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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (8): 329-344.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1404

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Study on the Influence of Carbon Option Purchase Quota Based on Demand Uncertainty on Supply Chain Decision-making and Coordination Mechanism

Wenfang Shang1, Xintao Gu1, Tao Li2()   

  1. 1.School of Business,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China
    2.School of Management,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China
  • Received:2024-08-16 Revised:2025-03-24 Online:2026-08-25 Published:2026-07-14
  • Contact: Tao Li E-mail:taoli@zzu.edu.cn

Abstract:

The uncertainty of product market demand leads to the uncertainty of emission dependent manufacturers' demand for quotas. Carbon option gives manufacturers the right to lock the price of quotas before the implementation of the contract, which can not only avoid the risk caused by the uncertain price of carbon trading market, but also mitigate the impact of the uncertain quantity of quota demand. Aiming at the two-stage supply chain formed by emission-dependent manufacturers and their retailers, the impact of carbon option procurement on supply chain decision-making and coordination mechanism is discussed. The findings are as follows: (1) Under decentralized decision-making, carbon option procurement expands manufacturers' quota procurement volume, making their production more flexible, thus better meeting retailers' flexible order demand and driving retailers' profits to increase; In addition, when the option price and exercise price meet the threshold conditions, the manufacturer can hedge the risk caused by the uncertainty of carbon quota purchase at a lower cost and improve its own profits. (2) Under centralized decision-making, the risk weakening effect of carbon option procurement extends to the entire supply chain system, and the total profit of the supply chain can also be improved within a reasonable parameter range. (3) When retailers and manufacturers share the cost of carbon option purchase and exercise, if the cost sharing coefficient and fixed cost meet the incentive compatibility conditions, the optimal profit of the whole supply chain and the profit improvement goal of the two members can be achieved at the same time, and the profits of both manufacturers and retailers exceed the decentralized decision-making without coordination mechanism, which verifies the effectiveness of the carbon option cost sharing mechanism.

Key words: demand uncertainty, carbon options, quota procurement, cost sharing

CLC Number: