碳配额交易政策下考虑消费者偏好和成员行为的供应链微分博弈研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2262

Abstract

Abstract:

As environmental conditions deteriorate and climate change accelerates， consumers’ green preference continue to increase in order to reduce their carbon footprint. They will pay more attention to the firm’s environmental performance when purchasing products. Consumers who has green preference are willing to buy environmentally friendly products even if they cost a bit more. Meantime， several legislations， such as emission standard， carbon tax， carbon subsidy， and cap-and-trade system have been issued to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases by the regulators to deal with pollution reduction problems. The pollutant emissions are accumulated with the increase of production， which is not welcome by the environment and has a negative impact on firm’s reputation. Given the manufacturer’s actual emission of production， a reference level is introduced for emissions， which represents the number of emissions permits allocated to the firm by the regulator， and the market price of the carbon quota. Then the impact on the manufacturer’s profit of carbon quota is calculated with respect to actual emissions.As an important characteristic of firm’s environmental performance， green goodwill is an intangible asset that changes over time. In the dynamic equation of green goodwill， we use a parameter to scale the manufacturer’s environmental performance， i.e.， the gap between the actual emission and emission standard $σ (e ˉ - e)$ ， which is interpreted as the consumers’ green preference. When the actual emission is smaller than the standard， i.e.， $e ˉ - e > 0$ ， the environmental performance will have a positive impact on the green goodwill and demand. On the contrary， the impact is negative. The manufacturer’s advertising strategy also has a positive impact on the green goodwill. When the impact of environmental performance is negative， the positive effects of advertising strategy can offset the negative effects.From the short-term and long-term effects of actual carbon emissions， a differential game model is established that demands rely on green goodwill， it is found the advertising and pricing strategies of manufacturer and retailer in different decision-making models， respectively. The impact of key parameters on the strategies and profits is analyzed. Furthermore， the impact of retailer’s myopic behavior on the equilibrium strategies and outcomes is assessed. The retailer is myopic when she ignores the effect of today’s decision on future outcomes. In this setting， the strategies and profits are found and compared when retailer is myopic or far-sight. From the theoretical analysis and numerical simulations， it is found that the carbon quota price and consumers’ green preference coefficient are negatively related to the manufacturer’s advertising strategy and positively to the retailer’s pricing strategy. When the consumers’ green preference coefficient is zero， the retailer’s myopic behavior will have no influence on the advertising and pricing strategies. The environmental performance also has no impact on the decision of consumers. Green goodwill and profits are highest in the centralized decision-making model， and the manufacturer’s green goodwill in myopic scenario is higher than a far-sight scenario. Manufacturer prefers a myopic retailer because it can squeeze the retailer’s profit margins， consolidate the leadership and increase the share of profits. The results of the paper can provide implications for firms and policymakers.

Key words: cap-and-trade, differential game, consumers’ green preference, green goodwill, myopic

CLC Number:

F224

Fanjun Yao,Han Xiao,Ye Gao,Hongwei Gao. A Differential Game Study of Supply Chain Considering Consumers' Green preference and Member's Behavior under Cap-and-trade Policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(1): 231-241.

Figures/Tables 11

参数	$γ$	$μ$	$k$	$τ$	$θ$	$σ$
$A N$	$↗$	$↘$	$↘$	$↘$	$↗$	$↘$
$w N$	$↗$	$↗$	—	$↗$	—	$↗$
$p N$	$↗$	$↗$	—	$↗$	—	$↗$

参数	$γ$	$μ$	$k$	$τ$	$θ$	$σ$
$A O$	$↗$	$↘$	$↘$	$↘$	$↗$	$↘$
$w O$	$↗$	$↗$	—	$↗$	—	$↗$
$p O$	$↗$	$↗$	—	$↗$	—	$↗$

	$γ$	$μ$	$k$	$τ$	$θ$	$σ$
$A C$	$↗$	$↘$	$↘$	$↘$	$↗$	$↘$
$p C$	$↗$	$↗$	—	$↗$	—	$↗$

参数	$σ = 0.2$	$σ = 0.4$	$σ = 0.6$	$σ = 0.8$	$σ = 1$	参数	$σ = 0.2$	$σ = 0.4$	$σ = 0.6$	$σ = 0.8$	$σ = 1$
$w N$	4.453	4.542	4.609	4.661	4.704	$w O$	4.603	4.814	4.982	5.120	5.237
$A N$	5.238	4.397	3.816	3.386	3.053	$A O$	5.614	4.918	4.397	3.989	3.660
$p N$	6.305	6.438	6.538	6.617	6.681	$p O$	6.249	6.354	6.438	6.507	6.566
$G ∞ N$	6.117	5.733	5.715	5.853	6.066	$G ∞ O$	6.412	6.026	5.941	5.997	6.126
$π M N$	36.814	38.014	39.353	40.652	41.863	$π M O$	47.219	48.138	49.442	50.863	52.291
$π R N$	24.197	21.756	20.638	20.127	19.927	$π R O$	19.300	16.904	15.114	13.712	12.580
$π S C N$	61.011	59.770	59.991	60.779	61.790	$π S C O$	66.519	65.042	64.556	64.575	64.871
$D N$	2.772	2.380	2.210	2.132	2.098	$D O$	3.008	2.645	2.466	2.371	2.320
$π R O / π R N$	0.798	0.777	0.732	0.681	0.631	$A O / A N$	1.072	1.118	1.152	1.178	1.199
$π M O / π M N$	1.283	1.266	1.256	1.251	1.249	$p O / p N$	0.991	0.987	0.985	0.983	0.983
$w O / w N$	1.034	1.060	1.081	1.098	1.113	$D O / D N$	1.085	1.111	1.116	1.112	1.106

参数	$τ = 0.2$	$τ = 0.4$	$τ = 0.6$	$τ = 0.8$	$τ = 1$	参数	$τ = 0.2$	$τ = 0.4$	$τ = 0.6$	$τ = 0.8$	$τ = 1$
$w N$	4.401	4.489	4.578	4.666	4.754	$w O$	4.759	4.831	4.902	4.975	5.047
$A N$	4.465	4.272	4.083	3.896	3.712	$A O$	5.095	4.865	4.640	4.418	4.201
$p N$	6.427	6.459	6.491	6.524	6.557	$p O$	6.327	6.363	6.399	6.435	6.471
$G ∞ N$	5.877	5.786	5.697	5.608	5.520	$G ∞ O$	6.170	6.064	5.959	5.855	5.752
$π M N$	35.886	37.264	38.683	40.143	41.643	$π M O$	47.819	48.244	48.764	49.367	50.079
$π R N$	23.918	22.476	21.092	19.763	18.488	$π R O$	17.513	16.725	15.950	15.188	14.440
$π S C N$	59.804	59.740	59.775	59.906	60.131	$π S C O$	65.332	64.969	64.714	64.555	64.519
$D N$	2.458	2.367	2.278	2.191	2.105	$D O$	2.757	2.648	2.541	2.436	2.334
$π R O / π R N$	0.732	0.744	0.756	0.769	0.781	$A O / A N$	1.141	1.139	1.136	1.134	1.132
$π M O / π M N$	1.333	1.295	1.261	1.230	1.203	$p O / p N$	0.984	0.985	0.986	0.986	0.987
$w O / w N$	1.081	1.076	1.071	1.066	1.062	$D O / D N$	1.122	1.119	1.115	1.112	1.109

参数	$e ˉ = 1$	$e ˉ = 2$	$e ˉ = 3$	$e ˉ = 4$	$e ˉ = 5$	参数	$e ˉ = 1$	$e ˉ = 2$	$e ˉ = 3$	$e ˉ = 4$	$e ˉ = 5$
$w N$	4.578	4.578	4.578	4.578	4.578	$w O$	4.902	4.902	4.902	4.902	4.902
$A N$	4.083	4.083	4.083	4.083	4.083	$A O$	4.640	4.640	4.640	4.640	4.640
$p N$	6.491	6.491	6.491	6.491	6.491	$p O$	6.399	6.399	6.399	6.399	6.399
$G ∞ N$	3.878	4.787	5.697	6.606	7.515	$G ∞ O$	4.183	5.071	5.959	6.846	7.734
$π M N$	22.476	30.580	38.683	46.786	54.889	$π M O$	31.164	39.964	48.764	57.564	66.364
$π R N$	15.988	18.540	21.092	23.643	26.195	$π R O$	15.950	15.950	15.950	15.950	15.950
$π S C N$	38.464	49.12	59.775	70.429	81.084	$π S C O$	47.114	55.914	64.714	73.514	82.314
$D N$	1.551	1.915	2.278	2.642	3.006	$D O$	1.784	2.162	2.541	2.919	3.298
$π R O / π R N$	0.998	0.860	0.756	0.675	0.609	$A O / A N$	1.136	1.136	1.136	1.136	1.136
$π M O / π M N$	1.387	1.307	1.261	1.230	1.209	$p O / p N$	0.986	0.986	0.986	0.986	0.986
$w O / w N$	1.071	1.071	1.071	1.071	1.071	$D O / D N$	1.150	1.129	1.115	1.105	1.097

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A Differential Game Study of Supply Chain Considering Consumers' Green preference and Member's Behavior under Cap-and-trade Policy

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