资金支持还是劳动联合？第三方回收动态闭环供应链合作模式选择

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2575

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文研究了在第三方回收下单个制造商、单个零售商以及单个第三方回收商组成的闭环供应链中的回收合作策略选择问题。构建了制造商提供资金支持或劳动联合的动态回收微分博弈模型，求解得到无合作模式、资金支持模式以及劳动联合模式下的最优定价、回收投入、成本分担比例及各方利润水平。以无合作模型为参考，分析比较了不同合作回收模式对产品回收率、定价、市场需求以及利润的影响，得到以下结论：（1）制造商的回收合作总有助于提高产品回收率，且制造商、零售商和第三方能够在合作模式下达成帕累托改善；（2）相较于资金支持，劳动联合在提高产品回收率上更为有效，且对制造商来说更有利可图；（3）进一步将模型扩展到了制造商和第三方回收成本存在差异的情况，此时仅当制造商成本显著高于第三方时，制造商才能在资金支持模式下能获得更多利润。相比单纯向第三方回收商提供资金支持这一合作方式，制造商积极参与到回收活动中是更有效的合作方式。

关键词: 动态闭环供应链, 第三方回收, 合作回收, 资金支持, 劳动联合

Abstract:

Remanufacturing offers numerous advantages， including the reduction of natural resource consumption， the mitigation of pollutant emissions， the decrease in carbon emissions， and cost savings. The collection of used products plays a crucial role in remanufacturing and has gained significant attention from both academia and industry. Existing studies primarily focus on a single supply chain member being responsible for product collection. However， in practical scenarios， if a supply chain member solely undertakes the collection process， it will incur substantial costs and result in a low return rate. Therefore， it is essential to extend recycling responsibility to the entire supply chain and enhance the return rate through cooperative collection.Currently， supply chain members engage in cooperative collection through two methods： fund-cooperative and labor-cooperative. Fund-cooperative refers to the manufacturer providing financial support to alleviate the cost burden of the recycler， indirectly influencing the return rate of the supply chain. Labor-cooperative， on the other hand， involves manufacturers participating in collecting activities to assist the recycler in completing challenging tasks such as product transportation and consumer advertising， thereby directly impacting the return rate of the supply chain. For the manufacturer， it is crucial to explore their motivation to support the recycler's collecting activities and determine the most advantageous form of cooperation. A third-party recycler responsible for product collection is considered， with the manufacturer providing either fund-cooperative or labor-cooperative programs to the third party. The main problems addressed in this study are as follows： 1） What are the optimal strategies and profits for the manufacturer， retailer， and third party under different cooperation modes？ 2） How do different cooperation modes affect product return rates， prices， and market demand？ 3） Which cooperation mode is more advantageous for the manufacturer， and how do different cooperation modes impact the retailer and third party？To address these questions， we formulate a dynamic collection differential game model in which the manufacturer provides either fund-cooperative or labor-cooperative to the third party. An open-loop control strategy is employed to determine the optimal strategies and profits under non-cooperative， fund-cooperative， and labor-cooperative modes. By using the non-cooperative mode as a benchmark， the following results are drawn： 1） Cooperative collection consistently contributes to higher collection rates， enabling the manufacturer， retailer， and third party to achieve a Pareto improvement through such collaboration； 2） Compared to fund-cooperative， labor-cooperative is more effective in enhancing the return rate and generating higher profits for the manufacturer； 3） The model is further extended to consider situations where the collection costs of the manufacturer and third party differ. The results indicate that the fund-cooperative mode is more advantageous to the manufacturer only when the collection cost coefficient is relatively higher for the third party. Actively participating in collection activities， rather than solely providing financial support to the third party， proves to be a more effective cooperation mode for the manufacturer.

Key words: dynamic closed-loop supply chain, cooperative collection, third-party collection, fund-cooperative, labor-cooperative

中图分类号:

F270

黄宗盛, 张媛, 曾令康. 资金支持还是劳动联合？第三方回收动态闭环供应链合作模式选择[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(7): 262-271.

Zongsheng Huang, Yuan Zhang, Lingkang Zeng. Funding or Laboring? Cooperative Collection Strategy Selection in Dynamic Closed-loop Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(7): 262-271.

图/表 7

表1

模型参数定义"

参数	模型含义
$c m, c r$	利用原材料生产产品的单位成本，利用废旧产品进行再制造的单位成本
$Δ$	再制造节约的单位生产成本
$b$	制造商向第三方支付的单位废旧产品转移价格
$ρ$	回收投入水平对产品回收率变化的影响程度
$δ$	回收率的衰减系数
$ϕ$	市场总容量
$β$	产品的需求系数
$k$	回收成本系数
$θ$	制造商和第三方回收成本系数间的比值系数
$τ t$	$t$ 时刻废旧产品的回收率，其中 $τ 0$ 为0时刻的产品回收率
$w t$	$t$ 时刻产品的批发价
$p t$	$t$ 时刻产品的零售价
$A i t$	$t$ 时刻回收投入水平，其中 $i = m, 3 p$ 分别表示制造商和第三方
$λ 3 p t$	$t$ 时刻制造商的成本分担比例
$J i j$	模型 $j$ 下 $i$ 的目标函数，其中 $j = N C, F C, L C$ 分别代表非合作模型、资金支持模型和劳动联合模型； $i = m, r, 3 p$ 分别代表制造商、零售商和第三方
$Π i j$	模型 $j$ 下 $i$ 的利润率

表1

图1

图2

图3

图4

图5

图6

参考文献 26

[1]	Atasu A， Sarvary M， Van Wassenhove L N. Remanufacturing as a marketing strategy［J］. Management Science， 2008， 54（10）： 1731-1746.
[2]	Savaskan R C， Bhattacharya S， Van Wassenhove L N. Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing［J］.Management Science，2004，50（2）： 239-252.
[3]	Subramanian R， Gupta S， Talbot B. Product design and supply chain coordination under extended producer responsibility［J］. Production and Operations Management， 2009， 18（3）： 259-277.
[4]	黄宗盛，聂佳佳，胡培. 基于微分对策的第三方回收再制造闭环供应链回收策略研究［J］. 运筹与管理， 2013， 22（3）： 61-70.
	Huang Z S， Nie J J， Hu P. Dynamic model of third-party collecting closed-loop supply chain［J］. Operations Research and Management Science， 2013， 22（3）： 61-70.
[5]	冯章伟，肖条军，柴彩春. 第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略［J］. 中国管理科学， 2018， 26（1）： 118-127.
	Feng Z W， Xiao T J， Chai C C. Recycling and pricing strategies of closed-loop supply chain by the leader of third-party recycler［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2018， 26（1）： 118-127.
[6]	马祖军，胡书，代颖. 政府规制下混合渠道销售/回收的电器电子产品闭环供应链决策［J］. 中国管理科学， 2016， 24（1）： 82-90.
	Ma Z J， Hu S， Dai Y. Decision models for a closed-loop supply chain with hybrid sale/collection channels for electrical and electronic equipment under government regulations［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2016， 24（1）： 82-90.
[7]	公彦德，蒋雨薇，达庆利. 不同混合回收模式和权力结构的逆向供应链决策分析［J］. 中国管理科学， 2020， 28（10）： 131-143.
	Gong Y D， Jiang Y W， Da Q L. Decision analysis of reverse supply chain with different mixture recycling modes and power structures［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2020， 28（10）： 131-143.
[8]	Shekarian E， Marandi A， Majava J. Dual-channel remanufacturing closed-loop supply chains under carbon footprint and collection competition［J］. Sustainable Production and Consumption， 2021， 28： 1050-1075.
[9]	Suvadarshini P， Biswas I， Srivastava S K. Impact of reverse channel competition， individual rationality， and information asymmetry on multi-channel closed-loop supply chain design［J］. International Journal of Production Economics， 2023， 259： 108818.
[10]	汪翼，孙林岩，李刚，等. 闭环供应链的回收责任分担决策［J］. 系统管理学报，2009， 18（4）： 378-384.
	Wang Y， Sun L Y， Li G， et al. Sharing take-back responsibility across closed-loop supply chain［J］.Journal of Systems & Management，2009，18（4）： 378-384.
[11]	Cheng J S， Li B Y， Gong B G， et al. The optimal power structure of environmental protection responsibilities transfer in remanufacturing supply chain［J］. Journal of Cleaner Production， 2017， 153（1）： 558-569.
[12]	Jacobs B W， Subramanian R. Sharing responsibility for product recovery across the supply chain［J］. Production and Operations Management， 2012， 21（1）： 85-100.
[13]	Nie J J， Huang Z S， Zhao Y X， et al. Collective recycling responsibility in closed-loop fashion supply chains with a third party： Financial sharing or physical sharing？［J］. Mathematical Problems in Engineering， 2013， 2013： 176130.
[14]	Tojo N， Lindhqvist T， Davis G. EPR programme implementation： Institutional and structural factors. In Proceedings of OECD Seminar on EPR： EPR Programme Implementation and Assessment［R］.Part2： Assessing EPR Policies and Programmes， 2003.
[15]	Pazoki M， Zaccour G. Extended producer responsibility： Regulation design and responsibility sharing policies for a supply chain［J］. Journal of Cleaner Production， 2019， 236： 117516.
[16]	Ji Y， Yang H， Qu S J， Nabe M. Optimal strategy for a closed-loop supply chain considering recycling and warranty channels［J］. Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering， 2021， 46（2）： 1585-1601.
[17]	刘珊，姚锋敏，陈东彦，等. 回收竞争下考虑CSR行为的闭环供应链定价决策及协调［J］. 中国管理科学， 2022， 30（4）： 205-217.
	Liu S， Yao F M， Chen D Y， et al. Pricing and coordination strategies of closed-loop supply chain considering CSR behavior under recycling competition［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2022， 30（4）： 205-217.
[18]	Shi Y， Nie J J， Qu T， et al. Choosing reverse channels under collection responsibility sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with re-manufacturing［J］. Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing， 2015， 26（2）： 387-402.
[19]	Jian H Y， Xu M L， Zhou L. Collaborative collection effort strategies based on the “Internet + recycling” business model［J］. Journal of Cleaner Production， 2019， 241： 118120.
[20]	夏西强，路梦圆，陈彪，等.分类回收费用承担模式对回收渠道影响及协调机制研究［J］.中国管理科学，2023，31（2）：228-239.
	Xia X Q， Lu M Y， Chen B， et al. Research on the impact of the classification recycling expenses bearing mode on the recovery channels and the coordination mechanism［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2023，31（2）：228-239.
[21]	Ma Z J， Zhang N， Dai Y， et al. Managing channel profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chains［J］. Omega， 2016， 59： 251-262.
[22]	石纯来，崔春晖，胡培，等. 政府奖惩机制对闭环供应链制造商合作策略影响［J］. 管理评论， 2021， 33（7）： 282-289.
	Shi C L， Cui C H， Hu P， et al. The effects of premium and penalty mechanism on manufacturer’s cooperative strategies in the closed-loop supply chain［J］.Management Review，2021，33（7）： 282-289.
[23]	肖旦，聂珊珊. 回收商相互竞争下闭环供应链成员的竞合策略［J］. 系统工程学报， 2021，36（6）： 833-850.
	Xiao D， Nie S S. Members’ co-opetition strategy in closed-loop supply chains with competing recyclers［J］. Journal of Systems Engineering， 2021， 36（6）： 833-850.
[24]	Zheng B R， Wen K， Liang J， et al. Alliance or cost-sharing？ Recycling cooperation mode selection in a closed-loop supply chain［J］. Sustainable Production and Consumption， 2022， 32： 942-955.
[25]	黄宗盛，聂佳佳，赵映雪. 再制造闭环供应链产品回收合作模式研究［J］. 管理工程学报， 2019， 33（3）： 147-152.
	Huang Z S， Nie J J， Zhao Y X. The cooperation recovery strategies across the closed-loop supply chain［J］. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management， 2019， 33（3）： 147-152.
[26]	Huang Z S， Nie J J， Tsai S B. Dynamic collection strategy and coordination of a remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under uncertainty［J］.Sustainability， 2017， 9（5）： 683.