三方演化博弈下政府奖惩机制对WEEE回收的影响

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2196

Abstract

Abstract:

The recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment （WEEE） is an important part of the development of circular economy. The government has issued numerous departmental regulations and formulated industry planning， and manufacturers and recyclers have actively responded to the recycling policy， which has improved the recovery rate of WEEE. In addition， WEEE contains some effective parts， which can be dismantled， reassembled and reused， which can help enterprises save production costs， promote green and low-carbon transformation development， and help realize the goal of “carbon peak and carbon neutrality”.Therefore， an evolutionary game model of government， manufacturer and recycler is constructed， the stability of strategy selection of each game player is analyzed， and then Jacobian matrix is used to further analyze the stability of equilibrium points in the three-party game system. Finally， simulation analysis is carried out to discuss the influence of key parameters on the behavior evolution of participants. It is found：（i） the government's incentive and punishment intensity and the recovery rate of WEEE under the low price strategy of recyclers affect the cost range of the government's implementation of the incentive and punishment mechanism， and the cost range of the government's implementation of the incentive and punishment mechanism further affects the probability of the government's implementation of the incentive and punishment mechanism. However， the recovery （purchase） rate of recyclers and manufacturers under the high price strategy is not affected by cost changes. They vary inversely with the probability that the government will impose rewards and punishments；（ii） the increase in the probability of government implementing rewards and punishments can promote recyclers and manufacturers to choose high-price WEEE recycling as a stabilizing strategy， and the low price strategy of recyclers and manufacturers can in turn affect the probability of government implementing rewards and punishments mechanism；（iii） when the sum of the recovery price and the additional cost of recovery of the recycler under the high-price strategy is greater than the sum of the two under the low-price strategy， the additional cost of recovery of the recycler under the low-price strategy is lower， the recovery rate of the recycler under the high-price strategy is higher， and the government increases the incentives and punishments， all of the three situations will lead the recycler to choose the high-price recovery strategy. However， when the recovery price of the recycler is equal to the sum of the additional cost of recovery under the high price and low price strategies， the recycler will only choose the high price recovery strategy.Some management insights are offered based on our findings. At the early stage of the evolution， the government can increase the amount of WEEE in the recycling system by strengthening the incentives and punishments to promote recyclers and manufacturers to evolve to a stable high price strategy. Recyclers and manufacturers can improve the recovery rate of WEEE by changing the recycling channels and other measures to control the total cost of recycling. When a relatively perfect waste electronic recycling system is formed in the market， the government can adopt the strategy of not implementing rewards and punishments.

Key words: government reward-penalty, tripartite evolutionary game, WEEE, recycling, simulation

CLC Number:

F272

Wenbin Wang,Jinyu Qi,Mengxin Zhang, et al. The Influence of Government Reward-penalty Mechanism on the Recycling of WEEE under the Tripartite Evolutionary Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(11): 264-274.

Figures/Tables 11

符号	符号表示的含义
$k i (i = 1,2, 3,4)$	政府的奖惩力度
$t c$	回收商的回收率
$t m$	制造商的回购率
$C c$	回收商的回收额外成本
$C m$	制造商的回购额外成本
$P$	回收（购）价格
$t 0$	政府设置的回购（收）率
$C g$	政府实行奖惩机制的成本
$C r$	再制造产品的单位成本
$C n$	新产品的单位成本
$Q$	WEEE的回收数量
$Q n$	新产品的需求数量
$w$	新产品的销售价格
$s$	可再制造比例
下标
$c, m, g$	回收商，制造商，政府
$I, N I$	实施奖惩机制，不实施奖惩机制

制造商
		高价回购	低价回购
回收商	高价回收	$Q (P m H - P c H - C c H) + k 1 (t c H - t 0)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m H + C m H) + k 1 (t m H - t 0)$ ， $- k 1 (t c H + t m H - 2 t 0) - C g$	$Q (P m L - P c H - C c H) + k 2 (t c H - t 0)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m L + C m L) + k 2 (t m L - t 0)$ ， $- k 2 (t c H + t m L - 2 t 0) - C g$	实施奖惩	政府
	低价回收	$Q (P m H - P c L - C c L) + k 3 (t c L - t 0)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m H + C m H) + k 3 (t m H - t 0)$ ， $- k 3 (t c L + t m H - 2 t 0) - C g$	$Q (P m L - P c L - C c L) + k 4 (t c L - t 0)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m L + C m L) + k 4 (t m L - t 0)$ ， $- k 4 (t c L + t m L - 2 t 0) - C g$	实施奖惩
	高价回收	$Q (P m H - P c H - C c H)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m H + C m H)$ ， $0$	$Q (P m L - P c H - C c H)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m L + C m L)$ ， $0$	不实施奖惩
	低价回收	$Q (P m H - P c L - C c L)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m H + C m H)$ ， $0$	$Q (P m L - P c L - C c L)$ ， $Q n (w - C n) + s Q (w - C r)$ $- Q (P m L + C m L)$ ， $0$	不实施奖惩

均衡点	特征值 $λ 1, λ 2, λ 3$	特征值实部符号	稳定性结论	条件
$η 1 = 0,0, 0$	$Q (P c L + C c L - P c H - C c H)$ ， $- Q (P m H + C m H - P m L - C m L)$ ， $- k (t c L + t m L - 2 t 0) - C g$	-，-，-	$E S S$	①
$η 2 = 0,0, 1$	$k (t c H - t c L) + Q (P c L + C c L - P c H - C c H)$ ， $k (t m H - t m L) - Q (P m H + C m H - P m L - C m L)$ ， $k (t c L + t m L - 2 t 0) - C g$	-，-，-	$E S S$	②
$η 3 = 0,1, 0$	$Q (P c L + C c L - P c H - C c H)$ ， $Q (P m H + C m H - P m L - C m L)$ ， $- k (t c L + t m H + 2 t 0) - C g$	-，+，-	不稳定点	/
$η 4 = 1,0, 0$	$Q (P c H + C c H - P c L - C c L)$ ， $Q (P m L + C m L - P m H - C m H)$ ， $- k (t c H + t m L + 2 t 0) - C g$	+，-，-	不稳定点	/
$η 5 = 1,1, 0$	$Q (P c H + C c H - P c L - C c L)$ ， $Q (P m H + C m H - P m L - C m L)$ ， $- k (t c H + t m H - 2 t 0) - C g$	+，+，-	不稳定点	/
$η 6 = 1,0, 1$	$k (t c L - t c H) + Q (P c H + C c H - P c L - C c L)$ ， $k (t m H - t m L) - Q (P m H + C m H - P m L - C m L)$ ， $k (t c H + t m L - 2 t 0) + C g$	#，#，+	不稳定点	/
$η 7 = 0,1, 1$	$k (t c H - t c L) + Q (P c L + C c L - P c H - C c H)$ ， $k (t 2 L - t 2 H) + Q (P 2 H + C 2 H - P 2 L - C 2 L)$ ， $k (t 2 H + t c L - 2 t 0) + C g$	#，#，+	不稳定点	/
$η 8 = 1,1, 1$	$k (t c L - t c H) + Q (P c L + C c L - P c H - C c H)$ ， $k (t m L - t m H) + Q (P m H + C m H - P m L - C m L)$ ， $k (t m H + t c H - 2 t 0) + C g$	-，#，+	不稳定点	/
$η 9 = 0, y 1, z 2$	$z 2 k (t c H - t c L) + Q (P c L + C c L - P c H - C c H)$ ， $z 2 (z 2 - 1) y 1 (1 - y 1) k 2 (t m H - t m L) 2$ ， $- z 2 (z 2 - 1) y 1 (1 - y 1) k 2 (t m H - t m L) 2$	#，+，-	不稳定点	③
$η 10 = 1, y 2, z 2$	$z 2 k (t c L - t c H) + Q (P c H + C c H - P c L - C c L)$ ， $z 2 (z 2 - 1) y 2 (1 - y 2) k 2 (t m H - t m L) 2$ ， $- z 2 (z 2 - 1) y 2 (1 - y 2) k 2 (t m H - t m L) 2$	#，+，-	不稳定点	③

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The Influence of Government Reward-penalty Mechanism on the Recycling of WEEE under the Tripartite Evolutionary Game

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