区块链技术赋能下考虑新能源汽车动力电池梯次利用的定价策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1418

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

动力电池梯次利用是指对“退役”的动力电池进行检测、分类、拆分，通过再循环使其功能全部或部分恢复后再应用至其他领域的过程。考虑到电动汽车电池梯次利用的安全性，本文基于区块链技术具有信息溯源的优势，构建由一个电池制造商和一个授权处理商组成的两阶段博弈模型，研究区块链技术引入对供应链成员最优决策的影响。研究结果表明：（1）仅当两类梯次产品的竞争强度适中时，电池制造商和授权处理商才有合作的可能，此时双方利润均随着产品竞争强度的增加而增加；（2）对电池制造商而言，区块链技术引入成本存在一个临界值，当引入成本小于该临界值时，制造商才有动力引入区块链技术，此时消费者剩余和社会福利均优于无区块链的情形；（3）当电池制造商相对于授权处理商处于强势地位时，其利润分成也将会高于授权处理商。最后，本文以比亚迪“唐”为例，通过收集行业实际数据对模型进行验证，计算结果表明，模型具有较强的稳健性和适用性。

关键词: 动力电池, 区块链技术, 梯次利用, 定价策略

Abstract:

Echelon utilization of power batteries refers to the process of inspecting， classifying， and disassembling “retired” power batteries， followed by recycling them to restore their functionality， either partially or fully， for application in other fields. Considering the safety of echelon utilization of electric vehicle batteries， a two-stage game model is constructed， consisting of a battery manufacturer and an authorized processor， based on the advantage of blockchain technology in information traceability， and the impact of introduction of blockchain technology on the optimal decisions of supply chain members is investigated. The battery manufacturer is the leader in the game， while the authorized processor is the follower. The model is solved using backward induction. The research findings indicate that：（1） Battery manufacturers and authorized processors are likely to cooperate only when the competition intensity between the two types of echelon products is moderate， and both parties' profits increase with the intensification of product competition；（2） For battery manufacturers， there is a critical value for the cost of introducing blockchain technology. Only when the introduction cost is below this critical value does the manufacturer have the incentive to introduce blockchain technology. At this point， consumer surplus and social welfare are both superior to scenarios without blockchain technology. （3） Compared to the battery manufacturer， the authorized processor has no incentive to introduce blockchain， as the processor’s profit in this scenario is lower than the situation where the battery manufacturer is responsible for introducing blockchain. （4） When the battery manufacturer is in a dominant position relative to the authorized processor， its profit share will be higher than that of the authorized processor. Finally， using BYD's "Tang" as an example， this paper validates the model by collecting actual industry data. The calculation results show that the model has strong robustness and applicability. The conclusions of this study further enrich the application of blockchain technology in operations management.

Key words: power battery, blockchain technology, echelon utilization, pricing strategy

中图分类号:

F272.3

徐杰,胡文,罗春林, 等. 区块链技术赋能下考虑新能源汽车动力电池梯次利用的定价策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(5): 285-294.

Jie Xu,Wen Hu,Chunlin Luo, et al. Pricing Strategies for the Echelon Utilization of New Energy Vehicle Power Batteries Enabled by Blockchain Technology[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(5): 285-294.

图/表 6

表1

符号及含义"

符号	含义
参数
$q H j$ ， $q L j$	$H$ 型和 $L$ 型产品的市场需求量
$c H$ ， $c L$	$H$ 型和 $L$ 型电池回收成本
$F$	区块链技术引入成本
$θ$	消费者对 $H$ 型产品的支付意愿
$β$	$L$ 型产品对 $H$ 型产品的替代程度
$λ$	授权处理商分配给电池制造商的利润比例
$k$	区块链技术采用对消费者感知效用的提升水平
$π M j$ ， $π P j$	电池制造商和授权处理商的利润
决策变量
$p H j$ ， $p L j$	$H$ 型和 $L$ 型产品的零售价格
$w H j$ ， $w L j$	$H$ 型和 $L$ 型产品的批发价格

表1

表2

电池制造商引入区块链技术时的均衡结果"

批发价格	$w H B * = k λ - c H - k λ - 2$	$w L B * = k β λ - k β - c L λ - 2$
零售价格	$p H B * = (2 λ - 3) k - c H 2 λ - 4$	$p L B * = k β 2 λ - 3 - c L 2 λ - 4$
产量	$q H B * = β k - k + c H - c L 2 k λ - 2 1 - β$	$q L B * = β c H - c L 2 λ - 2 β - 1 k β$
利润	$π M B * = (1 - β) [β k (k - 2 c H) + c L 2] + β (c H - c L) 2 4 k β β - 1 λ - 2 - F = λ - 2 λ - 1 π P B * - F$
利润	$π P B * = λ - 1 [(1 - β) (β k (k - 2 c H) + c L 2) + β (c H - c L) 2] 4 k β β - 1 λ - 2 2$

表2

表3

未引入区块链技术时的均衡结果"

批发价格	$w H N * = λ - c H - 1 λ - 2$	$w L N * = β λ - β - c L λ - 2$
零售价格	$p H N * = 2 λ - c H - 3 2 λ - 4$	$p L N * = (2 λ - 3) β - c L 2 λ - 4$
产量	$q H N * = - β - 1 + c H - c L 2 λ - 2 β - 1$	$q L N * = β c H - c L 2 λ - 2 β - 1 β$
利润	$π M N * = (1 - β) [β (1 - 2 c H) + c L 2] + β (c H - c L) 2 4 β β - 1 λ - 2 = λ - 2 λ - 1 π P N *$
利润	$π P N * = λ - 1 [(1 - β) (β (1 - 2 c H) + c L 2) + β (c H - c L) 2] 4 β β - 1 λ - 2 2$

表3

表4

梯次产品替代强度对供应链成员最优决策的影响"

$β$	$w H B *$	$w L B *$	$p H B *$	$p L B *$	$q H B *$	$q L B *$	$π P B *$	$π M B *$
0.62	0.7800	0.4807	0.9400	0.5813	0.1419	0.0057	0.0116	0.0249
0.64	0.7800	0.4880	0.9400	0.5960	0.1313	0.0221	0.0117	0.0251
0.66	0.7800	0.4953	0.9400	0.6107	0.1194	0.0394	0.0118	0.0255
0.68	0.7800	0.5027	0.9400	0.6253	0.1061	0.0579	0.0120	0.0261
0.70	0.7800	0.5100	0.9400	0.6400	0.0909	0.0779	0.0123	0.0270
0.72	0.7800	0.5173	0.9400	0.6547	0.0736	0.0998	0.0127	0.0282
0.74	0.7800	0.5247	0.9400	0.6693	0.0536	0.1241	0.0133	0.0298
0.76	0.7800	0.5320	0.9400	0.6840	0.0303	0.1515	0.0139	0.0318
0.78	0.7800	0.5393	0.9400	0.6987	0.0028	0.1829	0.0148	0.0344

表4

表5

利润分配比例对供应链成员最优决策的影响"

$λ$	$w H B *$	$w L B *$	$p H B *$	$p L B *$	$q H B *$	$q L B *$	$π P B *$	$π M B *$
0.1	0.8474	0.5647	0.9737	0.6674	0.0718	0.0615	0.0138	0.0192
0.2	0.8333	0.5533	0.9667	0.6617	0.0758	0.0649	0.0137	0.0208
0.3	0.8176	0.5406	0.9588	0.6553	0.0802	0.0688	0.0134	0.0227
0.4	0.8000	0.5262	0.9500	0.6481	0.0852	0.0731	0.0130	0.0247
0.5	0.7800	0.5100	0.9400	0.6400	0.0909	0.0779	0.0123	0.0270
0.6	0.7571	0.4914	0.9286	0.6307	0.0974	0.0835	0.0113	0.0297
0.7	0.7308	0.4700	0.9154	0.6200	0.1049	0.0899	0.0099	0.0327
0.8	0.7000	0.4450	0.9000	0.6075	0.1136	0.0974	0.0077	0.0363
0.9	0.6636	0.4155	0.8818	0.5927	0.1240	0.1063	0.0046	0.0405
1.0	0.6200	0.3800	0.8600	0.5750	0.1364	0.1169	0.0000	N/A

表5

表6

单位区块链技术引入成本下的均衡结果"

批发价格	$w H B C * = k (λ - 1) - c - c H λ - 2$	$w L B C * = β k λ - β k - c - c L λ - 2$
零售价格	$p H B C * = k (2 λ - 3) - c - c H 2 λ - 4$	$p L B C * = k β (2 λ - 3) - c - c L 2 λ - 4$
产量	$q H B C * = - β k - c H + c L + k (2 λ - 4) k (β - 1)$	$q L B C * = (c H + c) β - c - c L (2 λ - 4) k (β - 1) β$
利润	$π M B C * = A 4 k β - 1 β λ - 2 = λ - 2 λ - 1 π P B C $ ， $π P B C = λ - 1 A 4 k β - 1 β λ - 2 2$
利润	$A = β (1 - β) k 2 - 2 β (1 - β) c H + c k - β c H + c (c + 2 c L - c H) + (c + c L) 2$

表6

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