突发公共卫生事件下企业委托代理问题与最优资本结构

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2120

Abstract

Abstract:

Public health emergencies is a new era proposition of the economic development. The epidemic affects the firms’ financial decisions， which has been widely concerned by government， firms， and scholars. The outbreak of COVID-19 led to a sharp rise in employee unemployment， causing huge losses to the economy. According to the National Bureau of Statistics， the unemployment rate reached 6.2%， and GDP in the first quarter fell by 6.8% in 2020. Faced with the impact of epdidemic， reasonable business decisions are very important. Thus， stochastic SIS model is incorporated into the continuous-time principle-agent model and the impact of epidemic on manager’s compensation and financing decisions is studied.The negative impact of the epidemic on the firm value is considered. Specifically， it is assumed that the shareholders hire agents to take charge of the business decisions of the firm. The profits after interest and tax， denoted by $d X t$ ， evolves as： $d X t = μ I t + a t d t + σ I t d Z t,$ where denote the state variable， infected population by $I t$ . An increase in the infected population $I t$ leads to a decrease in the growth rate $μ I t$ and an increase in corporate volatility $σ I t$ . $a t$ represents the effort level of agents， $μ I t$ at represents the growth rate of cash flow， $σ I t$ denotes the volatility of income and $Z t$ is a standard Brownian motion. Besides we assume that the infected population I_t is given by $d I t = [β (1 - I t) - η] I t d t + σ t I t (1 - I t) d Z t$ ， where β represents an effective transmission rate and η represents the rate at which infected individuals become cured. The numerical results show that： first， the relationship between optimal coupon and the transmission rate is negative； the relationship between optimal coupon and the uncertainty of the infected population is positive. Second， the relationship between agency cost and the transmission rate is positive， while the relationship between agency cost and the uncertainty of infected population is negative. Last， we also find that the epidemic reduces the optimal effort and exacerbates the debt overhang problem.

Key words: the stochastic SIS model, the contract theory, financing policies, agency cost

CLC Number:

F830

Pengfei Luo,Yanming Yao,Yingxian Tan. The Principal-agent Problem and Financing Policies under the Public Health Emergencies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(10): 47-56.

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The Principal-agent Problem and Financing Policies under the Public Health Emergencies

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