不同权力结构下考虑持股的需求信息不对称供应链定价研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0709

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

越来越多的零售商持有制造商股份，并在供应链中占主导地位。零售商持股和供应链权力结构共同影响上下游企业之间关于市场需求信息的信号传递。考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链，零售商持有制造商股份，且拥有关于市场需求的私有信息，研究零售商主导供应链和制造商主导供应链时上下游企业的定价决策，以及零售商持股对上下游企业信号传递与定价决策的影响。研究发现：无论谁主导供应链，零售商的边际收益与持股比例和市场规模为高类型的概率负相关，批发价与持股比例和市场规模为高类型的概率正相关。当市场规模为低类型时，不论持股比例高低，供应链成员作为供应链主导者时获得的利润高于作为跟随者时获得的利润，但当市场规模为高类型时，供应链成员作为主导者不一定更有利。当制造商主导供应链时，供应链成员的利润与持股比例无关。零售商主导供应链时，当市场规模为低类型时，持股比例较高时，零售商能无成本地传递市场需求信号；持股比例较低时，零售商只能有成本地传递市场需求信号，此时，零售商的边际收益扭曲量和信号成本随持股比例的提高而增加。零售商主导供应链时，提高持股比例能够提高零售商的利润，而不一定能提高制造商的利润，但制造商和零售商在一定条件下能够实现双赢。

关键词: 供应链管理, 持股, 信息不对称, 信号博弈, 权力结构

Abstract:

In the context of supply chains， there is an emerging trend where retailers acquire equity in manufacturers， and gain a position of dominance. This equity holding， coupled with the inherent power structure in supply chains， significantly impacts the flow of demand information signals between upstream and downstream enterprises. A two-tier supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer is considered， where the retailer holds equity in the manufacturer and possesses private information about market demand scale. The aim is to analyze pricing decisions made by both upstream and downstream enterprises， taking into account scenarios where either the retailer or the manufacturer dominates the supply chain. Furthermore， it aims to explore the impact of equity holding on signal transmission and pricing decisions. The findings reveal that， regardless of who leads the supply chain， the retailer's marginal revenue exhibits a negative correlation with both the equity holding ratio and the probability of a high-type market size. Conversely， the wholesale price demonstrates a positive correlation with these factors. In scenarios where the market size is low-type， supply chain members tend to achieve higher profits when acting as leaders， regardless of their equity holding ratio. However， when the market size is high-type， being a leader may not always be advantageous. Notably， when the manufacturer leads the supply chain， the profits of supply chain members remain unaffected by the equity holding ratio. Under retailer leadership， the retailer's signaling behavior is influenced by market size and equity holding ratio. Specifically， when the market size is low-type and the equity holding ratio is low， the retailer must signal the market size information costly， while it can signal the market size information cost-free if the equity holding ratio is high enough. Furthermore， at lower equity holding ratios， both the retailer's marginal revenue distortion and signaling costs increase as the equity holding ratio rises. Finally， an elevated equity holding ratio can indeed boost the retailer's profitability， though it does not guarantee a corresponding increase in the manufacturer's earnings. Nevertheless， under specific circumstances， both entities can achieve a harmonious outcome that leads to mutual advantages.

Key words: supply chain management, equity holding, information asymmetry, signaling game, power structure

中图分类号:

F270

夏良杰,顾梦贤,李友东, 等. 不同权力结构下考虑持股的需求信息不对称供应链定价研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(6): 250-260.

Liangjie Xia,Mengxian Gu,Youdong Li, et al. Pricing Strategies of Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Information Considering Equity Holding under Different Power Structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(6): 250-260.

图/表 5

表1

混同均衡存在的条件"

序号	$a L$	$λ$	$η$
①	$a H 3 < a L ≤ a H 2$	$0 < λ < λ 1$	$0 < η < η 1$
②	$a H 2 < a L < a H$	$0 < λ ≤ λ 2$	$0 < η < 12$
③	$a H 2 < a L < a H$	$λ 2 < λ < λ 1$	$0 < η < η 1$

表1

表2

零售商主导供应链有利于零售商的条件"

序号	$a H$	$λ$	$η$
①	$2 a L < a H < 3 a L$	$λ 3 < λ < 1$	$0 < η < 12$
②	$2 a L < a H < a H 1$	$0 < λ < λ 3$	$0 < η < η 7$
③	$a H 1 < a H < 3 a L$	$λ 4 < λ < λ 3$	$0 < η < η 7$

表2

表3

制造商主导供应链有利于制造商的条件"

序号	$a H$	$λ$	$η$
①	$2 a L < a H < 3 a L$	$3 a L - 2 a H 3 a L - 3 a H < λ < λ 5$	$0 < η < 12$
②	$2 a L < a H < 3 a L$	$λ 6 < λ < λ 7$	$η 9 < η < 12$

表3

表4

零售商主导供应链时供应链成员双赢的条件"

序号	$a L$	$λ$	$η$
①	$a H 3 < a L ≤ a L 1$	$λ 8 < λ < λ 9$	$0 < η < 12$
②	$a L 1 ≤ a L < a H 2$	$λ 8 < λ < λ 9$	$0 < η < η 10$
③	$a L 1 < a L ≤ a H 2$	$0 < λ < λ 9$	$η 10 < η < 12$

表4

图1

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