考虑预期后悔与二手市场的品牌商区块链防伪技术引入

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0044

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在品牌商与二手商竞争的市场环境下，引入区块链技术能够阻止仿冒品混入二手市场并改善品牌形象。本文考虑消费者预期后悔行为，探讨品牌商的区块链引入策略及产品定价问题，根据品牌商的引入决策，存在两种情形：情形N（品牌商未引入区块链）和情形B（品牌商引入区块链）。在上述两种情形下，构建以品牌商为领导者，二手商为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型，并将均衡结果进行对比分析。结果表明：（1）解决成本问题后，品牌商应当在品牌形象改善程度较高或预期后悔敏感系数较大的条件下引入区块链。（2）区块链的引入会增加二手商的利润，并且预期后悔敏感系数和正品率越大，或平均保值系数越小，二手商受益的可能性越大。（3）考虑品牌形象具有溢出效应时，若该溢出效应较小，则在品牌商有动机引入区块链的情形下，二手商的利润总是降低的；若该溢出效应较大，则在满足一定条件下，品牌商引入区块链会使其和二手商实现双赢。

关键词: 区块链防伪, 二手市场, 预期后悔, 品牌形象, 产品竞争

Abstract:

Under the influence of the circular economy concept， people’s acceptance of second-hand consumption is gradually increasing. However， the penetration of counterfeits has always been a pain point in the secondary market and a long-standing problem for many brand owners. Although the brand owner can achieve strict control over the distribution channel by establishing direct selling store， to ensure that the new products they sell are genuine. However， the second-hand business is usually run by the third-party second-hand dealer. The low ability of the second-hand dealer to identify the authenticity of products has led to the proliferation of counterfeit products in the second-hand market， which can damage the brand image. Blockchain technology can solve the problem of counterfeit products and enhance brand image. In addition， for consumers， the second-hand market coexists with real and fake products， and the new product is expensive. Therefore， consumers may regret in the future no matter which product they buy. When consumers anticipate this potential regret psychology， it can have an impact on their current purchase choices. This behavior is called “anticipated regret” and can further influence the operational decisions of the companies. With the application of blockchain technology， the uncertainty of counterfeits penetrating the secondary market is resolved， naturally avoiding the anticipated regret behavior of consumers.Based on the above background， the competition between the brand owner selling the new product and the second-hand dealer selling the second-hand product is considered. The application of blockchain technology by the brand owner can prevent counterfeits from penetrating the secondary market， which can enhance brand image and also avoid consumers’ post-purchase regret. Therefore， it focuses on the blockchain technology application strategy of the brand owner and its impact on the second-hand dealer when consumers have anticipated regret behavior and when anti-counterfeiting through blockchain technology can also enhance brand image.Then， a Stackelberg game model dominated by the brand owner and followed by the second-hand dealer in scenario N （without blockchain technology） and scenario B （with blockchain technology）， respectively， is built. It is solved for the optimal pricing strategies， demands and profits for the two products based on the backward induction to maximize the profit. Afterwards， the optimal results under scenario N and scenario B are analyzed.The subsequent section covers equilibrium analysis， which consists of two main aspects. First， the sensitivity analysis mainly includes the effects of the anticipated regret sensitivity coefficient， the degree of brand image improvement and the average retention coefficient on the equilibrium results. Second， the optimal price， demand and profit between the two scenarios are compared to obtain the conditions for the brand owner to apply blockchain technology.The important conclusions obtained in this paper are as follows. （1） In Scenario N， as the anticipated regret sensitivity coefficient increases， the retail price of new and second-hand products and the profit of the brand owner increase， the demand for new product remains unchanged while the demand for second-hand product decreases， and the profit of the second-hand dealer first increases and then decreases. （2） In Scenario B， the retail price and demand for both products and the profits of both the brand owner and the second-hand dealer are positively related to the degree of enhancement of the brand image. （3） When blockchain fixed cost is negligible， the brand owner is motivated to apply blockchain technology only when the brand image improvement is high enough and the anticipated regret sensitivity factor is large enough. （4） The application of blockchain technology by the brand owner also benefits the second-hand dealer， and the Pareto improvement region after the application of blockchain is positively related to the anticipated regret sensitivity coefficient as well as the genuine rate， and negatively related to the average retention coefficient. （5） When the spillover effect of brand image improvement is small， the application of blockchain by the brand owner is always detrimental to the second-hand dealer.

Key words: blockchain anti-counterfeiting, second-hand market, anticipated regret, brand image, product competition

中图分类号:

F273

于天阳,关志民,董经洋, 等. 考虑预期后悔与二手市场的品牌商区块链防伪技术引入[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(10): 246-258.

Tianyang Yu,Zhimin Guan,Jingyang Dong, et al. Brand Owner's Blockchain Anti-counterfeiting Adoption Considering Anticipated Regret and Second-hand Markets[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(10): 246-258.

图/表 5

表1

符号说明"

符号	定义	符号	定义
$p 1$	新产品的零售价格，决策变量	$c 1$	新产品的成本
$p 2$	二手产品的零售价格，决策变量	$c 2$	二手产品的成本
$v ∼ U 0,1$	消费者对新产品的估值	$τ$	品牌形象改善的溢出系数
$α ∈ 0,1$	平均保值系数	$u f$	消费者所放弃选项的净效用
$x 0 < x < 1$	二手产品正品率（简称正品率）	$u c$	消费者所选择选项的净效用
$1 - x$	仿冒品入侵率	$u j$	消费者购买产品 $j$ 时的效用， $j = 1,2$
$γ 0 < γ < 1$	预期后悔敏感系数	$d j$	产品 $j$ 的需求， $j = 1,2$
$m$	品牌形象改善程度	$π j$	产品 $j$ 的利润， $j = 1,2$
$F$	引入区块链技术的固定成本

表1

图1

图2

图3

图4

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