多寡头电力市场中考虑水平合作的碳减排竞争微分对策模型

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.05.018

中国管理科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (5): 189-199.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.05.018

多寡头电力市场中考虑水平合作的碳减排竞争微分对策模型

余祥瑀¹, 黄守军², 杨俊¹

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
2. 中山大学岭南(大学)学院, 广东广州 510275

收稿日期:2019-03-14 修回日期:2019-07-04 出版日期:2020-05-30 发布日期:2020-05-30
通讯作者: 黄守军(1985-),男(汉族),安徽马鞍山人,中山大学岭南(大学)学院,副研究员,博士,研究方向:管理决策及其应用,E-mail:huangshj29@mail.sysu.edu.cn. E-mail:huangshj29@mail.sysu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大资助项目（19ZDA082）

Differential Game Models for Carbon Emission Reduction Competition Considering Horizontal Cooperation in Oligopoly Electricity Market

YU Xiang-yu¹, HUANG Shou-jun², YANG Jun¹

1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
2. Lingnan(University) College, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Received:2019-03-14 Revised:2019-07-04 Online:2020-05-30 Published:2020-05-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在多寡头竞争下，本文利用微分对策理论研究了电力市场中考虑水平合作的碳减排竞争问题。发展了Bass等提出的双寡头竞争模型，构建了多寡头竞争微分对策碳减排模型，并运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程求解了该模型的最优上网电价、初始竞争性碳减排和水平合作碳减排投入以及均衡价值函数。在非对称发电商情形下，考虑了水平合作碳减排对市场份额的影响，给出了稳定时发电商所占的市场份额解析式，扩展了Prasad和Sethi关于市场份额的结论；在对称发电商情形下，分析了合作碳减排成本占总碳减排成本比例与市场份额的相关性，并讨论了市场最优发电商数量满足的参数约束。研究结果表明：非对称发电商的初始市场份额相等，投入碳减排成本最大的发电商在稳定时拥有最大的市场份额，而投入减排成本最小的发电商稳定的市场份额则最小；即使对称发电商的初始市场份额存在差异，某个对称发电商完全垄断整个市场的极端情形也不会出现，而是由各自趋于承担相同电力供给任务；双、三寡头电力市场总能保证对称发电商都能获得正利润，一旦发电商数量增至大于三个将无法保证。

关键词: 初始竞争性碳减排, 水平合作, 市场份额, 微分对策, 反馈Nash均衡

Abstract: Under multi-oligopoly competition,mitigation competition considering horizontal cooperation in electricity market is studied using differential game theory. The duopoly competition model proposed by Bass et al. is developed,the carbon emission reduction model of multi-oligopoly competition differential game is constructed,and the optimal on-grid price,initial competitive and horizontal cooperative carbon emission reduction inputs as well as the generators' equilibrium value functions of the model are solved with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In the case of asymmetric generators,the impact of horizontal cooperative carbon emission reduction on market share is considered,and the analytical formula of market share of generators in stable condition is given,which extends the conclusions of Prasad and Sethi on market share. In the case of symmetrical generators,the correlation between the proportion of cooperative carbon emission reduction costs to total carbon emission reduction costs and market share is analyzed,and the parameter constraints satisfied by the optimal number of generators in the market are discussed. The results show that the initial market shares of asymmetric generators are equal,and the generator with the largest cost of carbon emission reduction has the largest market share when it is stable,while the generator with the smallest cost of carbon emission reduction has the smallest stable market share. Even though the initial market shares of symmetrical generators are different,there will not emerge an extreme situation in which a symmetrical generator monopolizes the whole market completely. Instead,each generator tends to undertake the same electric power supply task. Both the duopoly and triopoly electricity markets can always guarantee positive profits for symmetrical generators. Once the number of generators increases to more than three,it will not be guaranteed.

Key words: initial competitive carbon emission reduction, horizontal cooperation, market share, differential game, feedback Nash equilibrium

中图分类号:

TM73
F123.9

余祥瑀, 黄守军, 杨俊. 多寡头电力市场中考虑水平合作的碳减排竞争微分对策模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(5): 189-199.

YU Xiang-yu, HUANG Shou-jun, YANG Jun. Differential Game Models for Carbon Emission Reduction Competition Considering Horizontal Cooperation in Oligopoly Electricity Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(5): 189-199.

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多寡头电力市场中考虑水平合作的碳减排竞争微分对策模型

Differential Game Models for Carbon Emission Reduction Competition Considering Horizontal Cooperation in Oligopoly Electricity Market

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