企业环境研发、产品差异化与政府环境管制

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.019

中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 159-168.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.019

企业环境研发、产品差异化与政府环境管制

杨仕辉¹, 魏守道²

1. 暨南大学经济学院, 广东广州 510632;
2. 广东金融学院, 广东广州 510521

收稿日期:2013-09-19 修回日期:2014-10-01 出版日期:2016-01-20 发布日期:2016-01-28
通讯作者: 杨仕辉(1965-),男(汉族),江西丰城人,暨南大学经济学院教授,博士,博士生导师,研究方向:气候政策,E-mail:yangshh@126.com. E-mail:yangshh@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273114)

Environmental R&D, Product Differentiation and Environmental Regulation

YANG Shi-hui¹, WEI Shou-dao²

1. College of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China;
2. Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou 510521, China

Received:2013-09-19 Revised:2014-10-01 Online:2016-01-20 Published:2016-01-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 气候变暖已成为全球日益关注的重要问题之一,实施环境管制政策是政府控制企业碳排放量的重要手段。基于东道国企业和外资企业产品差异化竞争假设,建立了企业环境研发策略(环境研发卡特尔策略和独立环境研发策略)与政府环境管制的三阶段博弈模型,运用逆向求解法求得各阶段均衡解,比较了不同环境研发策略下企业环境研发水平(及碳减排量)、政策环境管制水平及国家福利。结果表明:企业环境研发投入越多,政府最优碳排放税越低;碳排放对环境造成的损害越大,政府最优排放税越高,企业越致力于环境研发。对关键参数赋值和模拟后进一步发现,总体而言,环境研发卡特尔策略要优于独立环境研发策略,但随着产品差异化程度的缩小和环境研发溢出程度的降低,环境研发卡特尔策略优于独立环境研发策略的程度也在缩小。因此,本文的研究可为外资企业和东道国企业产品策略选择和环境研发策略选择提供理论依据,也可为政府政策制定提供参考。

关键词: 独立环境研发, 环境研发卡特尔, 产品差异化, 环境管制, 博弈模型

Abstract: Global warming has been one of the most important issues around the world, and environmental regulation has been an important tool to control carbon emission for government. Under the assumption that a host-country enterprise and a foreign enterprise produce differentiated products, a three-stage game model is constructed to examine how the organization of environmental R&D-independent environmental R&D and environmental R&D cartel affects environmental regulation. By backward induction, equilibriums are got. With these equilibriums, levels of environment R&D (and reduction of carbon emission), environmental regulation and welfare are compared between different R&D strategies respectively. It's found that the more enterprises expend on environmental R&D, the lower the emission tax will be, and if carbon emission can cause more serious damage to environment, government will set higher emission tax and enterprises will be committed to more environmental R&D. By assigning several specific values to key variables, it's further found that environmental R&D cartel is dominant to independent environmental R&D in general. However, the possibility that environmental R&D cartel is dominant to independent environmental R&D will be lower as degrees of product differentiation and environmental R&D spillover between enterprises decrease. So, this paper not only contributes to the strategic choice for both foreign enterprise and host-country enterprise, but also contributes to policy making for government.

Key words: independent environmental R&D, environmental R&D cartel, product differentiation, environ- mental regulation, game model

中图分类号:

F741
F270

杨仕辉, 魏守道. 企业环境研发、产品差异化与政府环境管制[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(1): 159-168.

YANG Shi-hui, WEI Shou-dao. Environmental R&D, Product Differentiation and Environmental Regulation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(1): 159-168.

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企业环境研发、产品差异化与政府环境管制

Environmental R&D, Product Differentiation and Environmental Regulation

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