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中国管理科学 ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (10): 259-268.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0117

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混合销售模式下农产品电商的区块链技术提供策略研究

林晓刚1, 黄海玲1, 李文卓2, 林强1()   

  1. 1.广东工业大学管理学院,广东 广州 510520
    2.华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东 广州 510641
  • 收稿日期:2023-01-19 修回日期:2023-06-02 出版日期:2025-10-25 发布日期:2025-10-24
  • 通讯作者: 林强 E-mail:bmqlin@sina.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72001048);国家社会科学基金重大项目(22&ZD082);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目(2023A1515010857);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目(2021A1515011969);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目(2021A1515011876);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目(2020A1515010697)

Blockchain Provision Strategy in Agricultural Products E-commerce under Hybrid Sales Model

Xiaogang Lin1, Hailing Huang1, Wenzhuo Li2, Qiang Lin1()   

  1. 1.School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China
    2.School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China
  • Received:2023-01-19 Revised:2023-06-02 Online:2025-10-25 Published:2025-10-24
  • Contact: Qiang Lin E-mail:bmqlin@sina.cn

摘要:

随着农产品电商的快速发展,批发和代理相结合的混合模式逐渐成为各大电商平台和商家合作的主流销售模式。与此同时,平台企业可借助区块链技术向合作商家共享市场需求信息以提高销量和利润。基于此,本文在混合销售模式下运用Stackelberg博弈方法构建由两个涉农企业和单个电商平台组成的农产品电商供应链的决策模型,探讨平台企业如何制定两家涉农企业的区块链技术提供策略(即平台企业均不向两家涉农企业提供区块链技术、仅向一方提供区块链技术或同时给两方提供区块链技术)来共享市场需求信息。研究发现:市场需求的不确定性与佣金比例是影响平台企业提供区块链技术的关键因素,即:当需求不确定性较大且佣金比例较小时,平台企业均不向两家涉农企业提供区块链技术;而当佣金比例较大时,平台企业仅向批发模式下的涉农企业提供区块链技术;当需求不确定性和佣金比例都较小时,平台企业仅向代理模式的涉农企业提供区块链技术;当需求不确定性较小且佣金比例适中时,平台企业同时向两家涉农企业提供区块链技术。平台企业均不向与同时向两家涉农企业提供区块链技术,都将导致两家涉农企业的利益受损,但平台企业不管向批发还是代理模式下的单一涉农企业提供区块链技术,都可实现平台企业与该涉农企业双赢。此外,进一步开展存在网络外部性和单个批发/代理模式的拓展研究,发现网络外部性对平台企业的区块链技术提供策略的影响不显著,而单个批发/代理模式下平台企业的区块链技术提供策略与混合销售模式明显不同。

关键词: 平台经济, 农产品电商供应链, 混合销售模式, 区块链技术, 信息共享

Abstract:

With the rapid development of e-commerce of agricultural products, the hybrid sales model, which consists of wholesale and agency channels, has gradually become the main sales mode for major e-commerce platforms and their sellers to cooperate. Additionally, due to the typical characteristics of blockchain technology, i.e., distributed storage, non-tampering and transparency, these platforms can share the information of market demand with their sellers to increase sales and profits. However, the platform will face the elimination of its own information advantages by providing blockchain technology to agriculture-related enterprises. Does the platform have the motivation to share information with upstream agriculture-related enterprises? Can the platform and agriculture-related enterprises win together? Under the hybrid sales model, a game-theoretic model is built to consider an e-commerce agriculture supply chain consisting of an e-commerce platform and two agriculture-related enterprises by using Stackelberg game method. One enterprise sells its product to the platform who then sells to customers (wholesale channel), while the other enterprise sells its product through the platform by paying a commission rate (agency channel). Whether the platform should provide blockchain strategy (and thus disclose demand information) to neither enterprise, one enterprise, or both enterprises is examined. And its impact of the platform's blockchain provision strategy on agriculture-related enterprises and the conditions for the platform and agriculture-related enterprises to achieve a win-win situation is studied. It is found that: The market uncertainty and the commission rate will play a key role in the platform’s blockchain provision strategy. Specifically, when the demand uncertainty is large and the commission rate is small, the platform should not provide blockchain technology to both agriculture-related enterprises. Nevertheless, when the commission rate is large (both the demand uncertainty and the commission rate are small), it is better for the platform to provide blockchain strategy for only the agriculture-related enterprise that uses the wholesale (agency) channel. When the demand uncertainty is small and the commission rate is moderate, the platform provides blockchain technology to two agriculture-related enterprises simultaneously. The profit of the corresponding agriculture-related enterprise who is offered blockchain technology increases as the platform’s provision strategy is to provide blockchain for only one enterprise. However, both the agriculture-related enterprises become worse-off as the platform’s provision strategy is to provide or does not blockchain for both enterprises. Additionally, further expanding the study to investigate the existence of network externality and the single wholesale/agent model, it is found that the impact of network externality on the blockchain provision strategy of platform firms is not significant, while the blockchain provision strategy of platform firms under the single wholesale/agent model is significantly different from the hybrid sales model.

Key words: platform economy, e-commerce supply chain of agricultural products, hybrid sales model, blockchain technology, information sharing

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