	-2	1.34	0.42	4.83	14.35	9.53	1.43	0.43	5.27	14.76	9.49
(0,0.5)	2	1.18	0.39	12.35	31.34	18.99	2.66	0.59	12.35	31.34	18.99
	0.2	1.85	0.49	8.92	22.32	13.39	1.85	0.49	8.92	22.32	13.39
	-0.2	1.85	0.49	7.72	21.22	13.50	1.85	0.49	8.24	21.22	12.98
	-2	1.34	0.42	4.83	14.35	9.53	1.43	0.43	5.27	14.76	9.49
(0.5,0)	2	2.45	0.56	12.72	30.16	17.44	2.32	0.55	12.13	29.60	17.46
	0.2	1.85	0.49	9.44	22.32	12.88	1.85	0.49	8.92	22.32	13.39
	-0.2	1.85	0.49	8.24	21.22	12.98	1.85	0.49	8.24	21.22	12.98
	-2	1.78	0.48	5.49	13.93	8.44	1.18	0.39	5.49	13.93	8.44

表5

图3

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