在"互联网+"的大环境下，考虑网络平台的公平关切影响，对不同主导模式下的E-闭环供应链的销售、回收进行研究。文章构建了无公平关切制造商主导、无公平关切网络平台主导、考虑公平关切制造商主导、考虑公平关切网络平台主导的E-闭环供应链四种决策模式。针对每种模型，分析了相应的销售价格、服务水平、回收价格和最优利润等决策变量。研究发现：（1）无论网络平台是否考虑公平关切，制造商主导情况下的销售价格、服务水平和制造商利润均高于网络平台主导的情况；（2）闭环供应链的回收价格只与加工成本、回收再造成本和网络平台收取的回收服务佣金有关；（3）公平关切都会使产品销售价格、服务水平和制造商的利润降低；（4）当网络平台主导系统时，公平关切程度较低，网络平台的利润大于制造商主导时的利润，但当公平关切程度较大时，网络平台的利润则小于制造商主导时的利润。（5）当制造商主导系统时，网络平台的利润随其公平关切的程度先增后减。（6）公平关切相当于让利于消费者，且公平关切程度越大，对消费者的让利幅度越大，对制造商越不利。但在实际中，当网络平台主导系统时，网络平台并不会主动进行公平关切，而在制造商主导系统的情况下，网络平台会考虑一定程度的公平关切，或者由于受消费者的信任压力、政府部门的管理要求和竞争等因素的影响，而不得不考虑公平关切问题。文章的研究结论进一步丰富完善了E-闭环供应链的理论基础。
With the rapid development of the Internet, more and more manufacturers prefer to choose the E-closed loop supply chain system which has more opportunities and a larger market. However, with the growth of consumers' purchasing power and awareness of rights in online-shopping, a large number of customers require a network platform to be fairer, making fairness concern to be a key of E-closed loop supply chain's development.
Based on the E-closed loop supply chain which consists of a manufacturer and, third-party network platform, four kinds of decision-making models including are constructed:E-CLSC dominated by manufacturer without fairness concern, E-CLSC dominated by network platform without fairness concern, E-CLSC dominated by manufacturer with fairness concern, E-CLSC dominated by network platform with fairness concern.
In these four models,The profit function of manufacturer is:
πM=(p-cn)(Q-Qo)+(p-co-po)Qo-ρpQ-λQo
The profit function of network platform is:
πN=ρpQ+λQo-ks2/2
In these functions, cn is the cost of manufacturer producing new productions; co is the cost of manufacturer using wasted products to make recycled goods; p is sales price; po is recycling price; s is network platform's service level provided to selling and recycling (assuming the cost of service is ρ(0<ρ<1)); p > cn > co+po > po > 0 is market demand; Qo is market recovery amount; ρ(0<ρ<1)represents commission rate of unit sales charged by network platform; Q(p)=α-βp+γs is commission of unit recycling of wasted goods.
According to the profit functions of manufacturer and network platform, by using Stackelberg Game, the sale price, service level, recycling price and profit of each model are calculated and analyzed.
The findings can be drawn that:(1) Whether or not network platform concerned fairness, the sales price, the service level and the manufacturer's profit are all higher with dominant manufacturer than the dominant network platform. (2)The recycling price in CLSC is only influenced by the production cost, the recycling cost and the recycling commission charged by network platform.(3)The fairness concern could decrease the sales price, service level and manufacturer's profit.(4)When the fairness concern's degree is lower, the profit of network platform is higher with the dominant network platform than dominant manufacturer. But when the fairness concern's degree is higher, the profit of network platform is lower with the dominant network platform than dominant manufacturer. (5)When the manufacturer is dominated, the profit of network platform increases firstly and then decreases with the growth of fairness concern's degree. (6) In reality, the network platform would not consider fairness forwardly when it is dominated. However, when the manufacturer is dominated, the network platform would consider fairness.Moreover, because of the pressure of consumer's trust, government's requirement and the competition between enterprises, the network platform has to consider fairness.
The conclusion of this article further enriched the theoretical foundation of E-closed loop supply chain.
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