Abstract:

A Stackelberg dynamic game model is constructed to obtain the equilibrium decisions of wholesale price， retail price and product green level when the manufacturer are overconfident and capital-constrained. Under three financing models， the optimal decisions are achieved by backward induction. Using impact analysis， the impact of overconfidence on the decisions and profits is explored， and the financing strategies under different scenarios are obtained through comparative analysis. Numerical simulations are used to verify the theoretical results.Firstly， the game model under three financing models （bank loan， retailer advance and equity financing） is constructed to analyse the supply chain operation decision of each financing model considering overconfidence and to analyse the impact of overconfidence on the operation decision； Secondly， the financing strategy is obtained by comparing the manufacturer's profit under the three financing models and the impacts of overconfidence on the financing strategy are investigated. Research Results The choice of manufacturer financing strategy is associated with the level of overconfidence and the proportion of equity dividends， which differs from the finding that trade credit is often the best choice in previous studies of rational financing for decision makers； Overconfidence of decision makers is also found to affect operational decisions in green supply chains differently under different financing models， with overconfidence of the dominant supply chain player damaging the interests of other participants. The operational decisions and financing strategies considering the makers’ overconfidence are significantly different from the rational state， moreover， the operational decisions and benefits of followers are influenced by the overconfidence of the dominant person. Therefore， decision makers in the dominant position should take appropriate measures to eliminate the negative impact of overconfidence on supply chain partners， otherwise the imbalance of supply chain benefits caused by the power structure may lead to the breakdown of the partnership within the supply chain. Although supply chain operations and financing decisions when firms are short of capital have attracted much attention， the existing financing research related to behavior preferences of decision-makers still is relatively weak. There exists some literature considering the effects of risk-averse and fairness concerns， but less studies on financing and operational decisions with overconfidence. In fact， many firms are overly optimistic about the market status and their own operations state， and make irrational operational and financing decisions， which resulting in a failure to optimize the efficiency of supply chain operations， or even to go bankrupt. The gap between the operations as well as financing decisions and overconfidence preference is filled by investigating the optimal financing stratgy and pricing decisions of overconfident anufacturers with capital-constrained in a green supply chain. In a two-echelon green supply chain comprised of a dominant and capital-constrained manufacturer and the follower retailers， which manufacturers are overconfident in the market demand for their green products， while retailers have sufficient funds. Manufacturers have three financing ways： bank credit， trade credit and equity financing. The pricing and financing strategies of the supply chain are examined under the three financing models and the impact of overconfidence on operational decisions and the choice of financing strategies is explored under manufacturers’ overconfidence.

Key words: overconfidence, financing decisions, green supply chains, capital-constrained