考虑情绪演化下突发事件所致舆情危机的两阶段响应决策方法

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0541

Abstract

Abstract:

The occurrence of emergencies can not only endanger the human society directly but also cause a series of secondary or derivative events because their chain reaction， and public opinion crisis （POC） is one of them. With the rapid development of new media， we-media et.al， the negative impact of emergencies usually can cause POC，thereby resulting in social losses. Therefore， how to propose an effective emergency decision-making method for POC caused by emergencies has become an important issue needs to be solved urgently by the government. Focusing on this issue， a two-stage decision-making method in response to POC considering public emotion evolution is proposed. Firstly， the two-stage decision-making problem in response to POC is described， and a distance measure method for hesitant fuzzy decision information in POC is given. Second， a response method for the initial stage of POC is proposed based on cumulative prospect theory from the perspective of the attribute of response plan. Then， considering the impact of public emotion evolution on decision-making process， a model is constructed to analyze the evolution trend of public emotion under different strategic choices by decision makers， and a programming model regarding the optimal adjustment alternatives in medium stage of POC is given from the perspective of public intervention. a numerical example is given to verify the feasibility of the method， and the comparative analysis with other methods proves the advantages of this method. The results show that：（1） In response process of POC caused by emergencies， the government should pay real-time attention to the public’s emotion changes and whether the initial response plan needs to be adjusted， so as to avoid a large-scale outbreak of POC. （2） Decision makers should adjust the response plan before the proportion of public with negative emotions evolves to a steady state. （3） Compared with the existing distance formulas， our proposed novel distance measurement of decision information in POC can obtain more reasonable decision results.

Key words: public opinion crisis, two-stage decision-making, public emotion, evolutionary game, distance measure of information

CLC Number:

C934

Huifang Nie,Jianjun Zhu. Two-Stage Decision-making Method in Response to Public Opinion Crisis Derived from Emergency Considering Emotion Evolution[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(10): 112-125.

Figures/Tables 23

阶段	参数	说明
$t 1$ 阶段	$S j$	表示舆情发展初期可能出现的第 $i$ 种舆情危机情景， $j = 1,2, ⋯, n$
	$p j$	表示舆情危机情景 $S j$ 发生的概率
	$I q$	表示舆情危机发展初期评估响应预案时决策者关注的第 $q$ 个预案属性， $q = 1,2, ⋯, Q$
	$w q$	表示预案属性 $I q$ 的权重， $0 ≤ w q ≤ 1$ 且 $∑ q = 1 Q w q = 1$
	$A i$	表示舆情危机发展初期制定的备选响应预案， $i = 1,2, ⋯, m$
	$D = [d i j q] m × n × Q$	表示舆情发展初期出现情景 $S j$ 时响应预案 $A i$ 在属性 $I q$ 下的评估值
$t 2$ 阶段	$A i k i -$	表示舆情发展中期在响应预案 $A i$ 的基础上制定的调整子方案， $i = 1,2, ⋯, m$ ， $k i = 1,2, ⋯, m i$
	$L g$	表示舆情发展中期舆情危机产生和演变的第 $g$ 种诱导信息， $g = 1,2, ⋯, G$
	$W g$	表示舆情发展中期对诱导信息 $L g$ 进行评价时的权重， $0 ≤ W g ≤ 1$ 且 $∑ g = 1 Q W g = 1$
	$B = [b i k i g]$	表示舆情危机发展中期响应预案 $A i k i -$ 在诱导信息 $L g$ 下的评估值
	$R = [r i k i]$	表示舆情危机发展初期响应预案 $A i$ 与舆情危机发展中期响应预案 $A i k i -$ 间的相关性大小

参数	含义
$c$	决策部门调整舆情发展初期响应方案所产生的成本
$b 1, b 2$	分别为上级政府就部门方案调整工作不到位和未调整方案而导致负面情绪爆发给予决策部门的惩罚（ $b 1 < b 2$ ）
$μ 1, μ 2$	分别为上级政府就方案调整工作和初期响应预案实施工作所取得成效给予的奖励（ $u 1 < u 2$ ）
$r 1, r 2$	分别为部门方案调整工作不到位和未调整方案导致的公众负面情绪爆发造成的社会损失（ $r 1 > r 2$ ）
$f 1$	舆情危机发展初期最佳响应方案产生的社会价值，其等同于最佳响应预案的前景价值，即 $f 1 = m a x i {V i}$
$f 2$	舆情危机发展中期最佳调整子方案产生的社会价值
$P$	负面情绪下公众的心理需求，有 $P > 0$

		公众
		负面（ $y$ ）	正面（ $1 - y$ ）
政府	调整（ $x$ ）	$(f 2 - c - b 1 - r 1, \| f 2 τ - P \|)$	$(f 2 - c + u 1, f 2 ζ)$
政府	不调整（ $1 - x$ ）	$(f 1 - b 2 - f 2, \| f 1 τ - P \|)$	$(f 1 + u 2, f 1 ζ)$

方案	含义
$A 1$	成立疫情防控小组，出台疫情防治方案和诊疗手段，并实施相关疫情的每日通报等制度
$A 2$	在疫情防控基础上，成立应急响应小组，利用大数据舆情检测平台实时监测舆情危机发展态势
$A 3$	在应急响应基础上，建立积极的干预机制，包括核查舆情信息来源、严惩造谣的组织、开展舆情引导工作
$A 4$	在积极干预基础上，建立舆情危机事件响应的分析报告，并及时公开舆情危机处置进展

方案	$S 1$			$S 2$			$S 3$
方案	$I 1$	$I 2$	$I 3$	$I 1$	$I 2$	$I 3$	$I 1$	$I 2$	$I 3$
$A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 B j q$	${0.2,0.3,0.4} {0.2,0.5,0.6} {0.2,0.3,0.5} {0.3,0.4} {0.2,0.4,0.5}$	${0.4,0.5,0.7} {0.4,0.5} {0.3,0.4,0.6} {0.2,0.4} {0.3,0.45,0.55}$	${0.4,0.8} {0.3,0.4,0.5} {0.4,0.5,0.6} {0.3,0.4} {0.35,0.6}$	${0.5,0.6,0.7} {0.2,0.3} {0.3,0.5} {0.2,0.4,0.6} {0.35,0.45,0.5}$	${0.5,0.6,0.7} {0.3,0.4} {0.2,0.3,0.5} {0.4,0.7,0.8} {0.35,0.45,0.6}$	${0.2,0.6} {0.4,0.5} {0.5,0.7,0.8} {0.6,0.7,0.8} {0.4,0.65,0.7}$	${0.6,0.7} {0.3,0.4,0.5} {0.4,0.5,0.6} {0.7,0.8} {0.5,0.6,0.65}$	${0.2,0.4} {0.4,0.5,0.6} {0.3,0.4,0.6} {0.4,0.7} {0.3,0.55}$	${0.5,0.6,0.8} {0.5,0.8} {0.3,0.5} {0.2,0.4,0.6} {0.4,0.65}$

方案	$h i j q$			$v (h i j q)$
	$S 1$	$S 2$	$S 3$	$S 1$	$S 2$	$S 3$
	$I 1 I 2 I 3$	$I 1 I 2 I 3$	$I 1 I 2 I 3$	$I 1 I 2 I 3$	$I 1 I 2 I 3$	$I 1 I 2 I 3$
$A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4$	$0.13 0.15 0.37 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.15 0.28 0.15 0.21 0.30$	$0.15 0.17 0.34 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.21$	$0.22 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.20 0.30 0.29$	$0.17 - 0.39 - 0.91 - 0.43 - 0.44 0.32 0.15 0.18 0.71 0.18 0.25 0.34$	$- 0.39 - 0.45 0.38 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.21 - 0.55 0.24$	$- 0.57 0.32 - 0.70 0.24 - 0.65 - 0.86 0.24 - 0.58 0.37 - 0.57 - 0.74 0.33$

方案		含义	$r i k i$
$A 1$	$A 11 -$	政府部门、卫生防疫部门和医疗机构出台更成熟的防治方案和诊疗手段	0.50
$A 1$	$A 12 -$	各级政府组织广大群众积极开展疫情防控工作，并加强各类媒体的引导工作	0.48
$A 2$	$A 21 -$	了解公众关注的重点和疑点问题，预见舆情危机的发展和结果	0.55
$A 2$	$A 22 -$	识别主导舆情危机的诱导信息，并发布权威主流信息以阻止谣言传播	0.52
$A 3$	$A 31 -$	协同网络媒体封堵和删除网上谣言，特殊时期采取强硬手段	0.40
$A 3$	$A 32 -$	协同社会企业共同做好响应准备，尽可能保证公众可能抢购物资的供应	0.39
$A 4$	$A 41 -$	信息公开透明，及时澄清公众关切和疑惑，建立公众与政府之间的信任关系	0.50
$A 4$	$A 42 -$	根据公众的情绪和感受采取响应安慰措施，消除公众负面情绪	0.50

主导信息	$A 1$		$A 2$		$A 3$		$A 4$
主导信息	$A 11 -$	$A 12 -$	$A 21 -$	$A 22 -$	$A 31 -$	$A 32 -$	$A 41 -$	$A 42 -$
$L 1 L 2 L 3$	${0.3,0.4,0.5} {05,0.6} {0.4,0.6,0.7}$	${0.4,0.6,0.8} {0.5,0.6,0.7} {0.6,0.7}$	${0.2,0.4} {0.4,0.6,0.7} {0.3,0.5}$	${0.55,0.6,0.7} {0.4,0.7,0.8} {0.5,0.7}$	${0.4,0.5} {0.3,0.4,0.5} {0.4,0.5,0.7}$	${0.3,0.4,0.6} {0.4,0.5,0.6} {0.4,0.6}$	${0.4,0.5} {0.3,0.4,0.5} {0.2,0.4}$	${0.5,0.6} {0.4,0.6} {0.3,0.4,0.5}$

主导信息	$A 1$	$A 2$	$A 3$	$A 4$
主导信息	$A 11 - A 12 -$	$A 21 - A 22 -$	$A 31 - A 32 -$	$A 41 - A 42 -$
$L 1 L 2 L 3$	$0.40 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.62$	$0.30 0.53 0.39 0.60 0.57 0.56$	$0.45 0.40 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.48$	$0.45 0.40 0.30 0.56 0.45 0.40$

不同数值类型

舆情危机发展初期的响应决策结果

实数

区间数

直觉模糊数

犹豫模糊数

A 2 ≻ A 3 ≻ A 4 ≻ A 1 A 2 ≻ A 3 ≻ A 4 ≻ A 1 A 2 ≻ A 3 ≻ A 4 ≻ A 1 A 3 ≻ A 4 ≻ A 2 ≻ A 1

不同的距离测度公式

方案排序结果

基于文献[9]提出的距离公式

基于文献[10]提出的距离公式

基于文献[11]提出的距离公式

基于文献[12]提出的距离公式

基于本文提出的距离测度公式

A 4 ≻ A 3 ≻ A 2 ≻ A 1 A 4 ≻ A 2 ≻ A 3 ≻ A 1 A 3 ≻ A 2 ≻ A 4 ≻ A 1 A 3 ≻ A 2 ≻ A 4 ≻ A 1 A 3 ≻ A 4 ≻ A 2 ≻ A 1

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Two-Stage Decision-making Method in Response to Public Opinion Crisis Derived from Emergency Considering Emotion Evolution

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