Abstract:

In today’s society， where natural disasters and emergencies occur frequently， the effective reserves of emergency supplies is crucial for enhancing our country’s capacity to prevent and withstand major risks， as well as for ensuring social security and stability. However， the government often faces dual challenges of funding pressure and storage capacity limitations in physical reserve strategies. To address this dilemma， the government actively advocates for the social transformation of emergency supply reserves， aiming to create a new ecosystem for collaborative emergency reserves between the government and enterprises.A review of the relevant literature shows that early studies on the collaborative reserve of emergency supplies by the government and enterprises primarily considered the potential advantages of cooperation from a risk-neutral perspective. In recent years， the focus has shifted to more complex and realistic scenarios that incorporate risk aversion. While some studies have attempted to explore subsidy strategies to alleviate cooperation barriers caused by risk aversion， most have concentrated on the risk attitudes of a single party （such as enterprises） and have rarely expanded the perspective to the complex emergency environment where both the government and enterprises exhibit risk-averse characteristics. Furthermore， there is a lack of research that deeply explores how to optimize subsidy strategies to more effectively promote cooperation between risk-averse government and enterprise parties in emergency supply reserves.To further enhance efficient collaborative cooperation in emergency supply reserves between the government and enterprises， a residual supply subsidy strategy within a cooperative framework based on flexible quantity contracts is introduced. Two models of collaborative reserves are constructed： one as a benchmark model for risk-neutral government and enterprises， and the other as a risk-averse model based on Conditional Value-at-Risk （CVAR） decision criteria. Using the Stackelberg game model and backward induction method， the optimal decision-making strategies of the government and enterprises under different risk preference scenarios are analyzed. Finally， a case simulation is conducted on the collaborative reserve issue of disaster relief tents， investigating how key factors such as risk aversion coefficients and the government’s regular reserves influence the formulation of subsidy strategies.The research findings indicate that compared to risk-neutral scenarios， risk-averse enterprises adopt more conservative reserve strategies， reducing reserve quantities to mitigate potential economic losses. Meanwhile， risk-averse governments are more sensitive and vigilant to reductions in the reserve quantities held by enterprises， which may lead them to increase the optimal reserve subsidy to address enterprise concerns and maintain the stability and adequacy of emergency reserves. Moreover， as both parties’ risk aversion intensifies， as well as the government’s own reserve scale increases and spot market procurement prices rise， the optimal reserve subsidy that the government is willing to provide will also increase. By considering the risk-averse behavior of both the government and enterprises， it aligns more closely with real-world conditions and offers theoretical support for developing more accurate emergency supply reserve strategies. Furthermore， by optimizing subsidy strategies， it provides new ideas for establishing a stable collaborative reserve relationship between the government and enterprises.

Key words: emergency supplies reserve, government-enterprise collaboration, quantity flexibility contract, government subsidy, risk aversion