主管：中国科学院
主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
　　　中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (12): 139-147.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.12.016

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

动态博弈下引导企业低碳技术创新的政府低碳规制研究

王志国1,2, 李磊1, 杨善林2, 龚本刚1   

  1. 1. 安徽工程大学, 安徽 芜湖 241000;
    2. 合肥工业大学, 安徽 合肥 230009
  • 收稿日期:2015-03-14 修回日期:2016-02-06 发布日期:2017-03-07
  • 通讯作者: 王志国(1976-),男(汉族),吉林双辽人,合肥工业大学管理学院博士后,安徽工程大学硕士研究生导师,副教授,工学博士,研究方向:制造业信息化、低碳制造,E-mail:kingdom0526@126.com. E-mail:kingdom0526@126.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71171002）；安徽省自然科学基金（1308085MG108）；安徽省教育厅重点项目（KJ2015A303）；中国博士后基金项目（2013M541826）；安徽工程大学国家基金预研项目（zryy1312）

The Research on Government Low-carbon Regulation Guiding Enterprise Low-carbon Technology Innovation in Dynamic Game

WANG Zhi-guo1,2, LI Lei1, YANG Shan-lin2, GONG Ben-gang1   

  1. 1. School of Management Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, China;
    2. Postdoctoral Station of Management Science and Engineering, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China
  • Received:2015-03-14 Revised:2016-02-06 Published:2017-03-07

PDF (PC)

175

被引次数

13

摘要： 低碳技术创新是解决高排放的重要手段，本文首先针对低碳技术创新复杂系统进行分析，根据政企双方在不同时期、不同阶段的博弈状态和博弈形成机理，建立了动态赋时博弈模型，分析了政府的决策做出对企业低碳技术创新系统性能指标的时间量特性影响。政企在低碳技术创新行为决策博弈中，某一时段的目标函数取决于当前双方的博弈状态和前一时段演进过程中博弈结果。然后，建立了动态博弈下的企业目标决策模型和动态博弈下政府目标决策模型，以利润最大化来组织生产的企业，政府的低碳规制会直接影响企业低碳技术创新决策行为，政府的低碳经济与环境保护责任目标要求企业的单位排放量的销售额是稳定增加的，或者单位销售额的排放量的稳定下降，这就要求不断地进行低碳技术创新。最后，给出了双重集成引导低碳规制的路径选择方法，并以安徽省部分调研企业数据为例进行了仿真应用验证，验证结果表明所设计的低碳规制路径的合理性，为低碳环境下政府制定合适的引导企业低碳技术创新政策规制提供了科学的参考依据。

关键词: 低碳技术创新复杂系统, 动态赋时博弈模型, 低碳技术创新, 低碳规制路径

Abstract: Low-carbon technology innovation is an important means to solve the high emissions. Firstly, the complex of low-carbon technology innovation system is analyzed. A dynamic timed game model is established and the influence of government decision-making to time characteristics of enterprise low-carbon technology innovation system is analyzed according to game state and game formation mechanism between government and enterprise in different periods and different stages. In this decision-making game which is between governments and enterprises regarding to the behavior of low carbon technology innovation, the object function in certain period is based on current game state and the game result for previous progress. After that, set up the enterprise objective decision-making model under the dynamic game and government objective decision-making model under the dynamic game. The government's low carbon regulation will directly affect the behavior of low carbon technology innovation decisions,this business is to maximize profits for the purpose to organize the production of enterprises. The government goal of low carbon economy and environmental protection responsibility requires a steady increasing of enterprise's sales in certain amount emission per unit, or stable steady decreasing in emission per unit amount of sales. This requires constant low-carbon technology innovation. Finally, the double integration path selection method is given for guiding low-carbon regulation. The application simulation is verified based on the data of some enterprises investigated in Anhui Province. Validation results show that the low-carbon regulation path is reasonable. So that government could establish scientific and suitable policy guiding enterprise low-carbon technology innovation in low carbon environment.

Key words: the complex of low-carbon technology innovation system, a dynamic timed game model, low-carbon technology innovation, the low-carbon regulation path

中图分类号: