Abstract:

The impact of a supplier's demand information acquisition strategy on its encroachment strategy in a supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer is investigated， under the retailer’s demand information advantage. The results indicate that information acquisition does not always promote the supplier’s encroachment strategy but may instead weaken its encroachment motivation. The supplier’s encroachment behavior is influenced by the dual effects of information accuracy and cost. Specifically， when the supplier possesses a high probability of high-demand market distribution， its motivation for information acquisition strengthens. In such cases， the supplier’s encroachment motivation increases with higher information accuracy. However， when the sales cost in the encroachment channel is elevated， this motivation is suppressed by cost factors. Conversely， when the supplier holds a low probability of high-demand market distribution， it tends to adopt a centralized sales mode to transfer risk to the retailer， thereby maintaining sustained profit growth. Furthermore， when evaluating market distribution scenarios， the supplier exhibits a stronger preference for leveraging historical information over proactive acquisition， particularly when cost considerations are incorporated into the analysis.

Key words: encroachment, demand uncertainty, information acquisition