“种草”与“翻车”：网红直播带货的产品质量问题与治理研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1937

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

随着短视频直播平台的发展和壮大，网红直播带货成为消费者购物的新形态。然而这一过程中网红带货产品质量差和维权难的问题也不断涌现。本文基于此背景，使用一个三方演化博弈模型研究了网红、短视频直播平台、消费者的三方策略选择与演化，并且进一步讨论了直播网红风险态度变化对带货和选品努力水平的影响。研究发现：随着消费者从网红直播带货的产品中获得的功能性收益增加，消费者越倾向于选择积极追责；而随着情感收益增加，消费者更倾向于选择消极追责。这种虚拟亲密关系带来的情感收益在一定程度上解释了当下网红直播带货产品质量问题泛滥的现象。其次，收益类参数对均衡状态的影响远比系数类参数的影响作用显著，这应该作为监管的重点方向。再次，消费者面对网红直播带货产品质量问题，会受到产品种类的影响，产品的功能性收益越高，消费者维权动力更充足。最后，直播带货网红的风险态度会影响其选品和带货努力，风险厌恶型网红的带货和选品努力水平比确定情形下努力水平更低。

关键词: 购物场域, 网红直播带货, 产品质量, 演化博弈

Abstract:

With the development and expansion of short video live broadcast platforms， online celebrity live-streaming has become a new form of consumer shopping. However， in this process， the problems of poor quality of products with online celebrities and difficulty in protection have also emerged. Based on this background， a tripartite evolutionary game model is used to study the tripartite strategy selection and evolution of internet celebrities， short video live broadcast platforms， and consumers， and further discusses the impact of changes in live broadcast internet celebrities’ risk attitudes on their efforts to selling goods and select products. The innovations of this article are： ①The dual attributes of consumers and the live broadcast platform are considered. ②The benefits that consumers get from online celebrity products are divided into emotional benefits and functional benefits， which is more in line with the existing empirical evidence and facts， and the conclusion proves that emotional benefits will produce more “negative action” in certain situations. ③In the existing evolutionary game literature， few scholars discuss in detail the changes and transitions of equilibrium points under different parameter conditions， while parameter changes which leads to the transition of the equilibrium point often contains profound policy enlightenment.④The risk attitudes of Internet celebrities on the efforts to bring goods is also discussed，which further explains the causes of the quality problems of products brought by Internet celebrities. In addition， it is also found an interesting insight： consumers' strategy choices when facing the quality trouble of online celebrity live broadcast products will be affected by product types. The higher the functional benefit of the product， the more powerful consumers' motivation to defend their rights. This means that not all products are suitable for online celebrity live broadcast mode for sales.It is found that as the functional benefits that consumers obtain from online celebrity products increase， consumers are more inclined to choose active accountability， and as emotional benefits increase， consumers are more inclined to choose passive accountability， this kind of virtual intimacy on the emotional benefits brought by the products partly explain the phenomenon of the current proliferation of online celebrity product quality problems. Secondly， the influence of basic income parameters on the equilibrium state is far more significant than the influence of coefficient parameters. This should be the focus of supervision. Moreover， consumers’ strategy will be affected by product types when they face the quality problems of online celebrities’ live streaming products. The higher the product’s functional benefits， the greater the motivation for consumers to defend their rights. Finally， the risky attitudes of live streaming internet celebrities will affect their attitudes of product selection. And as the effort to bring goods， risk-averse Internet celebrities' efforts to sell goods and select products are lower than those under certain circumstances.

Key words: shopping field, online celebrity live marketing, product quality, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F830.9

郭延禄,罗公利,侯贵生,王晓彤. “种草”与“翻车”：网红直播带货的产品质量问题与治理研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(10): 162-174.

Yan-lu GUO,Gong-li LUO,Gui-sheng HOU,Xiao-tong WANG. “Good Shopping Decisions” and “Bad Shopping Decisions”: Research on the Quality Issues and Governance of Internet Celebrity Live Marketing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(10): 162-174.

图/表 15

表1

直播网红、直播平台和消费者的收益矩阵"

策略组合	直播网红	直播平台	消费者
严格,积极,积极	$A - q 1 F 1 - α 1 S 1$	$η 1 A - λ 1 S 1$	$G - q 1 S 1 + B 1$
严格,积极,消极	$A - q 1 F 1$	$η 1 A$	$E - q 1 S 2 + B 2$
严格,消极,积极	$A - q 1 F 2 - α 1 S 1$	$η 2 A - λ 2 S 1$	$G - q 1 S 1$
严格,消极,消极	$A - q 1 F 2$	$η 2 A$	$E - q 1 S 2$
宽松,积极,积极	$H - q 2 F 1 - α 2 S 1$	$η 1 H - λ 1 S 1$	$G - q 2 S 1 + B 1$
宽松,积极,消极	$H - q 2 F 1$	$η 1 H$	$E - q 2 S 2 + B 2$
宽松,消极,积极	$H - q 2 F 2 - α 2 S 1$	$η 2 H - λ 2 S 1$	$G - q 2 S 1$
宽松,消极,消极	$H - q 2 F 2$	$η 2 H$	$E - q 2 S 2$

表1

表2

均衡点及其特征根汇总"

均衡点	均衡点对应的特征根
$R 1 (0,0, 0)$	$θ 11 = A - H - F 2 (q 1 - q 2), θ 12 = H (η 1 - η 2), θ 13 = G - E - q 2 (S 1 - S 2)$
$R 2 (0,0, 1)$	$θ 21 = A - H - F 2 (q 1 - q 2) - S 1 (α 1 - α 2), θ 22 = H (η 1 - η 2) - S 1 (λ 1 - λ 2), θ 23 = - [G - E - q 2 (S 1 - S 2)]$
$R 3 (0,1, 0)$	$θ 31 = A - H - F 1 (q 1 - q 2) - S 1 (α 1 - α 2), θ 32 = - H (η 1 - η 2), θ 33 = G - E - q 2 (S 1 - S 2) - (B 2 - B 1)$
$R 4 (1,0, 0)$	$θ 41 = - [A - H - F 2 (q 1 - q 2)], θ 42 = A (η 1 - η 2), θ 43 = G - E - q 1 (S 1 - S 2)$
$R 5 (1,1, 0)$	$θ 51 = - [A - H - F 1 (q 1 - q 2)], θ 52 = - A (η 1 - η 2), θ 53 = G - E - q 2 (S 1 - S 2) - (B 2 - B 1)$
$R 6 (1,0, 1)$	$θ 61 = - [A - H - F 2 (q 1 - q 2) - S 1 (α 1 - α 2)], θ 62 = A (η 1 - η 2) - S 1 (λ 1 - λ 2), θ 63 = - [G - E - q 1 (S 1 - S 2)]$
$R 7 (0,1, 1)$	$θ 71 = A - H - F 1 (q 1 - q 2) - S 1 (α 1 - α 2), θ 72 = - [H (η 1 - η 2) - S 1 (λ 1 - λ 2)], θ 73 = - [G - E - q 2 (S 1 - S 2) - (B 2 - B 1)]$
$R 8 (1,1, 1)$	$θ 81 = - [A - H - F 1 (q 1 - q 2) - S 1 (α 1 - α 2)], θ 82 = - [A (η 1 - η 2) - S 1 (λ 1 - λ 2)], θ 83 = - [G - E - q 1 (S 1 - S 2)]$

表2

表3

特征根正负及其不同条件下的稳定性"

均衡点为ESS	$R 3 (0,1, 0)$	$R 5 (1,1, 0)$	$R 7 (0,1, 1)$	$R 8 (1,1, 1)$	其他情况说明
$R 3 (0,1, 0)$	——	$(?, -, ?)$	$(+, ?, +)$	$(+, ?, ?)$	$R 7, R 8$ 不稳定
$R 5 (1,1, 0)$	$(?, -, -)$	——	$(?, ?, +)$	$(?, ?, ?)$	$R 7$ 不稳定
$R 7 (0,1, 1)$	$(+, -, +)$	$(-, -, +)$	——	$(+, ?, ?)$	$R 3, R 5, R 8$ 不稳定
$R 8 (1,1, 1)$	$(+, -, ?)$	$(-, -, ?)$	$(-, ?, ?)$	——	$R 3$ 不稳定

表3

图1

图2

图3

图4

图5

图6

图7

图8

图9

图10

图11

表4

关键参数变动和均衡转化总结"

关键参数变动	均衡状态转变	关键参数变动	均衡状态转变
$A : 2 → 5$	$(0,1, 0) → (1,1, 0)$	$S 2 : 3 → 7$	$(1,1, 1) → (1,1, 0)$
$H : 5 → 7, G = 5$	$(1,1, 0) → (0,1, 0)$	$G : 5 → 11$	$(1,1, 0) → (1,1, 1)$
$H : 4 → 9, G = 13$	$(1,1, 1) → (0,1, 1)$	$E : 1 → 3$	$(1,1, 1) → (1,1, 0)$
$S 1 : 3 → 7$	$(1,1, 1) → (1,1, 0)$	$F 1 = 15, q 2 : 0.7 → 0.9$	$(0,1, 0) → (1,1, 0)$

表4

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