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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (9): 99-108.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.2095

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考虑顾客渠道偏好的延保价格和服务水平的协同决策

阮渊鹏, 甄鑫, 丁祥海(), 雒兴刚   

  1. 杭州电子科技大学管理学院,浙江 杭州 310018
  • 收稿日期:2024-11-19 修回日期:2025-04-21 出版日期:2026-09-25 发布日期:2026-09-01
  • 通讯作者: 丁祥海 E-mail:dxh@hdu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学基金项目(23YJC630146);浙江省高校重大人文社会科学攻关计划青年重点项目(2023QN003)

Coordinated Decision of Extended Warranty Price and Service Level Considering Channel Preference

Yuanpeng Ruan, Xin Zhen, Xianghai Ding(), Xinggang Luo   

  1. School of Management,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China
  • Received:2024-11-19 Revised:2025-04-21 Online:2026-09-25 Published:2026-09-01
  • Contact: Xianghai Ding E-mail:dxh@hdu.edu.cn

摘要:

本文研究双渠道模式下,供应链成员在同时决策延保价格和服务水平时,顾客渠道偏好所产生的影响。基于单个制造商和零售商构成的供应链,构建了分别由制造商与零售商决策延保服务价格和延保服务水平的两个模型,探讨了在制造商和零售商分别决定延保服务价格和服务水平时,制造商和零售商的决策行为、各自利润及供应链总利润受顾客渠道偏好的影响。最后,进行数值实验,进一步验证结论。研究发现:由于进入延保市场需要一定的投资门槛,制造商和零售商都需要有一定比例的顾客需求才能维持双方的经济可行性。在延保服务价格敏感性较高的情况下,当由制造商决定延保价格和服务水平时,随着在制造商处购买延保的顾客比例增加,制造商利润减少,而零售商和供应链的总利润增加。此时,制造商应降低产品批发价格和延保服务价格,以保障自身利润;零售商则应提高产品零售价,以增加收益。当由零售商决定延保价格和服务水平时,随着顾客在制造商处购买延保的比例增加,制造商、零售商和供应链的总利润均会减少。此时,制造商应降低产品批发价,以刺激零售采购;零售商则应提高产品零售价以及延保服务价格,并于产品敏感性较低时,降低延保服务水平,以增加销售和延保收益。对于供应链来说,由零售商决策延保服务更优。

关键词: 延保服务水平, 顾客渠道偏好, 博弈论

Abstract:

Extended warranty (EW) services have been regarded as a key strategy for enhancing profit growth in supply chains involving manufacturers and retailers. With the development of digital technologies, dual-channel sales, where both manufacturers and retailers sell directly to consumers, have become increasingly prevalent. In this context, critical decisions regarding the determination of EW pricing and service levels have been raised, particularly under the influence of customer channel preference shaped by individual tendencies and product characteristics. Although prior studies have examined various aspects of EW service management, such as coordinated pricing, service level decisions, and channel strategies under dual-channel settings, the joint decision-making of EW price and service level in such contexts has been largely overlooked. Specifically, the influence of customer channel preference on the strategic behaviors and profit outcomes of supply chain members has not been systematically explored. In order to solve the above problems, a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is considered. Two models are developed in which either the manufacturer or the retailer determines the pricing and service level of the extended warranty. How customer channel preference influences the decision-making behaviors of the manufacturer and retailer, along with their respective profits and the overall supply chain profit under different decision-making structures, is explored. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to further investigate and validate the conclusions. The findings reveal that: (1) Due to the investment threshold required to enter the extended warranty market, both manufacturers and retailers need a certain proportion of customer demand to maintain the economic viability of both parties. (2) Under high EW price sensitivity, when the manufacturer decides on the EW price and service level,as the proportion of customers purchasing EW from the manufacturer increases,the manufacturer’s profit decreases,while the retailer's profit and the overall supply chain profit increase. In this scenario,the manufacturer should lower the product wholesale price and EW price to protect its profit, while the retailer should increase the product retail price to enhance product revenue. (3) Conversely, under high EW price sensitivity, when the retailer decides on the EW price and service level, as the proportion of customers purchasing EW from the manufacturer increases, the profits of the manufacturer, retailer, and the entire supply chain all decrease. The manufacturer should lower the wholesale price to stimulate the retailer's procurement, while the retailer should raise the product retail price and EW price, and reduce the service level when product price sensitivity is low, to increase sales and EW revenue. (4) For the supply chain, the model where the retailer determines the EW service is more advantageous. The theoretical understanding of dual-channel coordinated decision is enriched, and actionable insights are provided for supply chain managers.

Key words: extended warranty service level, customer channel preference, game theory

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