区块链智能合约驱动下动态利率定价的订单融资与供应链运营策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1934

Abstract

Abstract:

With the initial practical application of the blockchain smart contract-driven dynamic interest rate pricing method （DIP）， it is worth exploring compared to the stable interest rate pricing method （SIP）， what the value of DIP is， and how to introduce DIP into a supply chain financing scheme. Two types of bank interest rate pricing methods， SIP and DIP， are considered when a manufacturer applies for financing from a bank through the purchase order financing mode. Under SIP， before granting financing funds to the manufacturer， the bank decides a stable interest rate that remains unchanged throughout the loan cycle. Whereas， under DIP， after granting financing funds， the bank determines a detection time point to check the manufacturer’s production process， and the interest setting of the bank is contingent on whether the manufacturer has finished production and delivery at the detection time point. It aims to investigate how DIP changes participants’ decisions， and compared to SIP， whether DIP can bring extra profit for each participant， and under what conditions DIP should be applied. Stackelberg game and newsvendor models are used to analyze the bank’s interest rate pricing decisions， manufacturer’s production decisions， and retailer’s order decisions under SIP and DIP， and based on this， each participant’s profits under SIP and DIP are compared and DIP’s applicable conditions are identified. It is suggested that：（1） SIP can lead to the manufacturer’s and retailer’s deviations from their respective optimal decision profits under certain conditions， namely， under SIP， the manufacturer and retailer obtain lower profits than their optimal decision profits. （2） DIP can always completely repair the manufacturer’s deviation from its optimal decision profit caused by SIP， thereby improving the manufacturer’s profit to the level of its optimal decision profit， but DIP cannot guarantee the repair of the retailer’s deviation from its optimal decision profit caused by SIP. （3） There exist upper and lower bounds of the probability of the manufacturer completing delivery at the order deadline， as well as upper and lower bounds of the cost saving the manufacturer obtains from the delayed delivery； Within these upper and lower bound ranges， DIP can synchronously repair the manufacturer’s and retailer’s deviations from their optimal decision profits caused by SIP （namely， DIP can improve the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits to their respective optimal decision profits）， and DIP should be introduced. （4） Moreover， considering the retailer’s additional operating cost caused by the manufacturer’s delayed delivery， it is found that： If this retailer’s additional operating cost caused by the manufacturer’s delayed delivery is bigger than the cost saving the manufacturer obtains from delayed delivery， DIP can synchronously repair the manufacturer’s and retailer’s deviations from their respective optimal decision profits caused by SIP； Otherwise， DIP still cannot guarantee the repair of the retailer’s deviation from its optimal decision profit caused by SIP. The findings can help banks and enterprises make decisions on whether to introduce DIP and meanwhile provide guidance for a supply chain to achieve Pareto improvement through DIP.

Key words: supply chain, purchase order financing, smart contract, dynamic interest rate, manufacturer

CLC Number:

F274

Chengfu Wang,Xiangfeng Chen,Wei Jin, et al. Purchase Order Financing and Supply Chain Operations Strategies under Blockchain Smart Contract-driven Dynamitic Interest Rate Pricing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(6): 319-330.

Figures/Tables 5

参变量	描述
$ϵ$	制造商在检测时刻未完成供货时，能够在订单截止时刻完成供货的概率
$ξ$	随机市场需求量
$h (ξ)$	失效率， $h ξ = f ξ F ¯ ξ = f ξ 1 - F (ξ)$
$H (ξ)$	广义失效率， $H ξ = ξ h ξ = ξ f ξ 1 - F (ξ)$
$a$	制造商延迟供货（即在检测时刻之后的订单截止时刻完成供货）引发的零售商单位产品附加运营成本
$b$	制造商延迟供货（即在检测时刻之后的订单截止时刻完成供货）为自身带来的单位成本节约值
$c$	制造商单位产品的生产供货成本
$i$	下标， $i = m, r$ 分别表示制造商和零售商
$j$	上标， $j = y, n$ 分别表示制造商在检测时刻完成供货的情形，制造商在检测时刻不完成供货的情形
$p$	产品市场零售价
$q$	零售商决策的订货量
$R$	银行决策的利率
$R f$	市场无风险利率
$R n$	风险利率
$S (q)$	零售商的期望销售量， $S q = E m i n ξ, q = ∫ 0 q ξ f (ξ) d ξ + ∫ q + ∞ q f (ξ) d ξ = ∫ 0 q F ¯ ξ d ξ$
$w$	制造商决策的批发价格
$π i j$	参与方 $i$ 在情形 $j$ 下的期望利润
$π i j *$	博弈均衡下，参与方 $i$ 在情形 $j$ 下的期望利润

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Purchase Order Financing and Supply Chain Operations Strategies under Blockchain Smart Contract-driven Dynamitic Interest Rate Pricing

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