Abstract:

The production competition and charging infrastructure investment collaboration strategies between traditional automobile manufacturers and new energy vehicle （NEV） manufacturers under a dual oligopoly market structure are investigated. By constructing and solving both non-cooperative cooperative biform game model， how manufacturers determine the optimal production and investment strategies is revealed， as well as how profits are reasonably distributed. Theoretical and numerical analyses lead to the following conclusions： 1） The substitution rate between NEVs and fuel vehicles （FVs） significantly impacts manufacturers' production and charging infrastructure investment decisions； 2） Adjustments to charging service fees should be implemented in stages. When the NEV substitution rate is low， reducing service fees can effectively expand the NEV market and drive traditional manufacturers to transition. However， in the high substitution rate phase， excessive intervention should be avoided； 3） The effectiveness of the dual credit policy varies with the substitution rate. NEV credit values and trading prices have a positive incentive effect in low substitution rate markets， but their effectiveness reverses in high substitution rate markets. Additionally， the sensitivity of NEV credit price changes is higher than that of credit value changes； 4） Charging infrastructure subsidies have a significant effect during the early stages of NEV adoption， but their marginal benefits gradually decline as the substitution rate increases. The analysis of the impact of the dual credit policy on manufacturers' production decisions is expanded， the strategic role of charging infrastructure investment in a competitive cooperation environment is deepened， and theoretical foundations and decision-making references for policymakers and industry practitioners are provided.

Key words: new energy vehicles, fuel vehicle, charging infrastructure investment, noncooperative-cooperative biform game, dual?credit policy