虽然顾客重视产品的质量（可靠性），但其在做出购买决策时往往不能完全掌握产品的质量信息。不同质量的产品可能具有不同生产和保修成本，因此保修期和销售价格可以成为传递产品质量的有效信号。考虑市场上存在相互竞争的两个生产商：在位者和新进者，顾客了解在位者的产品质量信息但不了解新进者的质量状况。研究并比较了仅保修期作为单质量信号、保修期和价格同时作为质量信号时，市场实现分离均衡的条件，以及新进者的保修期设计与定价决策。研究表明：在保修期作为单质量信号时，只要高质量新进者的单位时间保修成本小于低质量新进者，即可实现分离均衡；在保修期和价格同时作为质量信号时，当满足某些条件时也可实现分离均衡。相对于保修期作单质量信号的情形，当保修期和价格同作质量信号时，高质量新进者实现分离均衡所需提供的保修期更短、价格更低（信息租金更少），且能获得更高的市场份额和利润。最后，数值分析表明保修期和价格同作质量信号时所需满足的条件是比较宽松的，比保修期单独作质量信号时更容易实现分离均衡。
Although consumers pay much attention on product quality (reliability), they may be uncertain about the quality information when the purchase decision is made. The manufacturer who provides high-quality products may have a different production and warranty cost structure from that with low-quality products. Hence, the high-quality manufacturer can signal its quality information by the retail price and the warranty period. Wise consumers can deduce quality information according to price and warranty period jointly. However, the extant researches examine the signaling effect of warranty and price individually.
In this study, a novel signal model consisting of both warranty and price is proposed. A market consisting of an incumbent manufacturer and an entrant one is considered. The consumers are aware of the product quality of the incumbent manufacturer, but are uncertain whether the product quality of the entrant is high or low. The existence of separating equilibriums, and the pricing and warranty decisions of the two manufacturers when the quality information is signaled solely by warranty or jointly by both price and warranty are investigated. It is shown that there exists a separating equilibrium as long as the high-quality entrant holds a smaller marginal warranty cost than the low-quality one when quality is signaled solely by warranty. When quality is signaled jointly by warranty and price, there exists a separating equilibrium under some mild conditions. In addition, the equilibrium warranty is shorter and the price is lower when quality is jointly signaled by price and warranty than solely by warranty. Finally, the numerical analysis shows that there is more likely to be a separating equilibrium when quality is jointly signaled by warranty and price.
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