联盟关系协同的股权规制机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.01.021

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 163-169.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.01.021

联盟关系协同的股权规制机制研究

蔡继荣

重庆工商大学商务策划学院, 重庆 400067

收稿日期:2012-03-05 修回日期:2012-09-26 出版日期:2015-01-20 发布日期:2015-01-21
作者简介:蔡继荣(1969-),男(汉族),甘肃兰州人, 重庆工商大学商务策划学院教授,研究方向:战略管理与决策.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972143)

Study on Equity Regulation Mechanism for Strategic Alliance Synergy

CAI Ji-Rong

Strategic Planning College, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China

Received:2012-03-05 Revised:2012-09-26 Online:2015-01-20 Published:2015-01-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 联盟关系协同是在一定的规制机制下的联盟系统自组织过程。股权式联盟可被视为一种规制机制,它借助于关系性资产的投入所形成的双边依赖关系在促进联盟成员激励相容、信息对称和利益分享方面发挥协同作用。本文分析了股权规制机制的协同机理,通过对等和非对等关系性资产投入下联盟成员纳什议价过程及结果的比较分析,确定了股权规制机制的协同效应,并结合最优股权结构的决策分析揭示出,对等分享股权有利于实现联盟关系的协同。

关键词: 战略联盟, 股权, 关系性资产, 规制机制, 协同

Abstract: Synergy of strategic alliances is a self-organization process guaranteed by mechanisms. Equity alliance can be seen as a kind of regulation mechanism. Incentive compatibility, information symmetry and benefit sharing among partners of alliances can be promoted by means of bilateral dependence relationship formed by investment of relational assets. Through the comparative analysis of Nash bargaining between the partners of alliances with the equivalent and nonequivalent investment of relational assets, synergistic effects of equity regulation can be detected. And combined with the decision analysis of optimal equity structure it revealed equivalence shared equity are available for synergy of alliances.

Key words: strategic alliance, equity, relational assets, regulation mechanism, synergy

中图分类号:

F270

蔡继荣. 联盟关系协同的股权规制机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(1): 163-169.

CAI Ji-Rong. Study on Equity Regulation Mechanism for Strategic Alliance Synergy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(1): 163-169.

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联盟关系协同的股权规制机制研究

Study on Equity Regulation Mechanism for Strategic Alliance Synergy

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