具有非对称零售服务质量的网络零售商退货运费险竞争策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2112

Abstract

Abstract:

Return freight insurance has become a common service offered by major e-commerce platforms. Retailers differ substantially in how they provide this service—some offer it for free， while others only allow consumers to purchase it themselves. These differences have significant implications for conversion rates， return behavior， and price competition. At the same time， retailers on the same platform exhibit substantial heterogeneity in retail service quality， such as the richness of product information， responsiveness of customer service， and the availability of sizing or fitting tools. Retail service quality affects consumers’ satisfaction probability and return likelihood， and also shapes insurance companies’ risk-based pricing of return freight insurance. However， existing research has primarily focused on vertical product quality， and has not systematically examined return freight insurance competition under retail service quality differences combined with horizontal product differentiation. A Hotelling-type duopoly model with heterogeneous retail service quality is developed. Retail service quality is incorporated into consumers’ satisfaction probabilities and how differences in service quality， insurance premiums， and refund compensation jointly influence retailers’ pricing， demand， and profitability under both monopoly and competitive settings is analyzed. The results show that， in a monopoly， retailers with higher service quality have a stronger incentive to offer return freight insurance， and the choice between offering it for free or providing only a purchase option depends primarily on the retailer’s own insurance cost rather than the consumer-paid premium. In a competitive market， return freight insurance affects not only total demand but also the location of the marginal indifferent consumer， thereby reshaping the demand boundary between the two retailers. Importantly， in contrast to findings in the vertical‐quality literature， it is shown that when retail service quality differences and horizontal differentiation interact， the two competing retailers can never simultaneously benefit from offering return freight insurance. Any insurance-provision strategy generates a clear demand-shifting effect in favor of one retailer at the expense of the other. It concludes with several managerial implications， highlighting that retailers should carefully consider their own service quality and insurance cost structure when designing return freight insurance policies， and strike a cost-effective balance among service-quality investment， return compensation， and insurance-premium subsidies in this paper.

Key words: return freight insurance, retail service quality, Hotelling model, horizontal differentiation, competitive strategy

CLC Number:

F272

Peng Zhang,Huijuan Wang,Jun Ma, et al. A Study on the Competitive Strategy of Freight Insurance for E-retailers with Different Retail Quality[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(8): 257-268.

Figures/Tables 14

条件

结果

0 r C r R 1 - θ m

$P M * P C * P R *$

$D M * D R * D C *$

$π M * π R * π C *$

0 r C 1 - θ m ≤ r R m

$P M * = P R * P C *$

$D M * = D R * D C *$

$π M * = π R * π C *$

1 - θ m ≤ r C r R m

$P M * = P R * P C *$

$D C * ≤ D M * = D R *$

$π C * ≤ π M * = π R *$

条件

高质量网络零售商

低质量网络零售商

C 2 C

$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$

$D 1 R C * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 C R *$

$π 1 R C * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 C R *$

$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$

$D 2 C R * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 R C *$

$π 2 C R * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 R C *$

E 2 C

$P 1 R R * P 1 R C * / P 1 C R * P 1 C C *$

$D 1 R R * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 C C *$

$π 1 R R * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 C C *$

$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$

$D 2 C C * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 R R *$

$π 2 C C * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 R R *$

条件

高质量网络零售商

低质量网络零售商

C 1 C

$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$

$D 1 R C * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 C R *$

$π 1 R C * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 C R *$

$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$

$D 2 C R * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 R C *$

$π 2 C R * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 R C *$

E 1 C

$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$

$D 1 C C * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 R R *$

$π 1 C C * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 R R *$

$P 2 R R * P 2 R C * / P 2 C R * P 2 C C *$

$D 2 R R * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 C C *$

$π 2 R R * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 C C *$

高质量网络零售商		低质量网络零售商
$C 2 C$	$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$	$C 1 C$	$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$
$E 2 C$	$P 1 R R * P 1 R C * / P 1 C R * P 1 C C *$	$E 1 C$	$P 2 R R * P 2 R C * / P 2 C R * P 2 C C *$

条件

高质量网络零售商

低质量网络零售商

C 1 C ⋂ C 2 C

$D 1 R C * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 C R *$

$π 1 R C * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 C R *$

$D 2 C R * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 R C *$

$π 2 C R * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 R C *$

C 1 C ⋂ E 2 C

$D 1 R R * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 C C *$

$π 1 R R * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 C C *$

$D 2 C C * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 R R *$

$π 2 C C * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 R R *$

E 1 C ⋂ C 2 C

$D 1 C C * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 R R *$

$π 1 C C * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 R R *$

$D 2 R R * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 C C *$

$π 2 R R * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 C C *$

E 1 C ⋂ E 2 C

$D 1 C R * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 R C *$

$π 1 C R * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 R C *$

$D 2 R C * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 C R *$

$π 2 R C * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 C R *$

	$Δ 1 C C , Δ 2 C C $
$Δ r C C Δ θ m$	$+, -$
$Δ r C C Δ θ m$	$-, +$

$C 2 R$		$E 2 R$
$Δ r C R Δ θ m$	$+, -$	$C 1 C$	$+, -$
$Δ r C R Δ θ m$	$-, +$	$E 1 C$	$-, +$

$C 1 R$		$E 1 R$
$Δ r R C Δ θ m$	$+, -$	$C 1 C$	$+, -$
$Δ r R C Δ θ m$	$-, +$	$E 1 C$	$-, +$

	$C 1 R ⋂ C 2 R$	$C 1 R ⋂ E 2 R$	$E 1 R ⋂ C 2 R$	$E 1 R ⋂ E 2 R$
$Δ r R R Δ θ m$	$+, -$	$+, -$	$-, +$	$0, 0$
$Δ r R R Δ θ m$	$-, +$	$+, -$	$-, +$	$0, 0$

References 29

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A Study on the Competitive Strategy of Freight Insurance for E-retailers with Different Retail Quality

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