Abstract: In this paper,we use Stachelberg game theory model to consider how a monopolistic firm of short life cycle product manages the revenue in the perspective of the strategic consumer behavior.The conclusion shows that the firm will leave a lot of money on the table if it ignores the consumer's strategic behavior.The firm should make the optimal price policy based on the inventory and consumers expectation.When the inventory is small,the firm can ignore the strategic consumer behavior and make a high price policy; When the inventory is relative large,the firms ptimal profit will be realized under the only rational equilibrium; when the inventory is enough,the firms optimal price policy is related with the consumers rational expectation and value discount.The firm can use suitable inventory controlling to enhance the risk of stock out,and avoid the adverse impact of the consumers strategic behavior.The conclusion is useful for the revenue management of the short life cycle product.

Key words: strategic consumer behavior, rational expect, dynamic pricing, Nash equilibrium