绿色信贷融资对制造商技术研发及授权决策的影响研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1257

Abstract

Abstract:

With the rapid development of the global economy， the ecological and environmental issues caused by carbon emissions have increasingly become a focal point for both governments and consumers. Driven by both the government and consumers， the R&D of low-carbon technologies has become an effective way for enterprises to achieve sustainable development and enhance their core competitiveness. However， for small and medium-sized manufacturers， the high capital investment required for R&D in low-carbon technologies may impose financial pressures on the enterprises. Green credit financing can alleviate the funding constraints faced by manufacturers during the initial R&D phase， while the licensing of low-carbon technologies can accelerate the recovery of funds. Both factors have a significant impact on R&D-oriented manufacturers.Therefore， to explore the impact of green credit financing on the technology R&D and licensing decisions of manufacturers， models are constructed for manufacturers under both general credit financing and green credit financing， comparing scenarios where technology is not licensed and where it is licensed， within the context of carbon caps and trading mechanisms. The research findings indicate：（1） Regardless of the type of financing model provided by banks， for clean manufacturer， licensing low-carbon technologies can enhance its carbon reduction. Moreover， R&D-oriented manufacturer consistently prefers to license low-carbon technologies； however， non-R&D-oriented manufacturer is only willing to accept technology licensing when the R&D cost coefficient is relatively low. （2） Compared to general credit financing， bank providing green credit can increase the carbon reduction and profits of R&D-oriented manufacturer. This demonstrates that green credit financing is beneficial for R&D-oriented manufacturer in conducting technology R&D. Additionally， it is shown that when the general credit interest rate from banks is low， the provision of green credit financing raises the threshold for non-R&D-oriented manufacturer to accept low-carbon technology licensing； otherwise， green credit financing lowers this threshold. （3） Regardless of whether the R&D-oriented manufacturer licenses its technology， the profits of itself， the retailer， and the bank decrease as the R&D cost coefficient increases. However， the impact of the R&D cost coefficient on the profits of non-R&D-oriented manufacturer also depends on whether they accept technology licensing. Specifically， in the case of not accepting technology licensing， the profits of non-R&D-oriented manufacturer are positively correlated with the R&D cost coefficient， while in the case of accepting licensing， they are negatively correlated. （4） For polluting manufacturer， when the R&D cost coefficient is small， the total carbon emissions of the supply chain under the general credit financing model are higher； when the R&D cost coefficient is large， the total carbon emissions of the supply chain under the green credit financing model are higher. In contrast， for clean manufacturer， the total carbon emissions under the green credit financing model are lower， resulting in less environmental damage.The relevant research results provide a reference for banks in formulating green credit strategies and for manufacturers in making low-carbon innovation decisions.

Key words: Carbon cap and trade, low carbon technology, green credit financing, technology licensing

CLC Number:

F274

Zhibing Lin,Zhiwei Liu. The Impact of Green Credit Financing on Manufacturer 's Technology R&D and Licensing Decisions[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(11): 33-45.

Figures/Tables 14

符号	说明	符号	说明
$c i$	制造商i的单位生产成本	$b$	消费者对于碳减排量的敏感性
$w i$	制造商i的批发价格	$β$	产品替代率
$p i$	产品i的零售价格	$t$	碳排放交易价格
$q i$	产品i的市场需求	$e$	初始单位碳排放量
$k$	研发成本系数	$θ i$	碳减排量
$r$	银行的一般信贷利率	$η$	银行的绿色优惠力度
$E g$	碳配额	$f$	技术授权费用
$π M i$	制造商i的利润	$π B$	银行的利润
$π R$	零售商的利润

$θ 1 B N * = A 1 A 2 (2 - β 2) (2 + β) ψ 1 B N$	$w 1 B N * = k (1 + r) (1 + e t) (2 - β) (2 + β) 2 - t A 2 ψ 2 B N ψ 1 B N$
$q 1 B N * = k (1 + r) A 1 (2 - β) (2 + β) 2 2 ψ 1 B N$	$w 2 B N * = k (1 + r) (1 + e t) (2 - β) (2 + β) 2 - A 22 (2 - β 2) (1 + e t + β) ψ 1 B N$
$q 2 B N * = A 1 (k (1 + r) (2 - β) (2 + β) 2 - A 22 (2 - β 2) (1 + β)) 2 ψ 1 B N$	$p 1 B N * = k (1 + r) (1 + β) (2 - β) (2 + β) 2 (3 - e t (1 - β) - 2 β) - A 2 (2 - β 2) ψ 3 B N 2 (1 - β) ψ 1 B N$
$π M 1 B N * = k A 12 (1 + r) (2 + β) 2 2 ψ 1 + t E g$	$p 2 B N * = 12 (1 1 - β + k (1 + r) (1 + β) (2 - β) (2 + β) 2 (3 - e t (1 - β) - 2 β) - A 2 (2 - β 2) ψ 3 B N 2 (1 - β) ψ 1 B N)$
$π M 2 G N * = A 12 (k (1 + r) (2 + β) (4 - β 2) - A 22 (2 - β 2) (1 + β)) 2 2 (ψ 1 B N) 2 + t E g$
$π R B N * = A 12 (2 k 2 (1 + r) 2 (2 - β) 2 (2 + β) 4 - 2 k A 22 (1 + r) (1 + β) (2 - β) (2 - β 2) (2 + β) 2 + A 24 (2 - β) 2 (1 + β)) 4 (1 - β) (ψ 1 B N) 2$

$θ 1 B Y * = A 1 A 2 A 3 ψ 1 B Y$	$w 1 B Y * = 2 k (1 + r) ((4 - β) (2 + β) + e t (1 - β) (8 - β (2 - 3 β))) - A 2 A 3 t (1 + b e (1 - β)) (1 - β) ψ 1 B Y$
$f B Y * = 2 A 1 k (1 + r) (8 + β 3) (1 - β) ψ 1 B Y$	$w 2 B Y * = 2 k (1 + r) (12 - β (4 - β (2 - β)) + e t (1 - β) (4 + 4 β + β 3) - A 2 A 3 t (1 + b e (1 - β)) (1 - β) ψ 1 B Y$
$q 1 B Y * = k A 1 (1 + r) (8 + β (2 + β + β 2)) ψ 1 B Y$	$p 1 B Y * = k (1 + r) (24 + β (2 + β) + e t (1 - β) (8 - β (2 - 3 β))) - A 2 A 3 t (1 + b e (1 - β)) (1 - β) ψ 1 B Y$
$q 2 B Y * = 2 k A 1 (1 + r) (2 + β 2) ψ 1 B Y$	$p 2 B Y * = k (1 + r) (28 - β (2 - β) 2 + e t (1 - β) (4 + 4 β + β 3) - A 2 A 3 t (1 + b e (1 - β)) (1 - β) ψ 1 B Y$
$π M 1 B Y * = k (1 + r) A 12 A 3 2 ψ 1 B Y + t E g$	$π M 2 B Y * = 8 k 2 A 12 (1 + r) 2 (2 + β 2) 2 (ψ 1 B Y) 2 + t E g$
$π R B Y * = A 12 k 2 (1 + r) 2 (80 + β (16 + β (6 + 5 β)) (6 - β (1 - β))) (1 - β) (ψ 1 B Y) 2$

$η L N * = r - ψ 1 L N k (4 - β 2) 2$	$θ 1 L N * = A 1 A 2 (2 + β) (2 - β 2) 2 ψ 1 L N$
$w 1 L N * = 2 k (1 + e t) (4 - β 2) 2 - (2 - β 2) ψ 2 L N 2 (2 - β) ψ 1 L N$	$w 2 L N * = 2 k (1 + e t) (4 - β 2) 2 - (2 - β 2) A 22 (4 + β - 2 β 2 + e t (4 - β - β 2)) 2 (2 - β) ψ 1 L N$
$q 1 L N * = A 1 (2 k (4 - β 2) 2 - A 22 (2 - β 2) 2) 4 (2 - β) ψ 1 L N$	$q 2 L N * = A 1 (2 k (4 - β 2) 2 - A 22 (2 - β 2) (4 - β + 2 β 2)) 4 (2 - β) ψ 1 L N$
$p 1 L N * = k (3 + e t (1 - β) - 2 β) (4 - β 2) 2 - (2 - β 2) ψ 3 L N 2 (1 - β) (2 - β) ψ 1 L N$	$p 1 L N * = 12 (1 1 - β + 2 k (1 + e t) (4 - β 2) 2 - (2 - β 2) A 22 (4 + β - 2 β 2 + e t (4 - β - β 2)) 2 (2 - β) ψ 1 L N)$
$π M 1 L N * = A 12 (2 k (4 - β 2) 2 - A 22 (2 - β 2) 2) 4 (2 - β) 2 ψ 1 L N + t E g$	$π M 2 L N * = A 12 (2 k (4 - β 2) 2 - A 22 (2 - β 2) (4 - β + 2 β 2)) 2 8 (2 - β) 2 (ψ 1 L N) 2 + t E g$
$π B L N * = A 12 A 22 (2 - β 2) 2 8 (2 - β) 2 ψ 1 L N$	$π R L N * = A 12 (8 k 2 (4 - β 2) 4 - 4 k A 22 (2 - β 2) (4 - β 2) 2 (6 + β - 3 β 2) + A 24 ψ 4 L N) 16 (1 - β) (2 - β) 2 (ψ 1 L N) 2$

$η L Y * = r - ψ 1 L Y 4 k (8 + β 2)$	$θ 1 L Y * = A 1 A 2 A 3 (1 - β) 2 ψ 1 L Y$	$f L Y * = A 1 (8 + β 3) (8 k (8 + β 2) - A 3 A 22) 4 (1 - β) (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$
$w 1 L Y * = 8 k (8 + β 2) ((4 - β) (2 + β) + e t (1 - β) (8 - 2 β + 3 β 2)) - A 2 A 3 ψ 2 L Y 4 (1 - β) (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$		$q 1 L Y * = A 1 (8 + 2 β + β 2 + β 3) (8 k (8 + β 2) - A 3 A 22) 8 (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$
$w 2 L Y * = 8 k (8 + β 2) (12 - β (4 - β (2 - β)) + e t (1 - β)) (4 + 4 β + β 3)) - A 2 A 3 ψ 3 L Y 4 (1 - β) (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$		$q 2 L Y * = A 1 (2 + β 2) (8 k (8 + β 2) - A 3 A 22) 4 (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$
$p 1 L Y * = 8 k (8 + β 2) (24 + β (2 + β) + e t (1 - β) (8 - β (2 - 3 β))) - A 2 A 3 ψ 4 L Y 8 (1 - β) (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$		$π M 1 L Y * = A 3 A 12 (8 k (8 + β 2) - A 3 A 22) 16 (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y + t E g$
$p 2 L Y * = 8 k (8 + β 2) (28 - β (2 - β) 2 + e t (1 - β) (4 + 4 β + β 3)) - A 2 A 3 ψ 5 L Y 8 (1 - β) (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$		$π M 2 L Y * = A 12 (2 + β 2) 2 (8 k (8 + β 2) - A 3 A 22) 2 8 (8 + β 2) 2 (ψ 1 L Y) 2 + t E g$
$π R L Y * = A 12 (80 + β (16 + β (6 + 5 β) (6 - β (1 - β)))) (8 k (1 - β) (8 + β 2) - A 3 A 22) 2 64 (1 - β) (8 + β 2) 2 (ψ 1 L Y) 2$		$π B L Y * = A 12 A 22 A 32 (1 - β) 2 32 (8 + β 2) ψ 1 L Y$

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The Impact of Green Credit Financing on Manufacturer 's Technology R&D and Licensing Decisions

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