Abstract: Under the condition of trade friction, it is more and more common for domestic suppliers to participate in equipment development and innovation activities. As the representative of high-end equipment, the implementation of collaborative development of complex equipment in the context of national "civil military integration" can promote the upgrading and high-quality development of equipment. Supply disruption occurs frequently, how to deal with the situation of complete disruption and how to make use of the potential civil (military) suppliers and the main manufacturers to carry out collaborative innovation becomes a research difficulty. Based on the cooperation of complex equipment, this paper discusses the innovation of cooperative development. Taking the military (civil) suppliers who enters into the cooperative development of complex equipment as the starting point, and explores the impact of different types of suppliers' risk attitude (military, civil) on the overall collaborative innovation strategy, then discusses whether the incentive strategy of main manufacturers has any impact. Firstly, the production quantity and revenue function of the main manufacturers, military (civil) suppliers of collaborative innovation are constructed. Secondly, taking whether the main manufacturers share the cost of supplier collaborative innovation as the research point, considering the loss cost of collaborative innovation, then analyzes whether the main manufacturers have incentive to share the cost of collaborative innovation of complex equipment, constructs the corresponding Stackelberg game model, and calculates the equilibrium according to the Stackelberg model. Finally, with the help of the calculation results and numerical verification analysis, the external conditions for the implementation of collaborative innovation and the risk strategies for military (civil) supplier is obtained. The results show that: when the external interruption is small, the main manufacturer and military (civil) suppliers could participate in the complex equipment development process cooperatively, and military (civil) supplier automatically choose to bear the loss cost of collaborative innovation, which is conducive to the implementation of collaborative innovation and the maximization of profits in the supply chain. At the same time, the more cautious risk strategy the military (civil) supplier adopts, the more conducive to the optimal process innovation degree and the optimal value of assembly innovation degree. It is also beneficial for the main manufacturer to implement the process innovation cost sharing strategy, the more favorable. This paper analyzes the influence of suppliers' risk attitude on the incentive strategy of complex equipment collaborative innovation activities, which it is under the possible conditions of external interruption, and provides some reference for the conditions of complex equipment civil military collaborative development, and the risk strategy selection of civil military suppliers participate are discussed.

Key words: military（civilian）supplier, main manufacturer, complex equipment, collaborative innovation, risk strategy