董事责任保险作为上市公司治理的重要避险工具，在改善公司治理绩效的同时，也可能引发董事的道德风险，损害公司价值。董事责任保险参与公司治理能否产生积极的经济后果，显著提升企业价值，尚有待经验证据检验。为了深入探究董事责任保险对企业价值的影响机理，文章基于公司治理视角，以2007年-2015年我国沪深两市A股上市公司的数据为样本，采用倾向得分匹配方法，在控制样本自选择偏差后，研究董事责任保险购买决策对公司价值的影响。实证结果显示，不论以财务还是以会计绩效衡量，购买董事责任保险均能够显著提升公司价值。研究结论揭示了董事责任保险的综合治理效应，提供了转型经济下董事责任保险对公司价值整体影响的经验证据。
Directors' and officers' liability insurance(D&O insurance) as an important hedging tools for corporate governance can improve corporate performance, however may lead to moral hazard which impairs firm values at the same time. China's special institutional environment may lead to the listed companies in China for the purchase motivation and economic consequences of liability insurance and the western developed countries have significant differences.Whether the D&O insurance which participate in corporate governance can produce positive economic consequences, and significantly enhance the value of enterprises, but also to be tested by empirical evidence.In order to further explore the mechanism influence of D&O insurance on corporate value, the data of listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2007 to 2015 are analyzed.The variables of the decision making of D&O insurance may also affect the value of the company, ignoring the endogenous problem will lead to the error of the estimation result. After controlling sample self-selection bias,the propensity score matching method is used to study the influence of the D&O insurance purchase decision on the value of the company. Whether it is financial or accounting performance to measure the value of the company, Empirical evidence indicates that purchasing D&O insurancepolicy can significantly improve corporate value.The research results reveal the comprehensive governance effect of D&O insurance, and provide the empirical evidence of the impact of D&O insurance on corporate value in the transitional economy.
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