具有非对称零售服务质量的网络零售商退货运费险竞争策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2112

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在退货运费险已成为网络零售中普遍的服务项目背景下，不同零售商在赠送退货运费险与仅提供退货运费险购买选择策略上的差异，对在线购物转化率、退货率和价格竞争产生重要影响。同时，零售服务质量的差异，一方面通过改变消费者满意概率与退货率；另一方面通过保险公司对运费险的差异化定价，进一步塑造其策略选择。本文在Hotelling 横向差异化框架下构建存在零售服务质量差异的双寡头竞争模型，并结合不同退货运费险策略的保费与补偿机制，分析零售服务质量差异、保费差异与退货补偿水平对零售商定价、需求及利润的影响。研究发现：在垄断环境中，零售服务质量越高，其提供退货运费险的意愿越强，且是否赠送退货运费险主要取决于自身保费水平而非消费者自付保费；在竞争环境中，退货运费险通过改变无差异消费者的位置影响两家零售商的需求和总需；与纵向质量文献不同，在零售服务质量差异与横向差异化共同作用下，两家零售商不可能同时从退货运费险中获益；任何退货运费险策略组合都具有明显的需求转移效应。最后提出管理启示，建议零售商在退货运费险策略选择中应充分考虑自身零售服务质量和保费结构，并合理权衡零售服务质量投入-退货补偿-赠送保费之间的关系，以实现更具成本效益的策略选择。

关键词: 退货运费险, 零售服务质量, Hotelling模型, 横向差异化, 策略竞争

Abstract:

Return freight insurance has become a common service offered by major e-commerce platforms. Retailers differ substantially in how they provide this service—some offer it for free， while others only allow consumers to purchase it themselves. These differences have significant implications for conversion rates， return behavior， and price competition. At the same time， retailers on the same platform exhibit substantial heterogeneity in retail service quality， such as the richness of product information， responsiveness of customer service， and the availability of sizing or fitting tools. Retail service quality affects consumers’ satisfaction probability and return likelihood， and also shapes insurance companies’ risk-based pricing of return freight insurance. However， existing research has primarily focused on vertical product quality， and has not systematically examined return freight insurance competition under retail service quality differences combined with horizontal product differentiation. A Hotelling-type duopoly model with heterogeneous retail service quality is developed. Retail service quality is incorporated into consumers’ satisfaction probabilities and how differences in service quality， insurance premiums， and refund compensation jointly influence retailers’ pricing， demand， and profitability under both monopoly and competitive settings is analyzed. The results show that， in a monopoly， retailers with higher service quality have a stronger incentive to offer return freight insurance， and the choice between offering it for free or providing only a purchase option depends primarily on the retailer’s own insurance cost rather than the consumer-paid premium. In a competitive market， return freight insurance affects not only total demand but also the location of the marginal indifferent consumer， thereby reshaping the demand boundary between the two retailers. Importantly， in contrast to findings in the vertical‐quality literature， it is shown that when retail service quality differences and horizontal differentiation interact， the two competing retailers can never simultaneously benefit from offering return freight insurance. Any insurance-provision strategy generates a clear demand-shifting effect in favor of one retailer at the expense of the other. It concludes with several managerial implications， highlighting that retailers should carefully consider their own service quality and insurance cost structure when designing return freight insurance policies， and strike a cost-effective balance among service-quality investment， return compensation， and insurance-premium subsidies in this paper.

Key words: return freight insurance, retail service quality, Hotelling model, horizontal differentiation, competitive strategy

中图分类号:

F272

张鹏,王慧娟,马俊, 等. 具有非对称零售服务质量的网络零售商退货运费险竞争策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(8): 257-268.

Peng Zhang,Huijuan Wang,Jun Ma, et al. A Study on the Competitive Strategy of Freight Insurance for E-retailers with Different Retail Quality[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(8): 257-268.

图/表 14

图1

表1

垄断情形下的决策结果比较"

条件

结果

0 r C r R 1 - θ m

$P M * P C * P R *$

$D M * D R * D C *$

$π M * π R * π C *$

0 r C 1 - θ m ≤ r R m

$P M * = P R * P C *$

$D M * = D R * D C *$

$π M * = π R * π C *$

1 - θ m ≤ r C r R m

$P M * = P R * P C *$

$D C * ≤ D M * = D R *$

$π C * ≤ π M * = π R *$

表1

表2

条件C1R⋂E2R下的决策结果比较"

条件

高质量网络零售商

低质量网络零售商

C 2 C

$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$

$D 1 R C * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 C R *$

$π 1 R C * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 C R *$

$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$

$D 2 C R * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 R C *$

$π 2 C R * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 R C *$

E 2 C

$P 1 R R * P 1 R C * / P 1 C R * P 1 C C *$

$D 1 R R * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 C C *$

$π 1 R R * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 C C *$

$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$

$D 2 C C * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 R R *$

$π 2 C C * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 R R *$

表2

表3

条件E1R⋂C2R下的决策结果比较"

条件

高质量网络零售商

低质量网络零售商

C 1 C

$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$

$D 1 R C * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 C R *$

$π 1 R C * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 C R *$

$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$

$D 2 C R * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 R C *$

$π 2 C R * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 R C *$

E 1 C

$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$

$D 1 C C * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 R R *$

$π 1 C C * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 R R *$

$P 2 R R * P 2 R C * / P 2 C R * P 2 C C *$

$D 2 R R * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 C C *$

$π 2 R R * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 C C *$

表3

表4

条件 E1R⋂E2R下的决策结果比较"

高质量网络零售商		低质量网络零售商
$C 2 C$	$P 1 R C * P 1 C C * / P 1 R R * P 1 C R *$	$C 1 C$	$P 2 C R * P 2 C C * / P 2 R R * P 2 R C *$
$E 2 C$	$P 1 R R * P 1 R C * / P 1 C R * P 1 C C *$	$E 1 C$	$P 2 R R * P 2 R C * / P 2 C R * P 2 C C *$

表4

表5

条件E1R⋂C2R下的决策结果比较"

条件

高质量网络零售商

低质量网络零售商

C 1 C ⋂ C 2 C

$D 1 R C * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 C R *$

$π 1 R C * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 C R *$

$D 2 C R * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 R C *$

$π 2 C R * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 R C *$

C 1 C ⋂ E 2 C

$D 1 R R * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 C C *$

$π 1 R R * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 C C *$

$D 2 C C * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 R R *$

$π 2 C C * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 R R *$

E 1 C ⋂ C 2 C

$D 1 C C * D 1 R C * / D 1 C R * D 1 R R *$

$π 1 C C * π 1 R C * / π 1 C R * π 1 R R *$

$D 2 R R * D 2 R C * / D 2 C R * D 2 C C *$

$π 2 R R * π 2 R C * / π 2 C R * π 2 C C *$

E 1 C ⋂ E 2 C

$D 1 C R * D 1 C C * / D 1 R R * D 1 R C *$

$π 1 C R * π 1 C C * / π 1 R R * π 1 R C *$

$D 2 R C * D 2 C C * / D 2 R R * D 2 C R *$

$π 2 R C * π 2 C C * / π 2 R R * π 2 C R *$

表5

图2

图3

图4

图5

表6

情境CC下，网络零售商i的ΔiCC*"

	$Δ 1 C C , Δ 2 C C $
$Δ r C C Δ θ m$	$+, -$
$Δ r C C Δ θ m$	$-, +$

表6

表7

情境CR下，网络零售商i的ΔiCR*"

$C 2 R$		$E 2 R$
$Δ r C R Δ θ m$	$+, -$	$C 1 C$	$+, -$
$Δ r C R Δ θ m$	$-, +$	$E 1 C$	$-, +$

表7

表8

情境RC下，网络零售商i的ΔiRC*"

$C 1 R$		$E 1 R$
$Δ r R C Δ θ m$	$+, -$	$C 1 C$	$+, -$
$Δ r R C Δ θ m$	$-, +$	$E 1 C$	$-, +$

表8

表9

情境RR下，网络零售商i的ΔiRR*"

	$C 1 R ⋂ C 2 R$	$C 1 R ⋂ E 2 R$	$E 1 R ⋂ C 2 R$	$E 1 R ⋂ E 2 R$
$Δ r R R Δ θ m$	$+, -$	$+, -$	$-, +$	$0, 0$
$Δ r R R Δ θ m$	$-, +$	$+, -$	$-, +$	$0, 0$

表9

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