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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 151-162.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1618cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1618

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本业固守还是他业竞逐?平台跨界运营策略研究

王保骄1, 李治文1(), 熊强1, Le Texier Thomas2   

  1. 1.江苏大学管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013
    2.University of Rennes,France Rennes 35065
  • 收稿日期:2024-09-13 修回日期:2025-10-23 出版日期:2026-11-25 发布日期:2026-11-10
  • 通讯作者: 李治文 E-mail:zhiwenli@ujs.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(25BGL127);江苏省研究生科研创新计划项目(KYCX25_4152)

Stick to the Core Business or Compete in Other Business? Study on Cross-sector Operation Strategy of Platforms

Baojiao Wang1, Zhiwen Li1(), Qiang Xiong1, Thomas Le Texier2   

  1. 1.School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhen’jiang 212013,China
    2.School of Economics,University of Rennes,Rennes 35065,France
  • Received:2024-09-13 Revised:2025-10-23 Online:2026-11-25 Published:2026-11-10
  • Contact: Zhiwen Li E-mail:zhiwenli@ujs.edu.cn

摘要:

近年来,平台企业通过跨界运营构筑生态系统的现象频现,其跨界运营策略及影响引发广泛关注。本文以Hotelling模型为基础,构建连接双边用户(买方与卖方)的两个平台在两个市场(本业市场与他业市场)上的运营和竞争的模型,探讨平台在本业固守还是他业竞逐中的跨界运营策略选择及其影响。研究结果表明:(1)平台跨界运营策略的选择受到价格竞争效应和市场扩张效应两种效应的共同影响;(2)两个平台均选择他业竞逐和仅一个平台选择他业竞逐而另一个平台选择本业固守均可能成为平台跨界运营策略的纳什均衡,具体取决于平台为用户提供的基础效用和用户间的交叉网络外部性;(3)在一个或两个平台选择他业竞逐的情形下,社会总福利水平均可能最高,而在两个平台均选择本业固守的情形下,社会总福利水平最低。

关键词: 双边市场, 平台跨界运营, 策略选择, 平台竞争

Abstract:

In recent years, it has been increasingly common for platform enterprises to build ecosystems through cross-sector operations, and the strategies and impacts of such operations have attracted widespread attention. Based on the Hotelling model, an operation and competition model is established for two platforms connecting two types of users (buyers and sellers) in two markets (the core business market and the other business markets). It explores the platforms’ choices of cross-sector operation strategies and their impacts when faced with the decision to either stick to the core business or compete in other business. It is shown that: (1) The choice of a platform’s cross-sector operation strategy is jointly influenced by two effects: the price competition effect and the market expansion effect; (2) Two scenarios may both become Nash equilibria for platforms’ cross-sector operation strategies, which are both platforms choosing to compete in other business, and only one platform choosing to compete in other business while the other choosing to stick to its core business. The specific equilibrium depends on the basic utility provided by the platforms to users and the cross-network externalities among users; (3) When one or both platforms choose to compete in other business, the social welfare level may reach the highest. In contrast, when both platforms stick to their core businesses, the total social welfare level is the lowest. Theoretical guidance is provided for platform enterprises to formulate cross-sector operation strategies and consolidate their competitiveness, while also laying a theoretical foundation for relevant authorities to address cross-sector regulatory challenges and develop platform cross-sector regulatory policies.

Key words: two-sided markets, platform cross-sector operation, strategy selection, platform competition

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