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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 82-93.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1417

• Articles • Previous Articles    

Research of Incentive Mechanism for 3PL Based on Fairness Preference in Inventory Pledge Loan

WANG Lu, LIN Kai, CHEN Li-hua   

  1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing100871, China
  • Received:2020-07-23 Revised:2020-10-23 Published:2022-08-31
  • Contact: 王璐 E-mail:wanglu_18@pku.edu.cn

Abstract: Inventory pledge loan is an important financing method in supply chain finance. To solve the problem of operational funds shortage, firms approach the bank for a loan by pledging their products, semi-finished products and raw materials. In this process, third party logistics (3PL) plays an important role. Specifically, 3PLs are responsible for the supervision of pledges, and it’s obvious that the ability and effort level of 3PL will affect the supervision quality, which is very critical for determining whether the business can be carried out smoothly. However, information asymmetry always exists between the bank and 3PL, and those two elements are often private information of 3PL, which cannot be mastered by the bank in advance. On the other hand, many scholars have pointed out that the hypothesis of rational economic man is not entirely tenable, and supply chain members often pay great attention to fairness in reality.

Key words: inventory pledge loan; fairness preference; moral hazard; adverse selection; incentive mechanism

CLC Number: