Abstract:

Emergency materials allocation is the prerequisite guarantee for local governments to cope with major public health emergencies. Due to the escalating pressure of epidemic prevention and control and material allocation， decision-makers face the problem of choosing and changing the mode of material allocation. Materials allocation within the territory and the coordination of materials allocation in internal and external provinces and cities are the two main modes to solve the above problems. In this paper， based on the disease transmission rate and the prevention and control level of public health emergencies， the differential game model of dynamic on-demand supply is constructed for two modes of internal allocation and coordinated internal and external allocation. When the demand for fixed materials exceeds the critical value， coordinating internal and external allocation is more advantageous. When the demand for fixed materials is less than the critical value or the cost of external provincial and municipal assistance is greater than the critical value， the internal allocation mode is advantageous. Local governments in disaster areas choose the most appropriate material allocation mode according to specific situations， such as the demand for fixed materials in disaster areas， the proportion of materials allocated within the territory， and the critical point of external provincial and municipal assistance costs. Finally， combined with the case study of material allocation in Wuhan and Xi 'an， a cross-comparison analysis of single factor and double factor is conducted to analyze the total effectiveness of the two deployment modes to provide decision support for the overall allocation and rapid response of materials in significant public health emergencies.

Key words: territorial management, differential game, allocation of materials, emergency management, feedback equilibrium