非对称信息和风险态度成为影响供应链协调的重要因素,而契约机制设计是实现协调的一种方法。本文在双边成本信息不对称情形下研究供应链契约机制的设计问题。考虑了由一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险规避的销售商组成的二级供应链,供应商和销售商分别拥有私人的生产成本信息和销售成本信息。在分散决策下,供销双方为获得更好的私人利得从而有隐藏信息的动机。为实现信息的真实揭示,文中引入了利他委托人这一概念,从而供应链成为协调主体。借助AGV机制思想,设计了具有激励性质的转移支付,并且基于均值-方差方法建立了非对称信息下的供应链模型。我们发现销售商风规避度在一定范围时,所设计的激励机制能够实现供销双方信息的真实揭示,但并不能完全保证双方的事后非负收益。为解决这一问题,给出一种以期望信息租金比为基础的事后收益分配规则,设计了补偿参数。结合转移支付和补偿参数,提出了一个契约机制。我们发现当销售商风规避度不超过上界kr时,该机制能真实的揭示信息,并且能够保证供销双方的事后合理的收益分配。此外,当供销双方真实揭示信息时,风险规避度较大的销售商组成的供应链有更低商品交易量和供应链收益。最后,给出数值算例,验证信息揭示的激励有效性并对风险规避度进行敏感性分析。本文的研究将对双边不对称信息下的供应链管理提供一定的理论基础和实践指导。
Asymmetric information is an important factor for affecting supply chain coordination, and designing contract mechanism is a method of achieving coordination. The problem of contract mechanism designing under bilateral asymmetric information structure is investigated in this paper. More specifically, a supply chain is considered consisting of one risk-neural supplier and one risk-averse retailer who have their private information regarding the production cost and retail cost, respectively. In a decentralized setting, the supplier and the retailer both have motivations to conceal their private information for better performance. To realize the efficient incentives, the conception of benevolent principal is introduced,thus the whole supply chain can be seen as the coordination subject. By virtue of the idea of the AGV (d' Aspremont and Gerard-Varet) mechanism, the incentive transfer payments is designed and a bilateral asymmetric information model of supply chain using mean-variance (MV) approach is constructed. It is found hat when the retailer's risk aversion degree is in some range, the designed incentive transfer payments based on AGV mechanism can only reveal the private information of two parties truthfully, but can not ensure their ex post nonnegative benefits. In order to overcome this issue, an ex-post allocation rule is presented that associated with the proportion of the expected information rents, and design the corresponding compensation parameters. Combining the transfer payments and the compensation parameters, a contract mechanism is proposed.It shows that the contract mechanism can reveal the private information truthfully and ensure the expost reasonable profits if the retailer's risk aversion degree does not exceed the upper bound kr. When the supplier and retailer reveal their information truthfully, the supply chain with more risk aversion retailer has lower optimal commodity trading quantity and supply chain performance. Finally, one numerical example is presented to examine the incentive effectiveness for information revealing and analyze the sensitivity of the risk aversion degree.Some theoretical basis and practical guidance for bilateral asymmetric supply chain management will be provided in our research.
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