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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (10): 232-243.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1036

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Merchant Promotion Strategy Selection under Platform’s “Sales Task-Traffic Reward” Rule: Price Promotion vs. Customer Acquisition Through Traffic Investment

Lin Li(), Yi Zhong   

  1. Institute of Logistics & Supply Chain Management,School of Business,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China
  • Received:2024-06-24 Revised:2024-08-30 Online:2026-10-25 Published:2026-10-09
  • Contact: Lin Li E-mail:lilin012000@163.com

Abstract:

The “Sales Task-Traffic Reward” rule is widely implemented across e-commerce platforms in China, where merchants who achieve predefined sales targets within a specified period receive additional traffic rewards from the platform. Based on this background, how newly onboarded merchants adopt two alternative promotional strategies—price promotion (S) and customer acquisition through traffic investment (B)—to comply with the platform’s incentive mechanism is examined. Based on the analysis of the different characteristics of these sales strategies, a basic model under the non-responsive strategy (F) and decision models under the price promotion strategy (S/B) is constructed. The choice of sales strategies is investigated under different rule indicators, as well as the changes in key decisions such as pricing and traffic investment. By comparing these strategies from multiple perspectives, the optimal sales strategy responses of merchants to the “Sales Task-Traffic Reward” rules is analyzed and ideas are proposed for optimizing platform rule indicators. The main results include: (1) The more generous the traffic reward is, the stronger the incentive for merchants to actively respond to the rules. However, if the sales task threshold is too high, merchants' enthusiasm will decrease; (2) The effective thresholds of S and B strategies are positively influenced by the traffic reward. Increasing the sales task harms merchants' profits and platform profits under the S strategy, but the platform can benefit from traffic investment under the B strategy; (3) The S and B strategies can complement each other to some extent. The more favorable the traffic price, the lower the conversion cost, and the more advantageous the B strategy becomes; (4) Platforms should optimize rule parameters by considering the traffic price menu. When the traffic price exceeds certain threshold, platforms should lower the sales task indicators in the rules.

Key words: platform economy, sales task, traffic reward, price promotion, customer acquisition through traffic investment

CLC Number: