Abstract:

Multiperiod revenue allocation structure and dynamic incentive problem of supply chain considering newsvendor demand driven by long-term payment. The incentive model of moral hazard for single-period retailers is first explored under demand uncertainty. Based on this， the retailer moral hazard incentive model under long-term payment structure is analyzed. Further， the multiperiod is extended to infinite periods， the specific characteristics of the payment incentive system is discussed under infinite periods， and the smoothing mechanism of manufacturers’ incentive costs is elaborated. It is found that risk-averse agents have moral hazard under single-period cooperation. At the same time， it is found that multiperiod moral hazard contracts have two important properties， namely， memorability and harnessing， and that manufacturers prefer to smooth the burden of incentive constraints between the present and the future. Moreover， under multiperiod cooperation it is found that the total reward generated by the retailer’s effort is not fully realized in the current period， and it is also found the phenomenon of equal shares of payment for each subsequent period. However， when the parties do not know when the partnership will end， the manufacturer can derive additional benefits from repeating the game over time， i.e.， the incentive cost is the same for each period. If the retailer places a high value on future revenue， the manufacturer’s expected revenue will tend to be Pareto optimal， i.e.， the retailer does not have to take any risk in the long-run game. This mechanism of action is known as the “smoothing effect” of the manufacturer’s revenue allocation structure system.

Key words: long-term payments, revenue allocation structure, moral hazard, dynamic incentives