基于OEM与IR竞争的产品差异定价研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.11.012

中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (11): 111-121.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.11.012

基于OEM与IR竞争的产品差异定价研究

孟丽君, 黄祖庆, 张宝友, 杨玉香

中国计量大学经济与管理学院, 浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2016-02-16 修回日期:2017-01-18 出版日期:2017-11-20 发布日期:2018-01-31
通讯作者: 黄祖庆(1969-),男(汉族),江西会昌人,中国计量大学经济与管理学院教授,研究方向:逆向物流管理、供应链管理,E-mail:hzq1210@163.com E-mail:hzq1210@163.com
基金资助:
浙江省自然科学基金青年项目（LQ16G020005）；国家自然科学基金青年项目（71402173）；浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目（15NDJC251YB）；浙江省教育厅高校人文社科重大攻关计划项目（2014GH016）；浙江省人文社科基地“管理科学与工程”、浙江省产业发展政策研究中心和浙江省标准化与知识产权管理协同创新中心资助项目

Optimal Pricing for New and Remanufactured Products Based on the Competition Between OEM and IR

MENG Li-jun, HUANG Zu-qing, ZHANG Bao-you, YANG Yu-xiang

School of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2016-02-16 Revised:2017-01-18 Online:2017-11-20 Published:2018-01-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 随着资源的匮乏和环境污染的加剧，越来越多的企业和消费者开始关注废旧产品的回收再制造，然而消费者对再制品的价值评估低于新品。本文针对"集成制造商+独立再制造商"双寡头垄断市场竞争结构下新产品和再制品的差别定价问题提出了两周期博弈模型，研究结果表明：集成制造商可以通过第一周期对新品的合理定价来引导第二周期市场竞争结构以及独立再制造商的盈利能力。数值试验的结论则进一步验证了研究结论，并显示了独立再制造商的再制造成本优势、客户对再制品的价值评估均能影响制造商的新品定价和两寡头各自的利润。

关键词: 再制品, 定价策略, 价值评估, 博弈

Abstract: The residual value inherent in used products can make remanufacturing a profitable activity for OEMs, so many OEMS choose to sell remanufactured products. At the same time, there may be third-parties remanufacturers that remanufacture the used products originally sold by the OEM. However, in the academic field of closed-loop supply chain,thus far, few researches has been conducted on investigating the optimal pricing problem of new product and differentiated remanufactured product. In this paper, a two-period game-theoretic model with a monopolist manufacturer in the first period and duopoly of manufacturer and independent remanufacturer in the second period is developed. It is assumed that the OEM may remanufacture the used product returned by customer while manufacturing new product and the third-party remanufacturer competes with the manufacturer by remanufacturing the used product too. It is also assumed that customer's willingness to pay for remanufactured products is less than their willingness to pay for new products. Based on these assumptions, a Stackelberg game is employed to analyzed the OEM and independent remanufacture 's pricing strategies where the former act as the leader and the latter act as a follower.The optimal pricing strategies for the OEM and IR are obtained. The results suggest that, the OEM can use his first period price to blunt the independent remanufacturer's ability to compete in period 2. Based on numerical study, our results show the reduced remanufacturing cost of IR does not influence on the OEM's profitability and its optimal pricing strategy for new products. There exists a threshold on the valuation of remanufactured product for the monopolist. If the valuation is too low, OEM brings its own loss of profits while preventing IR into the market. If the valuation of remanufactured product, IR competes with OEM, that reducing the OEM's profit. These results can help the OEM to choose the optimal pricing strategy for its product to enhance his profit, and give some suggestion on how to guide the consumer perception of remanufactured product for OEM.

Key words: remanufactured product, pricing strategy, value, game theory

中图分类号:

F253.4

孟丽君, 黄祖庆, 张宝友, 杨玉香. 基于OEM与IR竞争的产品差异定价研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(11): 111-121.

MENG Li-jun, HUANG Zu-qing, ZHANG Bao-you, YANG Yu-xiang. Optimal Pricing for New and Remanufactured Products Based on the Competition Between OEM and IR[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(11): 111-121.

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基于OEM与IR竞争的产品差异定价研究

Optimal Pricing for New and Remanufactured Products Based on the Competition Between OEM and IR

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