Abstract:

In recent years， as the global environmental situation has become more and more severe， the topic of how to “educing carbon” has triggered extensive discussions among many enterprises and scholars. It is found under the carbon tax policy and cap-and-trade policy， the two-part tariff contract is conducive to mitigating double marginalization， but the extent of mitigation is closely related to the carbon policy， as the carbon tax policy is more stable， so the space to reduce the wholesale price is more constant； the cap-and-trade policy is affected by the uncertainty of the carbon price market， and the coordinating effect of the contract will be strengthened with the increase of the uncertainty of the carbon price. Secondly， the two-part tariff contract can realize the overall coordination of the supply chain under the carbon tax policy， but under the cap-and-trade policy， it depends on the correlation coefficient， and the two-part tariff contract can be beneficial to the supply chain participants only when the correlation coefficient meets certain conditions. In addition， it is found that the two-part tariff contract can bundle the risk of uncertainty with suppliers， and use the “risk-passing” effect to reduce the negative impacts of uncertainty on the brand. At the same time， the brand can use flexible pricing to amplify the positive effects of carbon reduction in the supply chain， thereby increasing supply chain profits. Moreover， under the carbon tax policy， the brand can only transfer the uncertainty of market demand brought by the supply chain’s low-carbon investment efforts to the upstream. Under the cap-and-trade policy， the brand can transfer the uncertainty of market demand， the uncertainty of carbon price， and the volatility of carbon trading price on demand upstream at the same time.

Key words: demand volatility, carbon trading price volatility, incentives, low carbon efforts